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Adl벅r

Implementation research , an area once largely ignored in
favor of policy design and impact assessment , now
constitutes a significant portion of the policy analysis
literature.

One of the key issues addressed by the theory

building portion of that literature is the necessity of
precisely identifying implementation variables , conditions
。r

actions that measurably contribute to the success or

2

failure of implementation efforts over a broad range of
policies and programs , and to then suggest some order of
significance. In order to test the validity of a variable
set proposed by the literature , a multivariate
implementation model was employed as the basis of a case
study designed to conduct both a process and impact analysis
。f

the implementation of the Water Resources Development Act

。f

1986 (WRDA 86) •
Implementation of the WRDA 86 was selected for this

research as it offered an opportunity to investigate
implementation of a significant policy change in an
established policy arena , the water resource development
industry.

Following ten years of failure to achieve

agreement on an omnibus water resource appropriation ,
passage of the WRDA 86 was widely perceived to have signaled
a new era of water

re~ource

development for the nation.

It

will likely be a period characterized by the transfer of the
financial burden of planning , construction , and maintenance
。f

water resource projects from the Federal government

the non-Federal sponsor/beneficiary.

t。

The transfer will be

achieved by application of cost-sharing formulas contained
in WRDA 86 and affirmed in subsequent biannual omnibus water
resource development legislation.
Cost-sharing and similar beneficiary-pay principles had
long been considered as an efficient alternative to water
resource programs which relied principally on Federal

3

funding owing to the long held assumption that the benefits
from such projects were so "widespread and general" as to be
in the national interest.

Incorporation of cost-sharing

principles in water resource legislation ensured that
appropriation language would require local project
beneficiaries to assume a larger portion of project costs.
In addition to the assumption that application of the
principles would lead to economically efficient projects it
was also

ar당ued

that cost-sharing and increased local

sponsor input would lead to smaller projects that better
reflected local need , projects with greater emphasis on
environmental concerns , and the construction of projects in
stages or phases.
The research proceeded with an implementation process
analysis to test the model ’ s assumption that specific
variables or conditions may be identified as having the
greatest significance in the achievement of successful
implementation.

Furthermore , the study attempted

t。

determine whether identified groups at different "levels" of
the implementation hierarchy would rank specified variables
consistently or result in a finding that variable
criticality rankings tend to reflect one ’ s position within
the hierarchy.
study outcomes did not confirm the model ’ s assertion
with respect to which variables were most critical. This

4

finding may have reflected the fact that conditions thought
to be most critical by the model , clear legal directives and
legislation that reflects sound theory , were largely issues
that had been thoroughly discussed and
enactment of the legislation.

resolved prior

t。

position within the hierarchy

appeared to influence the rater ’ s assignment of variable
criticality though not to a statistically significant
degree.

The differences , however , were intuitively

consistent and their basis supported by secondary survey
data.

This finding suggests that future implementation

studies need to carefully examine the role of hierarchical
position and intergovernmental interdependencies in theory
development.
with respect to the impact analysis , it was determined
that cost sharing would have a demonstrable impact on
resulting projects in a variety of areas.

Future cost-

shared water resource development projects will likely be
smaller on average than past projects though the precise
impact of cost-sharing is indeterminable.

Projects may

result in less impact on the environment but largely as a
result of reduced size rather than the additional
environmental input of local sponsors. Phased and staged
construction of large projects will be more likely ,
particularly where project benefits and revenue streams may
be partially captured by incremental construction.

Dedicated

T。
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The focus of this research involves an implementation
analysis of the Water Resources Development Act of 1986
(which shall hereinafter be referred to as the WRDA 1986) by
the united states Army Corps of Engineers with specific
treatment of the development and execution of the
Act ’ s cost sharing provisions. The signing into law of the
WRDA 1986 on November 17 , 1986 by President Ronald Reagan
was widely and correctly perceived to have signaled a new
era of water resource development , a period characterized
by:
1. The further transfer of the financial burden of
water resource planning , development , and maintenance from
the Federal 당。vernment to non-Federal project sponsors
(beneficiaries);
2. The emergence of a Federal Interest/Sponsor
environment" that promised to sUbstantively
modify the qualitative dimension of intergovernmental
resource development relationships;

’'partnership

3. A tenuous resolution of the struggle between the
executive and legislative branch of the Federal government
to control Federal water resource development policy.
The WRDA 1986 was a singularly important legislative
act for a variety of reasons.

As the first Omnibus water

2

appropriation in ten years , the Act authorized 377 projects
for construction or study including 43 port projects , 7
inland waterway projects , 115 flood control projects , 24
shoreline protection projects , 61 water resource
conservation and development projects , 38 studies , and 63
project modifications (Reuss 1990).
impor~ance

Notwithstanding the

of the authorized projects , the overriding

significance of the Act rests with the perception that , with
its passage , Federal water resource development was brought
"back on track" following a decade of often acrimonious
controversy over the appropriate role of Federal investment
in water resource development and the relationship of
Congress and the Executive branch in the development and
execution of water resource development policy.

Owing

t。

disagreement between theExecutive and Congress on such
broad but interrelated issues as project selection criteria ,
geographic distribution of capital investment , and cost
sharing requirements for non-Federal beneficiaries
。mnibus

n。

water resource legislation had passed since 1976.

The result was a significant "backlog" of projects awaiting
either authorization or funding.

The loss of consensus

between the executive and legislative branches on priorities
and the role of beneficiaries had effectively stopped the
great water projects engine.
It was widely acknowledged that the Corps had fallen on
hard times in the 1970s as it struggled to meet its mission

3

in the "constrained needs of a postindustrial , debt ridden ,
and service based economy" that was experiencing the rise of
the environmental movement compounded by the decline of
development interests (National Journal 1986 , 2822).
Immediately prior to the passage of the WRDA 1986 , the Corps
。f

Engineers noted that of the 106 ongoing construction

projects only six were begun after 1979 with $16 billion of
authorized projects awaiting construction funding and $13
billion in projects awaiting authorization (Wall 1985 , 22).
By 1983 , the Corps for the first time in its history spent
more money on operation and maintenance of projects than on
new start construction.

Over the course of this era , cost

sharing emerged as the dominant intergovernmental water
resource development issue requiring resolution.
As advocated by the Administrations of both President
Carter and Reagan , cost sharing by the non-Federal
beneficiary represented a best alternative , a practical and
efficient method of determining: 1) a beneficiary ’ s true
desire for a given project as evidenced by willingness

t。

invest , 2) optimal project size as mediated by the
beneficiaries willingness to pay , 3) a more economically
efficient method of allocating scarce Federal resources
while reducing the actual size of the Federal obligation.
As it was an Executive initiative it came as no surprise
that cost sharing , in the form it came to assume in the WRDA
1986 , also expanded the direct involvement of the Executive

4

branch , particularly the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB)

,

in establishing broad project selection criteria ,

authorization of cost ceilings , and approval of all cost
sharing arrangements reached with non-Federal interests.
While the economic logic of cost sharing realized the
support of a broad and eclectic range of interests , some of
which favored the measure for little more than its potential
to act as a constraint on development , it was not without it
detractors.

The concept of cost shared planning was soundly

rooted in applied microeconomic theory.

Alas , that same

body of work noted that the efficiencies achieved by
application of cost shared planning principles came at the
expense of reduced subsidization of marginally efficient
pUblic works.

Predictably , institutional interests which

had enjoyed a long history of delivering subsidized pUblic
works projects to their constituencies and those interests
which benefited from such Federal largess were opposed

t。

dramatically changing the traditional water resource
development calculus.
As is often the case , the removal or reduction of a
longstanding sUbsidy is perceived not so

I임uch

as a move

toward a more rational and equitable method of financing but
as a method of indirectly raising taxes.

A discussion of

this phenomena is offered in that section of Chapter II
which deals with the nature of pUblic goods and their

5

efficient provision.
As is so frequently the case , the opposing point of
view on a policy matter is not muted by "losing" in or being
excluded from the legislative arena.

The implementation

phase of pUblic policy provides such "losers" an opportunity
to revisit issues in hopes of influencing this stage of the
policy process (Rein , 1978).

Indeed , as late as June , 1985

OMB expressed concern that Congress would fail to require
cost sharing and user fees in the omnibus authorization (8
366) that was to become the WRDA 1986 (Congressional
Quarterly 1985 , 1239) and requested that the legislation
expressly prohibit the expenditure of funds for any
authorized project until a cost sharing agreement had been
executed.

The concern was shared by cost share advocates in

the Administration and Congress who fought to strictly limit
the number of projects that could be legislatively excluded
from cost share provisions.

This was done to preclude the

gradual erosion of the policy initiative by anti-cost share
legislators who might attempt to exempt projects ,
individually or by class , from cost share requirements in
sUbsequent legislation.
While the enactment of cost sharing provisions in the
WRDA 1986 was perceived by many as a tentative first step
toward establishing cost share principles as critical
planning elements in water resource development , it

als。

represented a significant change in the Army Corps of
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Engineers ’ (COE) approach to project planning and
development.
。 ccasioned

The "Partnership in Planning" model ,

by the additional financial contribution now

required of the non-Federal partner , presented a variety of
。pportunities

and challenges to the Corps and the non-

Federal interests.

Not the least of these involved

addressing the negotiation of "engineering and design"
issues which had heretofore been the express domain of the
Corps; a fact attested to by the thousands of pages of
regulations , circulars , pamphlets , and guidelines authored
and compiled by the agency over the years.

Absent local

budget constraints , the Corps had typically designed to the
highest engineering standard.

The engineering solution

proposed by local interests promised to offer a somewhat
more austere approach given the limited financial capacity
。f

most non-Federal interests and their desire to design a

project which met their specific needs rather than one which
necessarily met national benefits criteria.
the role of the new partner in deciding which

What was to be
en딩 ineering

solution was right?
From the perspective of non-Federal interests , the
issue of financing capital water resource development
projects in an environment of cost estimate uncertainty ,
largely a non-problem when construction was financed
the Federal government , presented an equally complex

100옹

by
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challenge.

Unlike the Federal government , the non-Federal

interest typically had strictly limited financial resources ,
a far shorter project planning horizon , and an interested
constituency.

For better or worse , all parties concerned

agreed that the WRDA 1986 promised to offer a unique
experience in intergovernmental cooperation.
In an attempt to offer a mUlti-perspective evaluation
。f

the implementation of the WRDA 1986 and its impact on the

water resource development planning process this research
focuses on two fundamental aspects of the implementation: 1)
a process analysis which attempts.to evaluate how well
specific theory based implementation models explain or
account for the inter-interest dynamics of the
implementation process , and 2) an impact analysis which
attempts to reveal the

ac~ual

and .likely project impacts of

implementing cost shared planning and development.
This approach was adopted to provide a broad
unders~anding

of the "end-product" impact of implementing

significant pOlicy change in the water resource development
arena and to expand upon that understanding by

evaluatin딩

the process in the context of models that reflect what we
know (or believe we know) about the implementation of pUblic
policy.

This effort is undertaken primarily to contribute

to the further refinement of the body of knowledge on
conceptual approaches to policy implementation.
Additionally , it is hoped that the findings of this research

8

may be utilized more generally to provide a rational basis
for the practitioner to determine strategy alternatives with
regard to limited resource allocation in the design of an
。ptimal

implementation strategy.

To provide a foundation for the process analysis , the
research examined the literature on implementation and
selected from several existing implementation models a
series of variables that have been identified as important
in the successful implementation of pUblic policy.

These

variables , in combination with variables identified by this
researcher , were combined in a survey instrument designed

t。

elicit from participants involved in the implementation
process data on the relative significance of various
identified aspects (hereinafter referred to as conditions)
。f

implementation.

For the purpose of the survey and

statistical analysis , the participants were grouped

int。

cohorts in accordance with the criteria set forth in the
selected implementation model.

This structure provided an

。pportunity

to test the statistical significance of recorded

differences

betweεn

groups identified as being at different

"levels" of the implementation process.

This aspect of the

research was undertaken both to'test the explanatory
capacity. of the model and its underlying theory and ,
hopefully , to thereby expand our working knowledge of inter
and intragovernmental policy implementation.

9

The project impact analysis focused on the
identification and assessment of how distinguishable
features of projects were modified or re-scoped as a result
。f

planning under cost share principles.

This approach was

selected to illustrate the empirical impact (scope , size ,
feature , etc.) of cost sharing on projects originally
planned or conceived under traditional Federal funding
guidelines and to determine the probable impacts on future
projects developed under cost shared planning principles.
The analysis for this effort proceeded with a
straightforward comparison of a sample of projects
。riginally

authorized and planned prior to the enactment of

the WRDA 1986 which subsequently required reauthorization
under the Act and were thus sUbject to project plan
renegotiation with the non-Federal interest.

These

projects , which represent a unique sample of projects
planned under both traditional and cost shared planning
principles , provide data that establishes a basis for
examining the existence and characteristics of empirical
differences between cost shared projects and those fully
funded by the Federal government.

Comparable data from

projects authorized under sUbsequent omnibus water resource
development legislation (the WRDA 1988 and the WRDA 1990) is
then analyzed to see if confirming evidence exists

t。

support the predicted impacts.
While it is not the intention of this research

t。

10

provide the reader with a definitive history of either the
role of the Army Corps of Engineers in water resource
development or the development of intergovernmental cost
sharing as pUblic policy , it will be necessary to offer some
background on both sUbjects to provide context for the
ensuing discussion.

With that historical context in place ,

the analysis will then

proy~de

a mUlti-perspective

examination of the projects , people , and processes that
comprised the implementation of the WRDA 1986.
It is the intention of this research to contribute

t。

an understanding of the extent to which cost sharing has
affected Federally assisted water resource development since
the passage of the WRDA 1986.

Moreover , data are offered

t。

suggest the impact cost sharing will have on the future of
water resource development in this nation and to provide
some idea of the predicted footprint of that impact as
regards the size , configuration , and geographical location
。 f ~uture

projects.

The research strives , through the analysis of existing
implementation models , to offer insight regarding the
dynamics of the policy implementation process.

Particular

attention is afforded the possibility of identifying the
foundation of the implementation process as a set of
variables/conditions which may be ordered based on their
relative importance or significance to the process.

If

there exist independent implementation variables that can be
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so ordered , policy makers , faced with designing
implementation strategies for new policy , should be capable
。f

utilizing such information to make a more informed and

rational allocation of organizational resources in pursuit
。f

successful program implementation.
Lastly , data on the existence of intergovernmental

differentials in the ranking of implementation variables
will be evaluated to determine the origin , nature , and
magnitude of the differences.
。f

The existence of differences

opinion between Federal interests and state/local

interests as to what contributes most significantly to a
successful implementation effort , though not intuitively
surprising , has both practical and theoretical implications.
The research will here address those implications by
examining the evolving relationship between the Corps of
Engineers and non-Federal interests as the partnership is
shaped by the influences of the implementation environment
and the impact of that process on the transformation of law
to applied policy.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This chapter provides a review of the literature and
relevant history of implementation research and cost shared
water resource development.

While the topics are integrated

for evaluative purposes in this research , implementation
research and water resource development policy are clearly
discrete fields of study , and as such , possess a unique
literature and history.

To more clearly establish the

theoretical and/or historical antecedents of the individual
areas of research , this chapter is set forth in four primary
subdivisions:
1.

A review of the literature on implementation

research and resultant theory;
2.

A review of the theoretical foundations of cost

sharing as a method'of planning for and funding public works
projects;
3.

A review of the history of

watεr

resource

development policy within the Army Corps of Engineers
leading to the implementation of the WRDA 1986;
4.

An analysis of the key issues established by the

literature that will be the sUbject of investigation in this
research.

13
AN OVERVIEW OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: THE LITERATURE

It is now well understood that the establishment of
major policy goals and directions in legislation does not
ensure the success of those initiatives. Indeed , the recent
literature on implementation would appear to suggest that
the tortuous route the execution of legislation to on-site
implementation of the program or policy more often than not
is characterized by a commingling of complexity , confusion ,
and compromise.

Perhaps this appears to be the case because

the first significant implementation studies , and so much of
the ensuing literature in the field , is devoted to an
analysis of failed programs (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973;
Derthick 1972) and the research itself , "an exercise in
concentrated pessimism" (Bardach 1977).

As a result ,

implementation research has tended to focus generally on the
constraining rather than the enabling variables or
conditions; and much has been written of the complexity and
dynamic instability of the process.

Here a likely

explanation is that it is somewhat easier to suggest why a
policy

fε‘ iled

in some important respect than why it

succeeded well in others.

Typically , someone (or group) did

not do something , or did less than was required , thus
providing some explanatory basis for the resulting underperformance of the policy initiative.
Contributing to this phenomenon is the observation that

14

almost nothing , let alone a social policy , works as well as
we had hoped.
。f

Thus , there appears always to be a rich array

pOlicy failures available for research.

It is frequently

the failure of policy over time that leads to an interest in
examining the process of policy implementation in hopes of
determining whether "mechanical failure" rather than bad
policy was the cUlprit (Goggin et. ale 1990 , 9).

For

whatever reason , there exists a significant body of
implementation research that is openly critical of the
research process itself and the resultant literature which
is found wanting for , among other deficiencies:
1.
(0

A failure to produce a body of coherent theory

’ Toole
2.

1986; Berman 1980; Goggin et. ale 1990);
A tendency to producefindings that are little more

than routine restatements of long observed phenomena
(Salamon 1981);
3.

Research findings that are long on description and

short on prescription (Williams 1982 , 18);
4.

Methodology characterized by a mUltiplicity of

approaches without an integrating framework (Alexander
1985).
Fox (1987 , 138) suggests that the problem rests more
with the positivistic bias of the research than the poverty
。f

the implementation effort. There is a suggestion by some

researchers (Alexander 1985) that the field of study may be
inherently intractable or that the target behavior ,

15
implementation , is an essentially political act , always
present and ever illusive (Wittrock 1986 , 46).
Indeed , there is persuasive argument made for
not considering implementation during policy formulation
lest policy options be constrained by perceptions of
administrative feasibility leading to a situation where "we
。nly

attempt to do that which we know we can do well"

(Linder and Peters 1987)
。ptimal

,

or design feasible rather than

policies (Majone 1975 , 50).

These observations have

normative implications which Linder and Peters note may be
highly undesirable and contribute little to a theoretical
understanding of how to effectively implement "difficult"
policy.
other scholars have inveighed against such constraints
arguing that unless implementation research generates a
product that is policy relevant and of utility to policy
makers it will never achieve status outside the established
work on organizational theory and management (Williams 1982 ,
I).

Pioneering studies in the area of implementation

analysis featured an emphasis on ascertaining the
feasibility of policy success of a given policy in a known
environment.

While

suc~

research advanced an appreciation

for the implementation component of policy success it did
little to suggest answers to the broader theoretical
concerns of researchers interested in what made

16
implementation work or not work (Wittrock and De Leon 1986).
Authors such as Jones (1977 , 137-158) and Anderson
(1975 , 99-115) tend to dismiss the field of implementation
research as a unique body of study by incorporating the
process of implementation into a broader framework of
analysis which they respectively refer to as the
"administrative process" or "public policy making."

still ,

there appears a formidable body of research that argues for
implementation analysis as the critical link in appreciating
。bserved

inconsistencies between the promulgation of policy

。bjectives

and the delivery of policy outcomes.

Absent

knowledge of whether or not a policy was implemented
sUbstantially as designed , it is virtually impossible

t。

assess the correctness of a policy direction.
In recognition of this , the policy implementation
process , which was once largely ignored in favor of analysis
。f

policy design and policy impact assessment , now

constitutes a significant portion of the policy analysis
literature (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973 , 166).
literature on implementation has ,

b닫ginning

The

with Pressman

and Wildavsky ’ s "classic" , Implementation (1973)

,

tended

t。

emphasize almost exclusively the case study approach (Fox
1987 , 129).

The case study is typically used to: 1)

descriptively. identify and distinguish the'character of the
"implementation problem" (as was largely the case in
Pressman and Wildavsky 1973 and Derthick 1972) , 2) focus on

17
the influences that affect policy making and implementation
(Allison 1971 and Bardach 1977) or , 3) attempt to isolate
the factors or variables in the process so that the
individual components of the process may be evaluated
(Edwards 1980 , Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983).
The use of the case study method has provided a rich
narrative literature examining the event sequencing (and
re-sequencing) of the implementation process. It has ,
however , also contributed to the observation that various
methodological approaches to analysis are "partial and
incomplete" and that each is exclusive of any other
perspective because the data set of each case study is
unique unto itself (Alexander 1985 , 407).

This latter

criticism is particularly significant to those researchers
engaged in theory building exercises for whom nonstandardized case studies provide no research platform for
replication (Goggin et. ale 1990 , 15).

Moreover , the case

study comparative approach has frequently resulted in a
"small N" or "degrees of freedom' ’ problem in which the
number of variables exceeds the number of cases thus making
inferential generalization a methodologically difficult
proposition (Yin 1982 , Goggin 1986 , Goggin et. ale 1990).
Van Horn lends support to such criticism noting that case
study analysis provides no coherent framework for analysis
as the findings appear idiosyncratic , variables and
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explanations being typically tailored to the single case
under investigation (1979 , 9).
The very decision as to where to initiate analysis is
both seminal and itself open to question.

various scholars

have noted that the hierarchical geography of implementation
suggests that one can initiate measurement and evaluation
from the "top down" or begin the analysis with an assessment
。f

implementation outputs and work back toward a resolution

。f

intent and outcomes.

The "top down-bottom up"

controversy , the dominant research protocol issue of the
1980s , remains unresolved.

Linder and Peters identify the

"top down" and "bottom up" approaches as the current schools
。f

thought in implementation analysis with the former being

more phenomenological and the latter positivistic (Linder &
Peters 1987 , 116).

While a number of models would arguably

fall neither entirely into one camp or the other , the
general groupings offers an attractive first order
classification of proposed research strategies.
Moreover , the distinction is not trivial because
selection of an approach to analysis , when the alternative
employs different units of measurement and evaluation
criteria , may lead to quite different results , even when
compe~ing

research models are tasked with evaluating an

identical sequence of events.

Thus , while the empirical

impacts of an implementation effort may generally be agreed
upon (a risky assumption at best) the measured "success" of
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an implementation effort may vary with the orientation of
the analysis.
Top down analysts emphasize the legitimacy of goals and
policies established by elected officials , a reasonable and
seemingly normative assumption.

The focus is generally on

national policy or policy goals set forth by a central
government (Goggin et. al. 1990 , 11).

The analysis begins

with a set of policy decisions and seeks to identify a
measurable differential between actual outcomes and
anticipated outcomes.

The incremental difference between

stated expectation and actual outcomes , if negative , is
ascribed , at least in part , to implementation deficiencies.
The straightforward nature of such analysis has a
certain intuitive charm.

Policies are frequently announced

with associated goals , though such goals are seldom
quantified with any degree of specificity.

Indeed , the

general lack of quantification in the implementation
research process has been a longstanding criticism of those
who see such imprecision as severely limiting the ability of
the research to identify precise relationships between
the various elements and outcomes (Goggin et. al. 1990 , 11).
Measurement of goal attainment thus becomes a basis for
meaningful implementation analysis.

If one assumes that the

policy is prescriptively correct and the goals realistic ,
the measurable difference between goal and goal achievement
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should be largely ascribable to what did or did not happen
in the implementation process.
Interestingly , as implementation research has progressed
the position of the top down analyst has generated numerous
critics.

A number of studies have offered evidence that

policy makers have little practical influence on the
behavior of implementors (Berman 1975 , 22-47; Lipsky 1980 ,
16-28).

This is so , it is argued , because outcomes are

primarily dependent upon the resources , initiative , and
commitment of first order implementors.

Hence , it is

methodologically appropriate to initiate analysis at the
bottom of the implementation hierarchy and work backwards
(Elmore 1978 , 212-213).

Moreover , the role of the state and

its agents as autonomous rational actors must be accounted
for when evaluating national/state intergovernmental
implementation efforts (Goggin et. al. 1990 , 13.)
。f

Critics

the top down approach cite the inherent necessity of

consensus building and accommodation in the implementation
process and suggest that to ignore their role and
significance is tantamount to "denying and renouncing the
very existence of politics" (Winter 1983 , 2).
Perhaps the first systematic reordering of the top down
policy flow perspective was Elmore ’ s backward mapping model
which traced the development of policy initiatives by first
。rder

implementors , whom he argues , should formally share

responsibility for the policy development process (1979).
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This view is generally shared by a number of researchers

wh。

either actually attempt to identify policy development
。rigins ，

as did Elmore , or who argue that policy , while

generally evinced at the top of the hierarchy , is dynamic ,
iterative , and sUbject to a wide variety of modifying
pressures (Elmore 1978 , 1979; Lipsky 1978; Hjern et. al.
1978).

stone (1980 , 13) suggests that implementation is an

integral part of the policy development process rather than
an administrative follow on and so has no one set of authors
but is the product of a "multiplicity of actors and agencies
involved and the linkages between them" (Barret and Hill
1984 , 220; Berman and McLaughlin 1975).
Elmore , in addition to advancing our understanding of
the shortcomings of using traditional bureaucratic models

t。

explain implementation has noted that implementation is
instrumental in nature and so employs policy instruments
which he identifies as: 1) mandates , 2) capacity building ,
3) inducements and , 4) system changing.

The instruments are

a means to accomplish a desired policy end or purpose and
are employed to elicit a predictable response from policy
makers.

Their utility , then , is that certain instruments

may fit a particular policy problem or objectives better
than others permitting the analyst to introduce strategic
implementation concerns in the policy design process by
recommending a particular instrument or combination (Elmore
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1987 , 175).
Edwards notes that a critical emphasis in continuing
implementation research must involve identification of the
preconditions of successful policy implementation and the
primary obstacles to its achievement (Edwards 1980 , 9).
This argument is extended by Goggin who , while affirming the
need to devote attention to the identification of process
variables , argues that the constants , the patterned
regularities of the implementation context require equal
consideration (Goggin 1987 , 27).

General criticism of rigid

bureaucratic top down implementation analysis addresses the
deficiency of the perspective for failing to recognize or
measure significant intangible effects of the implementation
process (Rossi and Wright 1985 , 328).

Indeed , a significant

portion of implementation research is criticized as
confusing policy implementation research with evaluation
research which is more appropriately concerned with a
straightforward comparison of outputs in relation

t。

expectations (Goggin 1987 , 27; Edwards 1980 , 8).
These approaches enjoy an intuitively obvious advantage
in that they immediately move one beyond simply
descriptively documenting the process of implementation.
serious questions remain , however.
。ne

How , for instance , is

to be sure that either the preconditions or patterned

regularities observed in conjunction with a particular
policy application would apply across policy types , let
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alone jurisdictional environments?

Fox notes that

implementation impacts , negative or positive , may appear
ahistorically general when they are , in fact , specific

t。

the times and particular environment (Fox 1987 , 137).
Moreover , assuming that a set of general variables (proxies
for the referenced preconditions and obstacles) could be
identified , how does one order the set so that limited
administrative resources can be rationally applied?
The criticism of "top down" implementation models is
both weighty and compelling but far from sufficient to fully
discredit the approach.

In fact , the persistence of

"textbook policy process" as Nakamura refers to it , may be
attributable to the fact that , while inaccurate , it is
superior to the next best alternative (1987 , 152).

Whereas

the "bottom up" perspective adds greatly to our
understanding of the obstacles and forces that impede or
redirect the implementation of mandated policy it errs on
the side of the "practical ," accepting , in Linder ’ swords ,
"an empirical difficulty as both a normative statement and
the sole basis of analysis ••. " (1987 , 459).
While we achieve an appreciation of the dynamics of a
particular process based on a purely descriptive network
analysis.we learn

li~:tle

of theoretical significance that

would have empirical or normative significance for
sUbsequent applications of the technique.

Indeed , there is
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a persuasive and disturbing argument made for not
considering implementation during policy formulation lest
pOlicy options be constrained by perceptions of
administrative feasibility so that "we only attempt to

d。

that which we know we can do well" (Linder and Peters 1987)
design feasible rather than optimal policies (Majone 1975)
。r

,

,

adopt policies (driven from the bottom up) that are

inconsistent with the fundamental values of society at large
(Hoggwood and Peters 1983).
Distinct from the focus on identifying the direction of
policy flow within an organizational hierarchy and the
correspondingly appropriate methodological perspective , a
body of research in the last decade has sought to examine
the development of models that identify the institutional
"mechanics" of implementation.

These models , once again

generally through.case study , attempt to provide a schema of
how the actors , forces , and organizations interact

t。

produce outputs that are more or less consistent with the
stated policy initiative; in effect , the physics of policy
implementation.

This initiative is in response to the early

criticism of implementation research as lacking in precisely
defined variable relationships that permit the generation of
estimates and quantitative measures (Goggin et. al. 1990 ,
11).

An assessment of the evolution of this research

provides an alternative model of categorization which
focuses on "generations of research" (Lester et. a l. 1987 ,
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201).
Indeed , the course of implementation research has
proceeded not unlike the early study of physics , observing
the consequences of a variety of behavioral interactions and
then attempting to formulate "laws" having broad explanatory
capacity.

In retrospect , this evolution may be mapped by

designating "generations" of research characterized by
methodological approach and sophistication of the techniques
employed.

While there is no widespread consensus within the

field on the exact number of generations of research that
have transpired the following breakdown provided by Lester
(et. al. 1987) is helpful in achieving perspective on the
status of current research interests and their antecedents.
Lester (et. al. 1987) designates four generations or
stages of research: 1) case study research; 2) development
。f

policy implementation frameworks; 3) application of the

frameworks and analysis; 4) synthesis and revision.

The

first generation of case study research (Pressman and
Wildavsky 1973; Derthick 1972; Bardach 1977) was generally a
descriptive assessment of implementation processes with
little emphasis on the identification of independent
variables or model construction.

The literature consisted

largely of accounts of how a single policy was carried out
within a given environment.

Though criticized for their

atheoretical research format , Goggin (et. al. 1990 , 15)
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notes that the first generation literature provided useful
information on: 1) the linkage between law and program; 2)
the complexity and dynamic nature of implementation and
diagnosed the common pathologies of the implementation
process; 3) the significance of policy subsystems and the
extent of required inter-system coordination.
Second generation (1975-1980) studies focused on the
development of application models or frameworks which
structured the analysis of the implementation process and
which served to guide research.

During this period of

implementation research the "top down" models emerged ,
positing the existence of implementation variables ,
measurable linkages between pOlicy intention and program
。utputs.

Major models of this period include those

developed by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975)
Sabatier (1981)
。f

,

and Edwards (1980).

,

Mazmanian and

While the development

these refined models offered focus and moved the research

forward , their over-broad specification of variables
reflected the novelty of the area of research and , perhaps ,
the use of informational interview and intermittent site
。bservation

as data collection tools.

Second generation models were the first to directly
address the need to identify prescriptive methods that might
apply across policies and focus on the derivation of
implementation variables , those conditions and obstacles
common to the implementation process that must be evaluated
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and addressed irrespective of scope of the implementation
strategy or nature of the policy initiative.

Van Horn and

Van Meter (1975) recommended that the "disposition of the
implementors" might be quantified and correlation estimates
。f

implementation success drawn from that data.
Mazmanian and Sabatier first recommended study of the

"attitudes and resources of constituency groups" (1980)
before fully outlining their conceptual framework of the
implementation process and establishing the six conditions
。f

successful implementation (1983). Similar to the approach

adopted by Mazmanian and Sabatier , Edwards suggested that
there were four preconditions of successful implementation
involving communication , resources , dispositions (of the
implementors)

,

and bureaucratic structure (1980).

This research provided a rich source of descriptive
information on inter-organizational and interpersonal
dynamics but tended also to defy any form of measurement
that had cross study relevance.

There was also general

criticism of the models for , while establishing a foundation
for inquiry into the existence of

implem~ntation variables

a subsequent failure to then identify which variables were
most important and under what circumstances (Lester 1987 ,
204).

In response to the aforementioned criticisms and a

general feeling tbat "top down" models simply did not
portray the implementation process accurately , the "bottom

,
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up" school (discussed above) developed and specified during
this period a family of models that focused on the network
。f

actors and agents that delivered policy "on the ground."
The third stage (1980-1985)

,

characterized by

application of the frameworks , was a period of testing
existing implementation models.

Van Horn ’ s assessment of

this period suggests that four broad lessons may be inferred
from the empirical testing of the models: 1) the frameworks
were useful in explaining the scope of the implementation
process; 2) implementation research tends to be time
sensitive and findings on the same process may vary between
studies that are cross-sectional and those which are
longitudinal; 3) the rate of program "failure" may not be as
high as was depicted in the early implementation literature;
4) even the most modest of programs can fail (Lester et.
ale 1987 , 205).
Am ong

the significant achievements of this stage was

the development of Mazmanian and Sabatier ’ s multivariate
implementation model (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983)

,

one of

the first to provided a comprehensive list of what carne
to be called "factors" (Lester 1987 , 203) associated with
the implementation process.

Whereas a number of

implementation models emphasizing variable identification
emerged from the "second generation" of implementation
research (Van Meter and Horn 1975; Edwards 1980) the model
specified by Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) provided the most
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thorough treatment of independent variables whose
presence or absence influenced the implementation process
and determined the ultimate effectiveness of programs
associated with that process.

Additionally , the model

contributed significantly to an appreciation of perspective ,
particularly when implementation involved several levels of
government.
The model further noted that focus and concerns were
differentiated by the level of the participant in the
implementation hierarchy.

Having identified the groups by

hierarchical level (center , periphery , target)

,

Mazmanian

and Sabatier went on to assert that successful
implementation may be largely contingent upon the extent

t。

which various groups understand the incentive structure of
。ther

groups in the hierarchy (1983 , 13).

The model necessarily made certain assumptions about
how implementation effectiveness should be measured by
recommending that the proper unit of measure is the
achievement of legal objectives.

Mazmanian and Sabatier

argue forcefully for evaluation that focuses on the
attainment of the legal objectives of legislation , the
intended outcomes and objectives of conscious policy choices
made by the legislative branch of government.

Where there

exists clear and precise legal objectives there also exists
evaluative criteria against which program outputs can be

30

measured.

A clear advantage of such an approach is the

capacity of the model to specify , and perhaps quantify ,
legislative goals against which performance can be measured
and to account for the role and influence of the dynamic
intergovernmental and interorganizational relationships
within the implementation environment.
This approach , characteristic of the "top down"
approach , has been criticized for its emphasis on the
primacy of legislative policy over policy initiatives
generated by the bureaucracy or other policy sub-systems
during the implementation process (Sabatier 1986; Lipsky
1980).

The criticism is principally concerned with the

actual character of the policy implementation environment.
Is it a "seamless web" of policy iteration and reformulation
as such diverse researchers as Bardach , Berman , Mclaughlin ,
Majone and Wildavsky have suggested or do definable
boundaries exist between policy development and policy
implementation?

Do implementing officials determine the

true nature of policy as a matter of course in attempting
interpret program directives (Lipsky , 1980)1

t。

While not

dismissing the difficulties associated with the blurring of
formulation-reformulation , Mazmanian and Sabatier assert
that the need to maintain normative assumptions ,
particularly the theoretically important , if empirically
tenuous , partitioning of legislative and administrative
authority , remains a proper and compelling concern of
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implementation research.
Stage four (1985-

) research represents an attempt

t。

synthesize the most fundamental and promising concepts of
the various models with particular emphasis on resolving the
"top down/bottom up" dichotomy.

The challenge of this

generation of research is the development of theories that
。 ffer

both explanatory and predictive capacity (Goggin et.

ale 1990 , 15).

The models proposed to date tend to focus on

policy systems and sub-systems and acknowledge the recursive
characteristics of intergovernmental/interorganizational
policy implementation.

Such an approach is consistent with

the effort to reconcile the policy flow issue.
Major fourth generation models include efforts by
Elmore (1985)

,

Goggin (Goggin 1987 , et. ale 1990)

Sabatier (1987).

,

and

While each of these efforts aspires

t。

identify and measure with ever greater accuracy the myriad
constraints , influences , and inducements that drive the
implementation process a major emerging distinction in the
research is whether the emphasis should remain with
developing "policy relevant" findings that may be employed
by policy practitioners (Elmore 1985) or directed toward
theory development (Sabatier 1986; Lester , et. ale 1987).
Goggin (et. ale 1990) emphasizes the need for the theory
development school to move forward from hypothesis building
to employing research conventions which permit hypothesis
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testing with emphasis on application of the scientific
method in implementation research.

Characterizing their

research as perhaps a "first step" toward a new generation
。f

research , Goggin , Bowman , Lester , and 0 ’ Toole (1990)

utilize communications theory to develop a set of testable
propositions about implementation and establish. a probable
design for theory-testing research.
While there is no disagreement among researchers that
utilitarian findings are of great value , the literature is
clear that contributions that would move us toward some
consensus on a general theory of implementation are the
William Glazer , noting the importance of both

greater need.

perspectives , offered the following , "Fact-finding without
theory produces

~

jumble ••• Theorizing without fact is a

dilettantish hobby rather than a useful contribution"
(1955 , 291).

Implementation research , though once

criticized as an atheoretically homogeneous exercise , can
now legitimately claim to be on the edge of a diverse and
dynamic research frontier.
While a number of engaging

con~eptual，

theoretical , and

practical issues present themselves in the literature , this
research elected to focus on the related questions of the
practicality of identifying and assigning levels of
significance to theoretically derived implementation
variables and the impact position within an implementation
hierarchy played on one ’ s perspective when evaluating
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variable significance.
The first issue , generating and establishing the
relative criticality of implementation variables , was
selected in response to the clear call for the need

t。

identify not only the nature and composition of independent
variables associated with the mechanics of implementation
but toe relative significance of the discrete variables.
While the research literature has promulgated the existence
。f

such variables (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979 , 1983) there

is no evidence of quantified data on ranking variables in
。rder

of relative importance to the implementation process

(Browne and Wildavsky 1984; Hargrove 1980; Wagner 1986).
Clearly , the nature of such relationships are theoretically
significant as they impact profoundly on the level of
contribution anyone variable or combination makes toward
the ultimate disposition of an implementation initiative.
From a practical standpoint , such knowledge is invaluable
when , faced with constrained resources , decisions must be
made as to where and how effort and resources are to be
directed.
The latter issue , the role hierarchical position plays
in determining a participant ’ s perception of what is
important in the policy implementation environment , is
fundamentally associated with the concerns of the "bottom
up" school of thought.

It is particularly relevant to those
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involved in researching the role of state/local government
in the implementation of nationally directed programs.

The

theoretical perspective of the "bottom up" approach , as
described above , suggests the significant impact ground
level implementors have on policy implementation and the
process of policy redesign.

Indeed , some theorists suggest

that , in practice , implementation analysts consciously
factor in cooptation by the administering agency (Berman
1978. )
The literature of the "bottom up" perspective has
provided substantial evidence that the dynamic and recursive
nature of policy flow within a structural hierarchy is
largely attributable to response and reaction to policy
initiation across the hierarchy. Policy initiation does not
。 ccur

only at the apex of the hierarchy nor is it a stable

process.

Does it not then follow that the relative

significance of a discrete implementation variable is
determined or influenced by one ’ s position in the hierarchy;
。r

are such relations well defined and theoretically static

across levels of an intergovernmental hierarchy?

These

questions seemed particularly appropriate given the recent
concerns of the literature for research that contributed
an understanding of implementation initiative involving
interstate variations (Goggin et. ale 1990).

t。
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COST SHARING: LITERATURE ON THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
It has been suggested that the intergovernmental cost
sharing of water resource projects initiated by the WRDA
1986 was primarily a political response to: 1) enable
increased executive branch involvement in project selection
and water resource development policy;
。utlays

2) reduce federal

for water resource development in a period of record

budget deficits.

There is undoubtedly some truth to both

assertions , but these arguments fail to address an equally
attractive alternative motive , the compelling economic logic
。f

cost sharing. There exists a significant body of evidence

that suggests cost sharing came to receive
serious consideration largely on the merits of sound theory
that , while at odds with the conventional political wisdom ,
argued strongly for the adoption of efficiency criteria
guide development'.

t。

Though the political allocation model

frequently fails to place a premium on efficiency , efficiency
concerns present arguments that are not easily dismissed by
decision makers facing increasingly scarce resources and a
multitude of demands.
It had become increasingly clear prior to 1986 that the
much criticized political distribution model of allocating
developed water resource projects was simply no longer
adequate (see discussion in the following section of this
chapter) and that a replacement model would have to possess
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an appearance of rationality and equity if it was to receive
broad acceptance within the water resource development
community.
cost

sharin당

This review seeks to set forth the rationale for
with a focus on basic economic principles and

the application of those principles in the development of
pUblic policy.
The foundation of cost share principles is the belief
that a rational development policy must address economic
efficiency criteria if efficient decisions regarding
development are to be made.

Indeed , efficiency arguments

should be considered even when the ultimate decision
criteria is of a non-economic nature for that is how the
true costs of forgone alternatives are determined.

It is

well understood that there are major non-efficiency criteria
which are considered in the development of pUblic policy ,
income redistribution being an example.

However , so as

t。

bring focus to the analysis at hand , this review restricts
the discussion to an assessment of rational efficiency
criteria as a basis for the development of policy.
Specifically , the discussion focuses on the relatively
straightforward and well understood body of principles
associated with cost sharing and welfare economic theory.
Economic efficiency may be broadly defined as a
condition wherein productive resources are so allocated
among alternatives that any reallocation pattern would not
improve anyone person ’ s position and still leave everyone

37

else equally well off.

This form of efficiency is

determined by basic optimality criteria and is often
referred to as "Pareto optimality."
。f

It may also be thought

as a condition which implies that output is maximized

given a particular set of inputs (Krutilla and Eckstein
1958 , 17).

Second order economic efficiency concerns itself

more specifically with income maximization as the sole index
。f

individual and social welfare.

Here , the optimally

developed resource project is that project which most
effectively generates national income.

As the basis for

investment in resource projects is benefit generation , of
some form , the generally applied criterion for resource
allocation is economic efficiency (James and Lee 1971 , 111).
From the standpoint of the individual , economic
efficiency is achieved when expenditures are allocated so as
to maximize satisfaction.

If one envisions the potential

non-Federal sponsor in a water resource development project
as representing an aggregate of individual preferences for
the project , the demand for a particular project should be
estimable and an efficient solution calculable.

Why this is

not so easily accomplished by conventional market mechanisms
is discussed in detail later in this chapter. 1
A related , and in the area of this research
significant , issue involves the potential for conflict
between the individual (the non-Federal interest) and
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society at large when the individual ’ s preferences do not
align with those of society.

Selection of the locally

preferred plan may , in such cases , result in a loss of
efficiency to society with the tradeoff in efficiency losses
。 ffset

gains.

by often equally critical non-efficiency criteria
A case in point might here be project acceptability

to

th~

interests who are responsible for the partial funding

。f

the project effort.
A word on the national economic development (NED) plan

alternative so frequently referenced in water resource
development planning documents is here appropriate

t。

identify what the plan consists of and what it represents. 2
The objective of Federal water resource development is the
maximization of net economic development benefits
consistent with protection of the. environment and sUbject
to such constraints as the safety , completeness ,
effectiveness , and acceptability of the project.
plan is the material reflection of this objective.

The NED
The

methodology for development and evaluation of the plan is
set forth in the Economic and Environmental Principles and
Guidelines for Water and Related Land Resources
Implementation Studies issued March 10 , 1983 by the United
States Water Resources Council.

Colloquially referred to as

the "Principles and Guidelines P&G ," the document is the
primary guide employed in the formulation and evaluation of
major Federal water resource development agencies.

The
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Principles and Guidelines replaced the Principles , Standards
and Procedures (18 CFR , Parts 711 , 713 , 714 and 716) in
March , 1983.
Addressing efficiency concerns , the Principles and
Guidelines defines the NED plan as that plan which maximizes
net national economic development benefits consistent with
the Federal objective.

As defined in the Principles and

Guidelines , the Federal objective is " •.• to contribute

t。

environmental statutes , executive orders , and other Federal
planning requirements" (EC 1105-2-115 1983 , 1).
Alternative plans which reduce net NED benefits in order

t。

address other legitimate concerns (safety or environmental
benefits) are formulated when it is determined these
concerns are not fUlly addressed by the NED Plan.
Notwithstanding the development of alternative plans ,
selection of other than the NED requires the approval of the
Secretary of a Federal department or the head of an
independent agency.
The water investment objective of the non-Federal
interest involved in cost shared planning is best
characterized as the accomplishment of a particular resource
related goal sUbject to financial constraints: to "maximize
the pace. and extent of water resource development subject

t。

the sponsor ’ s ability to obtain access funds at a reasonable
cost ..... (Mugler 1984 , 6).

Arguably , this more focused
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(substantively and geographically) and ’'businesslike"
approach may only infrequently (in the absence of Federal
financial assistance) advance a development solution
identical to that promulgated by theNED.

A more detailed

explication of why this is so is provided in the discussion
。f

derivation of demand function for water resource

development provided later in this chapter.
Before proceeding further with a discussion of the
relationship between cost sharing and the achievement of
socially efficient investment it is necessary to distinguish
between the efficiencies associated with private and pUblic
goods.
。f

Achieving a fundamental , if limited , understanding

the distinction is particularly critical when analyzing

historical models of water resource development because
there is often debate as to the pUblic/private nature of the
benefits which accrue from such projects.

Similarly , there

is an accompanying argument as to who should pay for them.
Private goods are goods that are consumed exclusively
by an individual consumer and so confer a benefit to the
consumer that is measurable by an expressed preference or
"demand" for the good.

Typically , such goods when consumed

confer no benefit to others who are effectively excluded
from the benefits which accrue to the consumer , e.g. food ,
drink , a pair of shoes , etc.

Thus , consumer demand is a

relatively straightforward measurement of an attempt by the
individual to maximize personal utility (Singer 1976 , 88).
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For the most part , market mechanisms deal effectively with
the production , supply , and consumption of private goods.
Public goods may be defined as those goods

끄으호

sUbject

to exclusivity , that is goods whose benefits accrue beyond
the individual consuming the good (e.g. , education) or whose
product may be shared by mUltiple consumers without
diminishment of anyone individual ’ s benefit (e.g. , street
lighting).
"spillover."

Benefits , in this instance , are said

t。

In the case of a pure pUblic good , the

benefits may be "all spillover" with many parties enjoying
equal benefit from the good simultaneously and , more
importantly , with no provision for exclusion and therefore
sUbject to joint consumption (Haveman 1976 , 25).
National defense is often proffered as an example of a
pure pUblic good.

As a result of the inability to restrict

access or assign rights to pUblic goods the market may fail
to produce such goods at a socially efficient level.
Because individuals cannot be excluded from the benefits of
such goods , and so need not pay for them , the private market
will either fail to produce pUblic goods or produce them in
less than socially optimal quantities as a result of the
non-exclusion principle.

Figure 1 offers an example of this

phenomena.
water resource projects are infrequently either purely
private or purely pUblic in nature and so represent what is
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typically referred to as mixed goods.

Navigation and

recreation benefits are typically mixed goods.

If one were

D

$/unit

T

S

O

01 Oz

Output of public goods. Whereas an unregulated
market would produce output Q1 ’ the socially optimal output
would be Q2 due to spillover benefits , e.g. individuals
benefiting from provision of a social good who were not
required to purchase units of the good. Welfare is not
maximized in such a situation if the market is allowed t。
underproduce. Source: Robert H. Haveman , The Economics of
the Public Sector , 1976.

닫g브E응~.

to envision a private-public goods water resource project
continuum with projects located along that continuum by type
。f

project , the anchors would arguably be hydro projects at

the private end and flood control at the pUblic end.
Hydro-power projects generate essentially private goods
in the sense that the product is vendible and potential
consumers may be excluded from consumption by a market
controlled distribution system.

Not surprisingly , the
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private market is involved in the development of hydro-power
projects and distribution systems , though such development
is generally sUbject to some form of monopolistic regulation
by the public.
Flood control projects present a quite different
picture.

Non-flood control benefits which obtain as a

result of the project design (esthetic benefits , recreation)
will typically be pUblic in nature , though access to project
lands can be controlled and fees assessed.

Flood control

benefits , on the other hand , while they clearly convey
private benefit to those in the flood plain are essentially
pUblic goods as once they are provided , consumption of the
protection within the plain can not be denied.

Individuals

who build in the protected area after construction of the
project will enjoy the same level of benefit as those
。 ccupied

wh。

the area prior to project construction and who ,

。 stensibly ，

"purchased" the protection.

B~cause

the protection , once it has been provided , can

not be denied (rationing of pUblic goods is generally
dismissed as an impractical solution) individual consumer
strategy will be to wait for "someone else" to pay for the
protection in hopes of receiving future unpurchased
benefits.
phenomena."

This behavior is typical of the "free rider
It should be readily apparent that in such an

environment privatefirms would have no incentive to produce
。r

market such commodities as consumers will be induced

t。
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deny that they wish to purchase such goods even though they
are involved in their consumption.

How then do we correct

for such "failures" of the market to provide what societies
generally have come to consider essential goods and
services?

The solution is collective action authorized by a

body able to impose and enforce participation , or as it is
more often referred to , the power to tax.
The critical question in the case of water resource
development is not so much whether pUblic investment is
appropriate if we are to achieve socially efficient levels
。f

development but where (at which level of government) the

responsibility for such investment rests.

Notwithstanding

a good body of evidence which suggests a method of deriving
economically efficient solutions , at least historically , the
answer has been essentially political.

A critical

examination of who should pay for developed water resource
projects is central to gaining an appreciation of the
linkage between the level of government which initiates and
supports investment and the development of economically
efficient projects.
How then does cost sharing influence efficiency based
decisions?

Demand estimates for public as well as private

goods may be thought of as approximations of anticipated
returns on investment (refer back to Figure 1).

When ,

however , the direct beneficiaries of a good or service

d。
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not pay the full cost of provision , a sUbsidy (or spillover
benefit) condition exists.

In addition to the subsidized

transfer of resources to beneficiaries from the body of
individuals providing the sUbsidy , general taxpayers in the
case of a Federally subsidized project (a distributional
issue)

,

the relative underpricing of the resource to project

beneficiaries will lead to an overstatement of demand for
the good or service. 3

Thus , beneficiaries will demand an

inefficient quantity of the good based on the apparent (in
this instance sUbsidized) price of the

딩。od

rather than its

actual cost , the full and true social cost of providing the
good or service.

Put more simply , the users will demand

more of the good than they would if they had to pay the full
cost of its provision.
It may here be helpful to here offer a somewhat more
descriptive

expla~ation

of the demand function expressed by

consumers of project benefits from the Federal and nonFederal interest perspective. 4

First , it is important t。

assume that Federal interests and non-Federal interests will
each seek to maximize satisfaction (benefits) within a
finite set of resource constraints.

To simplify the

analysis , we will also assume that the project under
discussion is a single purpose project , that the interests
agree on the value and distribution of benefits associated
with the various alternatives , and that the production
function for each project purpose is characterized by
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diminishing marginal returns for successive units of input.
For the Federal interest the demand function will
result in the attempted maximization of net social benefits.
Given a single purpose project under the assumptions
provided , the Federal interest would select that project
alternative which maximizes the difference between the
present value of social benefits and social costs.
Similarly , a rational non-Federal interest will argue for
the project alternative that maximizes benefits which accrue
within its jurisdiction at the least cost to the non-Federal
interest.

Marshall (1969) has demonstrated that the only

cost sharing rule which will induce the non-Federal interest
to select the socially efficient project alternative is that
which imposes cost on the non-Federal interest in the same
proportion as benefits are shared at the margin.

The rule ,

which he refers to as the Association Rule , offers evidence
。f

the linkage between cost sharing and efficiency criteria

and demonstrates how that linkage may be employed to direct
efficient project development.
Stated most simply , the Association Rule posits that
the project scale selected by the non-Federal interest will
equal that picked by society only when costs are shared in
the same proportion as benefits at the margin.

If the

proportion of benefits accruing to the non-Federal interest
exceed costs at the margin the non-Federal interest will
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argue for greater project output (scale).

Concomitantly , if

costs to the non-Federal interest at the margin exceed
benefits , they will be induced to prefer a project of
reduced scope which produces less output than the socially
。ptimal

project (Marshall 1969 , 31).

Figure 2 on the following page illustrates this concept
and offers a graphic explanation of the efficiency loss
associated with construction of a project larger or smaller
than that which reflects the socially optimal scale.
Point Qo represent the level of output which maximizes
benefits to society.

Thus , it can be shown that to achieve

non-Federal interest concurrence in selecting this level of
。utput

a cost share rate of

75 웅

would be required. (This is

determined by the intersection of Qoa and MNB.)
Implementation of a

90 옹

rate for the non-Federal interest

would result in project output of Ql and a resulting loss of
benefit represented by eda.

Were a

50 옹

rate to be applied

the non-Federal interest would argue to increase output

t。

Qh with an efficiency loss of abc.
In the general absence of cost .shared construction on
federally assisted water resource development projects and
the tendency to adopt , when adopted at all , quite general
cost sharing criteria , one would expect to see a pattern of
development

q~ite

different from that which might have

emerged under cost-sharing.

Broad criticism of the current

pattern suggests as much (Eckstein 1961; Krutilla 1966;
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Marshall 1972; Reuss 1983).
Water resource development subsidies have typically
represented transfers from the Federal level to state or
local governments.

A significant criticism of the

availability of Federal funds transferred with low or

n。

cost sharing requirements to state or local governments is
that such an arrangement ultimately leads to the
construction of Federal projects which yield primarily local
benefits , thus displacing investments in other projects that
may have a higher national interest
33).

(u.s. CBO August 1983 ,

John Bowman (1986 , 4) in citing a congressional BUdget

Office study on the Nations Public Works provided an
excellent , concise summary of the problem Federal
responsibility for development has created:
Undercharges to users. The direct beneficiaries of
infrastructure services often pays fees that
recover less than the cost of providing those
services , thus leading to excessive demand for
infrastructure services. This in turn can lead t。
。verestimates of investment needs.
A graphic illustration of Bowman ’ s caveat was provided in
Figure 2.
Bowman ’ s observation is , of course , consistent with what
would be expected under the theoretical framework outlined
earlier in this chapter.
delineat~d

Referring to the demand function

in Figure 2 , note that MSB represents marginal

social benefits while MNB represents marginal net benefits
to the non-Federal interest.
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As you may have noted , a curious irony permeates the
arguments for achieving greater efficiency through the
application of cost sharing criteria.

On the one hand , a

body of theory holds that cost sharing will lead to the
construction of fewer and possibly smaller projects and that
the sample of projects will represent an "efficient" mix of
projects. This set of assumptions is discussed at length in
Implicit in this argument , it should be noted ,

Chapter V.

is the assumption that construction of large inefficient
projects were the order prior to the advent of cost sharing ,
an assumption not wholly supported by fact.

On the other

hand , we know that cost sharing rules , improperly applied ,
will indeed induce local factions to negotiate for smaller
projects but not necessarily projects that are socially
efficient from a national standpoint.
From an

effi~iency

perspective , it is essential that

cost sharing principles be applied on a project by project
basis if the non-Federal interest is to be induced to select
the socially efficient project alternative.

This is

necessarily the case because the derivation of demand for a
project purpose from the local perspective varies across
projects.

We know this to be true because for the non-

Federal interest the marginal net benefits of a project are
computed as a proportion of local benefits and costs
compared with total benefits and cost of a specific project
alternative.

Thus , any across the board rate applied by
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project purpose would offer the correct inducement at best
。nly

coincidentally.

Yet from a political perspective such

allowances are seen as unacceptable as they are thought

t。

encourage "bargaining" on the non-Federal interest share of
individual projects and serve generally to undermine the
equity of the process.

The appearance of fairness is

particularly important when development costs are imposed on
interests that have historically enjoyed large scale social
subsidies.

The (inefficient) resolution of this paradox is

further addressed in later chapters.
Ostensibly , the above mentioned problem could be
readily overcome if each beneficiary or group paid a share
。f

the development cost equal to the benefits they would

receive from the project. (For the sake of simplicity we
will assume that non-marketable benefits are assigned or
shared to the mutual satisfaction of the parties involved.)
Indeed , willingness to pay criteria , when employed as a
project screening device , may provide a more accurate
valuation of project benefits than application of benefitcost methodology by the Federal interest during the
feasibility study phase (U.s. CBO August 1983 , 41).
Were it that simple , however , general agreement on the
application of efficiency criteria would have been reached
some time ago.

The problem , however , is resistant to such a

solution due to the opportunity for a conflict of interest
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between the local position (non-Federal interest) and
society.

The conflict arises when the project , most desired

from the local point of view , does not conform in
significant ways with that proposed by the Federal interest ,
whose primary goal is to maximize national efficiency.
Understandably , non-Federal interests may oppose
contributing significantly to a project whose benefits will
accrue largely outside the interest ’ s jurisdiction and
society may argue equally forcefully for a solution that is
socially optimal from a national perspective. In this
fashion , each interest will be induced to bargain for a
project scale that maximizes its benefits (Marshall 1969 ,
12) •

While the overview set forth above provides only the
most superficial of perspectives on the relationship between
efficiency considerations and cost sharing , it should be
。bvious

that the set of incentives which move us toward the

efficient solution in the selection and design of cost
shared water resource development projects also lends to the
conflict that may arise between interests.

Moreover , it is

well recognized that efficiency criteria are not the
exclusive criteria applied in project selection. (A major
non-efficiency consideration for Federal participation
generally is income redistribution.)

Thus; while

theoretical solutions to such dilemmas have been skillfully
proposed (Marshall 1969) the complexity of application in an
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environment with long standing traditions , expectations , and
institutions serve to render cost sharing a potential
solution--but not an easy one.
WRDA 1986: A HISTORY OF WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT POLICY
The previous section contained a discussion of why cost
sharing is advocated by those who seek to impose economic
rationality on the Federal water resource development
program and minimize the economic distortion associated with
the Federal sUbsidy.

Given the general consensus , at least

within the economic and financial communities , one would
expect that cost sharing would long ago have been
incorporated into the water resource development calculus ,
and to some extent that has been the case.

The

Congressional Budget Office (CBO) noted in 1983 that
emerging water development priorities were shifting away
from large interstate projects toward local development ,
rehabilitation , and.efficient management of existing
projects and that the trend suggested a much stronger role
for economic efficiency as a guiding principle in pUblic
investment (U. S. CBO 1983 , 21).
Indeed , it is important to note that the WRDA 1986 is
not the first piece of Federal cost share legislation nor
are the cost sharing principles contained therein applied
exclusively by the Corps within its civil Works program
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(Holmes 1972).

In some fashion cost share principles have

been advocated and employed over time in project
development , though neither to the extent required by the
WRDA 1986 nor with great consistency.

A review of the legal

and administrative history of cost sharing reveals much
about the intergovernmental dynamics of the water resource
development process.

That review is set forth here

t。

provide a historical context for the ensuing discussion and
to establish the political lineage of arguments for and
against the application of cost sharing as Federal resource
development policy.
In 1975 the

u.s.

Water Resources Council undertook a

study to develop a set of cost sharing policy options for
the implementation , operation , maintenance , and
rehabilitation of federally assisted water and related land
programs.

In developing the analytical model , the research

staff noted:
the mystery and obfuscation which these existing
cost sharing ground rules bring to the planning
and development of water resources , especially
with respect to who benefits and who pays , brings
to mind the art of veiled subterfuge which reached
its zenith in the victorian period as demonstrated
by formal garden mazes , superficial parlor games ,
formal costumes and genteel manners of the period ,
all of which were designed to contain the reality
and the truth of a changing world (U.S. Water
Resources Council 1975 , 4).
The report went on to call for a "truth in cost sharing"
policy and a reconciliation of the inconsistencies in both
principles and numbers which existed among and between
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agencies producing the same output.
specifically , the council ’ s report decried the
"plethora of laws , ad hoc decisions , and administrative
procedures which authorize cost sharing arrangements under
which Federal water resource agencies operate" (u.s. Water
Resources Council 1975 , 4).

Thus , the WRDA 1986 did not , as

is sometimes suggested , introduce cost shared water resource
development planning so much as it brought a degree of
consistency to its application. In so doing , the law called
attention to the inevitability of greater local
participation in the development of federally assisted water
resource development.
Prior to examining the direct political and legislative
history of the WRDA 1986 , it is helpful to have an
appreciation of the scope of the legal precedent for such
policy and to offer some data on prior cost share
arrangements and the impact they had on project funding.
Table I set forth below establishes Federal cost
sharing conventions that have been established by
statute.

It should be noted that the table addresses

nominal cost share rates rather than effective rates , a
distinction which will be addressed below , and does not
include single purpose or project specific legislation
that involved cost share principles.
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TABLE I

m

파

마명

A

때떼

MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING
COST SHARING BY PROJECT PURPOSE

·l

water Resources Development
Purpose

A연ency

Urban Flood Damage

caE

P.L. 74-738 , 1936
P.L. 75-761 , 1938

Rural Flood Damage

caE
SCS

Watershed Protect.
Act (P.L. 83-566)

L

a

Flood Cont. Act of
1928 (P.L. 70-391)
caE

Flood Cont. Act 1936
Flood Cont. Act 1938
Rec. Projects Act
1939 (P.L. 76-260)

Drainage

Irrigation

Municipal and Industrial

BLM

Small Projects Act
(P.L. 84-984)

TVA

TVA Act (P.L. 73-017)

SCS

Soil Conserv. Act
(P.L. 40-460)

caE

Flood control Act
1944 (P.L. 78-534)

SCS

Soil Conservation Act
Watershed Protect. Act

caE

Flood Control Act
1944 (P.L. 78-534)
Reclamation Act 1902
(P.L. 57-161)

Bureau

Small Projects Act
Rec. Projects Act

SCS

Watershed Protection
Act
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TABLE I
MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING
COST SHARING BY PROJECT PURPOSE
·깅
랴

m

“파

따 명‘

A

..
꽤m

(continued)
Water Resources Development
Purpose

Agency

Water Supply

COE

Water Supp. Act 1958
(P.L.·85-500)

Bureau

Small Projects Act
Rec. Projects Act

Stream Flow Regulation

COE

Federal Pollution
Control Act 1972
(P.L. 92-500)

Fish and Wildlife

SCS

Watershed Prot. Act

COE

Flood Cont. Act 1944
Water Resources
Protection Act 1965
(P.L. 89-072)
Water Res. Devel.
Act 1974 (P.L. 93-251)

Bureau

Water Resources Devel.
Act 1974 (P.L. 93-251)

Ports/Harbors

COE

Rivers/Harbors Act
1920

Inland Water waterways

COE

Rivers/ Harbors Act
1920

TVA

TVA Act

COE

Flood Cont. Act 1944
1937 BPA Act
(P.L. 75-329)

Bureau

Recl Projects Act

TVA

TVA Act

’
μ

Hydropower

“
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TABLE I

Agency

Area Redevelopment

COE

A

L

.m z
t

·.
째m

water Resources Development
Purpose

-원
뼈.웹

MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING
COST SHARING BY PROJECT PURPOSE
(continued)

Economic Oevel. Act
1965 (P.L. 89-136)

。f

TVA

TVA Act

(Source: U.S. water Resources Council , 。 otions for Cost
Part 80 , Planning and Cost Sharing for water and
Related Land Programs , November 1975.)

흐뇨효프후묘g --

Table II set forth on the following page provides an
。verview

of the status of cost sharing on a by-agency basis

in 1975 for both implementation and O&M costs.

However , it

is important to note that , notwithstanding the establishment
。f

specific cost sharing language in the referenced

legislation , no consolidated cost sharing policy was
‘

successfully incorporated into legislation prior to the
passage of the WRDA 1986.

Cost sharing arrangements were ,

as previously mentioned , authorized under a "plethora of
laws ,

르효고으드

decisions , letters , and administrative

procedures" (U.S. water Resources council 1975).
In 1983 the U.S. water Resources Council estimated that
for all types of water resource projects involving Federal
and non-Federal participants the mean non-Federal effective ,
composite cost share was

30 웅

(U.S. CBO August , 1983).

Table

III sets out the effective pre-WRDA 1986 cost share ratios
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IMPLEMENTATION AND OM&R COSTS FOR NON-FEDERAL
COST SHARING FOR 20 AGENCIES
Non-Federal Cost Shares
IlJ¥) lementat ion 1

x

애 &R 2
%

Farmers Home Administration
Tennessee Valley Authority
Community Planning and Development
EconOl비 c Development Agency
Environmental Protection Agency
Soil Conservation Service
Sn뻐 II Business Administration
Bureau of Reclamation
Ag. Stab. a빼 Conservation
NOOA
Corps of Engineers
Fish ar삐 Wildlife Service
Fed. Insurance Administration
Coast Guard
Forest Service
Bureau of Lar삐 Mgmt.
Bureau of Outdoor Rec.
National Park Service
Federal P 。“er Comm.

84

All Agencies

24

100
46
100
100
98
100
NA
96
NA
50
29
73
NA
NA
0
NA

79
70
44
26
43
47
31
34
25
19
16
13
8

o
o
o
o
o

Effective3
COlIψ 。site"

89
76
73
66
62
49
47
37
34
33
20
20
13
8

NA

o
o
o
o
o
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30

o
o

1. I lJ¥) l 윈nentation costs are the value of 51。뼈s and services necessary to establish
the project including construction , LERRO , mitigations , investigations , designs and
plans.
2. OM&R costs are the estir때 ted annual cost of operations , 뼈 intenance a며 cOlRpO nent
replacement of capital water resource facilities required to insure that the project
때erates a뼈 produces as designed and constructed for the full expected life of the
project.
3. The c OlRpOsite effective cost sharing rate which includes both i lJ¥) lementation
OM&R adjusted to present value.

,

ar삐

(Source: U.S. Water Resources Council Options for Cost Sharing -Part 8D , Planning and Cost Sharing for Water and Related Land
Programs (November 1975).
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TABLE I I I
NONFEDERAL MEAN , EFFECTIVE , COMPOSITE COST SHARE BY
PROJECT PURPOSE (IN PERCENTS)
AGENCIES
SCS

CORPS

BUREAU

17

a/

a/

20

7

10

27

11

Drainage

35

/b

89

46

Irrigation

19

18

54

19

5

/b

89

34

Municipal/Industrial
Supply

54

71

100

64

Water Quality Control

3

82

/b

60

Fish/Wildlife
Preservation

11

13

57

14

General Recreation

17

18

63

19

Commercial Harbors

16

/b

/b

16

Inland Navigation/ c

6

7

/b

g

Hydroelectric Power

61

65

/b

64

Agency Mean

20

37

49

30

Project Purpose
Urban Flood
Damage Reduction
Rural Flood Damage

Erosion Control

OTHER

lao Agency reported a cost category for this purpose but did
not report cost sharing.
lb. No activity reported for this purpose.
/c. Estimates may understate percentage as fuel tax
receipts from Inland Waterways Revenue act of 1978 are not
included.
(Source: U.S. Water Resources Council , Options for Cost
Sharing--Part 5A , Planning and Cost Sharing Policy Options
for Water and Related Land Programs , November 1975.)
function for the Corps of Engineers , Bureau of Reclamation ,
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Soil Conservation Service , and Others , a composite of the
remaining agencies listed from Table II.
As noted above , cost sharing , of a variety , has enjoyed
a broad if irregular and inconsistent Federal application in
the field of water resource development.

Particularly

alarming is the variation in rates between agencies whose
functions (flood damage reduction) are comparable and the
rate bias (from a sponsors viewpoint) in favor of structural
alternatives.

As noted earlier in the discussion on the

theoretical literature of cost sharing , such inconsistency
serves to undermine efficient development by inducing the
non-Federal interest to negotiate for the least cost (from
their perspective) solution rather than the most efficient
solution from a national perspective (Marshall 1969).
THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND THE HISTORY OF COST SHARED
WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
There have been a number of excellent histories
。n 'Federal water programs. S

This research does not presume

to offer the scope of a complete a history such as Holmes
(1972) but does find it necessary to call upon a number of
public history efforts , pUblished and unpublished , in an
attempt to provide adequate background on the involvement of
the C0rps in federally assisted/cost shared water resource
development.
The earliest formal intergovernmental efforts of the
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Federal Government in water resource development were in the
field of navigation with the Gallatin Report of 1808 ,
。n

B르g으rt

Roads and Canals , often cited as a landmark effort

t。

provide federal assistance to the states and territories.
The report data , provided largely by Army Engineers , offered
evidence of the potential for navigation development in the
new nation and called for a "cooperative effort" to develop
that potential in the name of economic development and
national defense (Elazar 1969 , 87-94).

Thereafter ,

cooperative development progressed slowly until 1824 and the
passage of the General Survey Act.

Though the

little in the way of Federal funding ($30 , 000)

~ct

,

provided

it did

empower the President to employ the "officers of the (Army)
Corps of Engineers" to survey roads and canals that were
thought to be of national importance.

The legislation

initiated , though on a very small scale , the first
centralized national resource planning mission of a Federal
agency (Holmes 1972 , 4).
Shortly thereafter , the Corps assumed planning
responsibility for inland navigation. with passage of the
first Omnibus Rivers and Harbors Act in 1826.

This Act was

to become the prototype for authorization of Federally
assisted water resource development in navigation and later
in the area of flood control cUlminating with passage of the
1936 Flood Control Act (President ’ s Water Resources policy
1950 , 92).

63
As it had in many other areas , the Federal role in water
resource development increased gradually as questions of the
appropriateness of Federal financing required discussion and
resolution.

By 1865 the Federal appropriation for .

navigation improvements totaled approximately $17 million.
Additionally , large scale land grants had been provided the
states for inland navigation development and enhancement.
still , the Federal contribution toward such development in
the early 19th century was considered modest in view of the
estimated one hundred and eighty-five million dollars that
had been contributed to canal development by state and
private interests (Pross 1938 , 44).
Investment in canal infrastructure was so great during
the period that the era between 1817 and 1838 is referred

t。

by historians as the Canal Era , characterized by the efforts
。f

state , municipal , and private interests to develop inland

navigation.

The failures of that era , due largely to the

inadequate financial and technical resources of non-Federal
developers and the growing influence of the Federal
government in directing the economic development of the
"western regions ,"

si당naled

a shift in the assumption of

responsibility for development of navigation resources
toward the Federal government in general and the Corps in
particular (Caulfield 1984 , 216).
Following the civil War , the Federal contribution

t。

64
development of harbors and inland navigation increased
dramatically.

This activity was consistent with a growing

concern for the linkage between transportation
infrastructure and national defense and recognized the
significant deterioration of navigable waterways during the

civil War due to wartime bUdgetary constraints (Reuss 1990 ,
3).

Thus , for the period 1866 to 1882 a total of 16

Federal rivers and harbors acts were signed into law.

The

Federal contribution had , by 1882 , reached $111 million
(Reuss 1983 , 12).
The increase in Federal spending was not without its

critics , particularly those who asserted that.the project
selection procedure lacked a coherent economic basis and
frequently directed Federal expenditures at development that
had little commercial potential.

In 1872 Congress created a

Select Committee on Transportation Routes composed of
various Senators and headed by Minnesota ’ s William Windom.
The Committee established the funding priority of water over
rail subsidy where waterways were "properly located" and ,
perhaps more importantly , established as pOlicy the concept
that river and harbor projects produced goods that reflected
a national interest (Reuss 1990 , 6).
As a result of such efforts , Congress passed general
navigation legislation in 1884 that instructed the District
Engineer (COE) to review and approve the potential
"worthiness" of projects prior to engaging in survey work
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(Holmes 1973 , 4).

Though formal methodological cost

benefit analysis was not required until passage of the Flood
Control Act of 1936 , it was clear that the political
allocation model of water resource development was
increasingly becoming the sUbject of critical scrutiny.
In an effort to exert additional control over the Corps
。f

Engineers , and impose greater rationality on the Federal

water resource development program Ohio , Congressman
Theodore Burton introduced legislation in 1902 which created
the Board of Engineers of Rivers and Harbors.

The Board was

chartered to review and evaluate the feasibility of projects
submitted by subordinate levels of the COE organization.
Additionally , Burton , a staunch opponent of what had come

t。

be known as "pork barrel legislation ," advocated local cost
sharing as a preferred method of determining the range of
viable project that should enjoy Federal assistance.
As a result of such efforts , a number of early 20th
century projects were authorized ·with cost sharing
provisions.

No standard procedure for requiring local cost

sharing was promulgated , however , until 1920 when the COE
annual appropriations bill was passed with language
requiring that the local and general benefits of a project
be identified and a recommendation made as to whether cost
sharing should be required (Reuss 1983 , 15).

It must

als。

be noted that a good deal of the discussion on efficiency
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concerns dealt more specifically with the institutional
arrangements within the Federal government (the competition
between executive and legislative branches to control the
direction of resource development pOlicy) than whether the
role of the Federal government in local and regional
resource development was sUbstantively correct.
The data on the subsequent development of
federally assisted navigation projects suggests that cost
sharing was only marginally effective in curtailing
congressional support for projects of questionable
efficiency.

The political feasibility of project support

was easily divorced from the economic feasibility of the
locals mustering sufficient funds to meet their apportioned
。bligation

(Reuss 1990 , 5).

Moreover , the issue of

federally assisted water resource development·, at least with
respect to inland navigation , was largely dominated by
ideological concerns: 1) the appropriate role of the Federal
interest in furthering national economic development ,
particularly in the West; 2) the struggle of the
Congress to reconcile rational economic development with the
preservation of their authority as the primary allocators of
Federal development dollars (Caulfield 1984 , 217).
Interestingly , the latter concern remains a potent influence
in the derivation and development of Federal resource
development policy , particularly with respect to the
promulgation of cost sharing initiatives.

67

Flood control had traditionally been seen as a
primarily local responsibility and federally assisted flood
control projects were generally entertained only in
conjunction with navigation improvement projects.

The first

significant Federal flood control legislation which
authorized projects was the Flood Control Act of 1917 which
authorized in excess of $50 million for control efforts
along the Mississippi and Sacramento Rivers (Reuss 1990 ,
13).

Earlier efforts such as the Swamp Lands Acts of 1849

and 1850 were generally land grants to states who assumed
and then sold flood plain lands with the proviso that the
revenues from such sales would be dedicated to state
sponsored flood control projects (Holmes 1973 , 4).
The Flood Control Act of 1917 required local interests
to cost share levee construction at a rate of

50웅

and

required that they provide the necessary lands and rights of
way to accomplish completion of the project (33 USC 701 ,
1917).
。f

The 1928 Flood Control Act reaffirmed the principle

cost shared flood protection projects but in deference

t。

the poverty of the region being served , the lower
Mississippi River valley , the local interests were , over
time , relieved of cost obligations other than the provision
。f

rights of way and operation and maintenance of the

projects (Seely 1987).
Flood control was formally acknowledged as a "proper
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activity of the Federal government in cooperation with
states , their political subdivisions , and localities
thereof" with passage of the Flood Control Act of 1936 , P.L.
The Act , which marked the beginning of

74-738.

comprehensive Federal flood control planning , greatly
expanded the scope of the Corp ’ s mission and reasserted
congressional control over federally assisted water resource
development , a particularly compelling contrast to the
general transfer of power to executive agencies which had
been underway since 1902.
Its passage , considered a response to both the
devastating floods of 1935 and the growing acceptance of the
necessity of federally assisted pUblic works , was not
without conflict.

Specifically , numerous questions were

directed at the local repayment provisions contained in or
。mitted

from the Act.

Congress and the Corps assumed the position that ,
unlike municipal water supply or hydro benefits , flood
control benefits were "widespread and general" with specific
beneficiaries unidentifiable.

Thus , flood control benefits

were treated as pUblic goods of a national order and payment
from a national account was deemed appropriate (Cook 1963 ,
427).

This position was further strengthened , at least

politically , by the poverty of the depression era
communities that were the likely beneficiaries of a
federally assisted flood control programs.

When considering
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the development of local repayment provisions it must be
remembered that the beneficiary regions along the
Mississippi that suffered devastating floods in the first
half of the 20th Century were also among the
nation ’ s poorest.

Further , the Act was perceived by many

to be as much a work relief measure as it was a Federal
respo~se

to acts of nature.

Critics also noted that the Act

failed entirely to address the issues related

t。

mUltipurpose , rational benefit based water resource
development planning.
Importantly , the Act also failed to require
construction repayment by local beneficiaries.

Rather , it

set forth the often referenced "a-b-c" requirements which
required local contribution of project lands , easements ,
rights of way , operation and maintenance responsibility , and
,

hold and save harmless provisions which provided that the
U.S. Government was free from all damages thatmay accrue as

a

resu~t

of the construction work.

These requirements ,

though subsequently repealed for construction of flood
control reservoirs by the

Flood Control Act of 1938 , became

the benchmark "local interest share" for all future
discussion of federally assisted water resource development
for flood control.
Confusion surrounded the implementation of the
requirements , particularly in the area of project lands
。wnership.

The language in the Act was sUfficiently
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ambiguous to suggest to some that title to project lands ,
and , thus , betterments within the project boundaries , were
not transferred to Federal ownership (Leuchtenberg 1953 ,
96).

This predicament was remedied by Federal largess in

1938 with passage of the Flood Control Act of 1938 which
asserted full Federal responsibility for flood control; an
assertion backed in no small measure by

100웅

Federal

funding.
For the next two decades discussion (and legislation
reflecting that discussion) continued on the appropriate
Federal role in flood control , the conflict between the
Congress and the Executive in determining which should serve
as initiator of a Federal water policy , and the extent

t。

which local interests should be involved in the planning ,
development , and funding of such a policy.

While

conservative administrations , such as that of Eisenhower ,
argued for a strengthened partnership with state interests
and , ostensibly , greater contributions on behalf of the
non-Federal interest , the Federal dominationof water
resource policy issues was generally supported jUdicially
and legislatively.

As a practical matter , the Federal

government , when compared to state and local government , had
。verwhelming

economic and technical dominance in planning as

well as those administrative areas White (1953) had
previously identified.
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The ongoing dialogue occasioned a number of
commissions , committees , and study groups constituted

t。

evaluate the various dimensions of a national water
resources policy.

These groups evaluated the contrasting

architectures of centralized and decentralized planning
systems and the viability of

implementin당

mUlti-purpose

regional water resource development planning in a political
environment that had been dominated by Congressional control
。ver

project selection.

As always , the bottom line of the

discourse ultimately involved a move away from a purely
ideological exchange to the more proximate concern of
pays."

"wh。

Cost sharing emerged as the compelling issue that

demanded the continued attention of all the players in the
water resource development policy arena.
In 1973 the National Water Commission , a seven member
commission authorized by Congress in 1968 , published its
final report in which it strongly urged an adoption of cost
share principles.

The Commission urged that , "Insofar as is

practicable and administratively feasible , the identifiable
beneficiaries of project services should bear appropriate
shares of development and operating costs through systems of
pricing or user charges ••• " (U.S. Congo Senate , Committee
。n

Public Works 1966 , 10).

Subsequently , a thorough

evaluation of the existing cost share requirements for
federally assisted water resource development programs and
an alternative model was provided by the Water Resources
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Council (WRC)

,

the details of this report having been

discussed earlier in the chapter (U.S. Water Resources
Council1975).
Notwithstanding the apparent momentum of the movement
to incorporate cost share principles into Federal
development policy , at least within the executive branch ,
the WRC in response to requirements of the 1965 water
Resources Planning Act published the Princioles and
Standards for Plannina Water and Related Land Resources in
1973.

For the Corps , and other executive agencies involved

in resource development , the Princioles and Standards
existed as the foundation of the planning and development
effort and was the policy basis for implementing agency
planning and engineering regulations.

other than to note

that cost share principles were under policy review by the
WRC , the Princioles and Standards was silent on the issue.
This ensured that , barring intervening legislation , the
status quo with respect to federal and federally assisted
project planning and development for navigation and flood
control would remain essentially unchanged; at least so it
appeared.
Though the struggle to integrate' cost share principles
into federal water resource development policy may appear
have been primarily an Executive initiative , Congress was
not without its cost sharing proponents.

By the 1970s the

t。
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demands of debt financing the Federal bUdget were so great
that "cost management" compelled a number of congressmen
reassess their position on Federal largess.

t。

Not

surprisingly , the scope and character of the sUbsidy
afforded the water resource development community became a
target for reassessment.

Significantly , the first major

cost share legislation did not directly address cost
sharing , as such , but focused on user charges for inland
navigation.
While the concept of "free waterways" was regarded by
many in the inland navigation industry as an immutable , if
not constitutionally guaranteed , right , there had been
mounting pressure from a number of sectors to temper the
scope of the Federal subsidy afforded the industry. As might
be expected , the rail industry was at the forefront of this
effort to reduce what it perceived as a pUblic subsidy to a
market competitor.

At the same time there was a growing

awareness that neither the renovation nor maintenance of our
inland waterway infrastructure was keeping pace with the
demands put on the deteriorating system
1987 , iv-v).

(Schillir맹

et. a l.

These forces , in conjunction with a Federal

bUdget increasingly driven by debt financing led in 1977

t。

the first serious waterway user fee proposal introduced by
Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico.
Domenici ’ s proposal would have implemented a fee system
。f

tolls and licenses that recouped

100캉 。 f

the operation
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and maintenance (O&M) costs of a project and
initial construction costs.

50 옹 。 f

the

Initial estimates for the cost

recovery mechanism suggested that some $200 million a year
would be recouped through the application of tolls and
license fees (Wall Street Journal June , 1977).

The bill ,

though successful in the Senate , was challenged by the House
which employed the seldom used tactic of notifying the
Senate that the measure (S.790) was a revenue generation
measure that should appropriately have been introduced in
the House (U.S. Congo senate , Committee on Environment and
civil Works 1978; Reid 1980 , 69-71).
The House compromise solution resulted in a graduated
rate fuel tax which required a levy of 4 cents a gallon for
two years with a subsequent increase to 6 cents.

Though

precedent setting , the schedule recaptured far less than the
anticipated revenues generated by Domenici ’ s proposal and
significantly less than the rate of 40 cents a gallon
suggested by then

S~cretary

of Transportation Brock Adams.

Adams argued , unsuccessfully , that any flat rate tax should
recover an amount similar to the amountthat would have been
recovered under the Senate plan (Reid 1980 , 79).
There followed a series of efforts that either failed
to meet the requirements of House/Senate conferees or faced
the swift and certain fate of a Presidential veto.

Carter

strongly supported both recapture of O&M costs and capital
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recovery and had been convinced to stand firm on his
position that both components be reflected in any authorizing legislation.

Ultimately , and strangely , the deadlock

was resolved by the establishment of a "Inland Waterway
Trust Fund" financed by a fuel tax.

The legislation was

skillfully attached to a bill that exempted bingo game
profits earned by political organizations from taxation.
Congress passed and Carter signed the bill into law on 21
October , 1978 thus establishing both the first user fee on
the nation ’ s waterways and further precedent for the
implementation of cost share principles in the development
。f

federally assisted water resource development policy

(Reid 1980 , 121-128).
The Reagan Administration in general , and OMB Director
David Stockman in particular , were strong advocates of cost
sharing.

This was consistent with

Rea딩an ’ s

belief that the

Federal government was larger (both in its budget and its
assumption of responsibility) than it needed to be.
Stockman reasoned that , where benefits were assignable (as
in navigation projects)

,

full cost recovery from users for

construction and O&M was appropriate (Knickerbocker March 3
1981 , 1).

There was strong opposition to this position

voiced by members of Congress and the affected industries.
stockman responded by intimating that without significant
cost sharing there would be no authorization for "large
scale new construction" for waterway or port improvements in
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the Administration ’ s bUdget request (National Waterways
Conference July 28 , 1981 , 1).
Waterway interests which had unsuccessfully fought

t。

defeat waterway user charge legislation saw cost sharing as
the next insidious step and were generally opposed to the
Some organizations , such as the Interstate

concept.

Conference on water Policy (ICWP)
inevitability of cost sharing.
。utright

,

recognized the

The ICWP abandoned its

opposition to cost sharing legislation and sought ,

rather , to ensure that cost sharing proposals effectively
provided for full participation of the non-federal interest
in project planning.

The ICWP identified such critical

study issues as the establishment of an equitable recovery
mechanism that recognized the difference of state and
federal bUdget cycles , the lack of uniform institutional
arrangements for water resource development across states ,
and the financial constraints faced by many potential nonfederal interests.
While there existed a good deal of pessimism in the
industry and Congress concerning the impact cost sharing
would have on water programs it was tempered by the belief
that , though things were not going well for those generally
。pposed

to a modification of traditional funding formulas

"things could hardly get worse •.• " for federally assisted
water resource development than they were during the Carter
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administration (Knickerbocker March 3 , 1981 , 14).
The rationale for cost sharing , at least from the
perspective of the Reagan Administration was not purely
economic , though the potential to transfer costs to nonFederal interests was certainly not lost on those whose job
it was to find cost savings in "discretionary" Federal
programs.

While the water resource development portion of

the Federal bUdget represented less than one-half of one
percent

(.05웅)

percent

(3 웅)

of the total , it represented over three

of that portion which was subject

t。

discretionary reductions.
There was also the issue of why it took so long for
"bad" projects to be dismissed from consideration.

The

Assistant Secretary of the Army for civil Works (1982)

,

William Gianelli , directed the Corps to review the status of
projects that had been considered for authorization in the
period 1973 to 1981.

Of the 462 studies evaluated during

that period 258 ultimately resulted in unfavorable reports ,
38 of the remaining 204 were authorized , and only 13
constructed (U.S. House of Representatives 1982 , 13-14).
Clearly , a good deal of time and money , virtually all of it
Federal , was spent evaluating projects that had little
chance of achieving fruition.
The traditional argument for the existence of this
condition generally focused on the lack of risk associated
with project advocacy by the non-Federal interest and their

78

congressional representatives and the willingness of the
Corps to engage in
projects.

Ion잉

range technical evaluation of such

Indeed , the Corps frequently mentioned the

twenty-plus year average it took for a major civil Works
project to move from conception to construction as a
testament to the quality of the planning effort which
supported Corps projects.

Marginal projects (from a

benefit-cost or environmental viewpoint) lingered at some
level of project review within the Corps hierarchy so long
as there existed a congressional "champion" and sufficient
study monies appropriated to fund the Corps ’ plan
formulation and design effort.

The local interests ,

wh。

typically had no direct investment beyond the "a-b-c"
requirements , generally sat patiently by and waited for the
tortuous process to deliver on its promise.
Cost sharing , which included cost shared planning ,
would revise that incentive structure by allocating a
portion of the planning costs to the non-Federal interest.
ostensibly this would result in the early termination of
projects that did not enjoy enthusiastic (financial) local
support and serve to redirect the technical resources of the
Corps toward those projects that were more likely to move
forward to authorization and construction.

The data on

"failed" projects hanging around in the planning process for
years simply provided yet more ammunition for those who were
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impatient with the pace of the project planning and
authorization process employed by the Corps and was
particularly useful to those cost sharing advocates who felt
they had a solution.
Reagan , like Carter , was insistent that any long term
solution to the water resource legislation impasse would
include some component of cost sharing.

Unlike Carter , he

was elected to a second term and enjoyed enormous political
popularity.

Following a series of hardline initiatives ,

policy swings (in reaction to criticism from Western
congressmen who felt cost sharing. was an anti-west
proposal)

, and extensive negotiations with Congress and the

industry , the Administration achieved a compromise solution
with the Senate in 1985 (McCool 1987 , 203).
The Senate bill (1985 Supplemental Appropriations Act ,
P.L. 99-88 passed August 15 , 1985) reflected a tentative
agreement on cost sharing between the Senate leadership and
the Administration , an agreement that was to become the
foundation of the WRDA 1986.

Previous efforts of the

Administration , including S. 809 (H.R. 2959)
deep draft ports , and S. 810 (H.R. 2962)

,

,

dealing with

which addressed

inland navigation , had attempted to recover

100옹

from the

local interest who would then attempt to recover costs
through fee assessment (U.S. CEQ 1981 , 156).

Though

unsuccessful , theseefforts were instrumental in forcing
movement on the cost sharing issue.
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The movement was , predictably , not achieved without a
great deal of political posturing.

Shipping interests , both

inland and port oriented , wanted assurance that the Federal
sector , and the Corps of Engineers in particular , would
accelerate the development process if a compromise on cost
sharing could be reached.

The water borne transportation

community emphasized their increasingly vocal position that
the interminable delays associated with water resource
project planning and approval were unacceptable even when
the Federal share of financing was

100 옹.

A variety of

formulas and plans were offered by members of Congress
seeking to appease industry and constituent interests while ,
at the same time , accommodating the Administration ’ s
position on shifting a portion of the burden of water
resource development to non-Federal interests.

As

previously noted , the congressional agenda also included an
effort to reassert the primacy of the legislative branch as
the force behind water resource development policy
initiatives and project selection.

Hearings

, proposals ,

demands , and negotiations continued unabated; project
authorization , on the other hand , was at a dead standstill.
Passage of the 1985 Supplemental Appropriations Act on
15

Augu~t ，

1985 broke the logjam.

The bill was almost

universally hailed as both landmark and imperfect , possibly
because it represented a product of frustration and-
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exhaustion as much as one of creative compromise.

The bill

provided $63.1 million dollars for 41 new start construction
projects with the caveat that no Federal money was to be
expended on the projects until such time as a cost sharing
agreement on each was reached between the non-Federal
interest and the Administration.

The Act established a

contingency date for resolution of cost sharing issues after
which the release of funds for the authorized projects would
be prohibited.
Reagan had made it clear that the Supplemental bill
would face a veto if it was sent to the Executive without
cost sharing language.

Execution of the agreements was

required before June 30 , 1986 or the funding authorization
was to be automatically revoked and there'were assurances
from the Senate leadership that cost share language ,
consistent with that set forth in the supplemental
legislation , would be included in any future omnibus water
bills referred to OMB (Conqressional Quarterlv June 22 ,
1985 , 1239).
On March 26 , 1986 the Senate passed S. 1567 , which was
similar in most ways to HR 6 , an omnibus water appropriation
bill passed by the House on November 13 , 1985.

The Senate

version of the legislation authorized fewer projects (180
vs. 360) , committed $8 billion dollars less in Federal
。utlays，

and demanded stricter cost share language than the

House version.

The resulting House-Senate conference was
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driven by a sense of inevitability as well as one of
urgency.

As Senator Moynihan stated , ’'Cost sharing is the

absolute minimum.

Absent that , there will be no legislation

and we will lose another decade" (Congressional Quarterly
March 29 , 1986 , 713).
Though HR 6 languished in conference for six months the
House , now facing a certain veto if it failed to agree

t。

stringent cost share language , capitulated to the Senate ’ s
recommended language.

The resulting legislation , the WRDA

1986 , was the last piece of legislation passed by the 99th
Congress and the first omnibus water resource development
legislation passed by Congress and signed into law since
1970.

Though it contained a large body of substantive water

related policy , the Act was immediately identified as the
most significant piece of cost sharing legislation in the
water resource development field.

As Senator Stafford

remarked at passage , liThe key to this bill - and possibly
the single most important reform ever crafted onto the
nation ’ s water resource development policy - is cost
sharing" (McCool 1987 , 203).
For the Corps of Engineers which had seen new start
construction steadily decline over the previous decade , the
Act was similarly historic.

While the administrative

ramifications were complex and promised to fundamentally
affect the relationship between the Army Corps of Engineers
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and its "clients" , it also served notice that , as
Congressman Robert Roe (NJ) stated following passage , "The
Corps is back in business" (Stanfield 1986).
Pre-WRDA1986Cost Sharinq For Coros-Pro;ects
Frequently lost in the discussion on the status and
impact of cost sharing is a recognition that the
implementation of cost share principles represents , in many
cases , an incremental adjustment rather than the
introduction of an entirely new financing strategy.

Former

Chief of Engineers E.R. Heiberg noted following passage of
the WRDA 1986 that:
The world hasn ’ t flipped 180 degrees. We didn ’ t
go from no cost sharing to 5 out of every 15
dollars- the estimated average between Federal and
non-Federal interest participation under the new
arrangement" (Engineering News Record April 23 ,
1987 , 24).
As Heiberg notes , it is the case that cost sharing , of
a variety , has enjoyed a broad if irregular and inconsistent
Federal application in the field of water resource
development.

Particularly alarming to those

wh。

have researched the implementation of cost share
principles is the variation in rates between agencies whose
functions (flood damage reduction) are comparable and the
rate bias (from a sponsors viewpoint) in favor of a
structural alternative.

For Corps projects , local

interests have , since passage of the Flood Control Act of
1936 , P.L. 74-738 , been required to provide the necessary
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lands , easements , rights-of-way (the "a-b-c" requirements
derived from section 3 of the Act) for project construction.
subsequent legislation resulted in relocations and dredge
disposal area requirements being added to the list of local
requirements , now referred to as the LERRO.

Thus , the

summed value of the local contribution was represented by
the market or estimated value of the required LERRO.
Additionally , specific cost share rates for Corps
projects were required on a "by feature" basis.

T。

appreciate the magnitude of the change the WRDA 1986
。 ccasioned，

a complete breakdown of feature and function

cost share rates prior to and subsequent to the Act are
set forth in the following tables IV , V, and VI.

A

review of the data set forth in the tables establishes
a historical basis for comparison of the cost share
provisions of the WRDA 1986 and its predecessors and
should serve to emphasize the fact that the WRDA 1986
is precedent setting only in the scope and application
。f

its cost share requirements.
Table V provides a by project funct.ion comparative

breakdown of how the WRDA 1986 shifted the financial
。bligation

in the direction of greater non-Federal

participation with the implementation of statutory cost
share formula.
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TABLE IV
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
COST SHARING ALLOCATION PRIOR TO WRDA 1986
PURPOSE

NON-FEDERAL SHARE CONSTRUCTION

HARBORS

0% Cost of construction. Provision of lands
easements , rights of way and disposal areas.

MAINTENANCE

O훌

FLOOD CONTROL
Structural

0%

Non-Structural

20%

HYDRO-POWER

100 훌

MUNICIPAL & INDUST.
WATER SUPPLY

100%

Of total construction cost. Provision of
lands , easements , and rights of way not
to exceed SO훌 。 f project costs.

Lands , easements , rights away included
as a portion of share.

AGRICULTURAL
WATER SUPPLY

SO 훌

RECREATION

50%

Lands , easements , and rights of way
included as a portion of share.

HURRICANE AND
STORM DAMAGE
PROTECTION

30%

Land , easements , and rights of way
included as a portion of share.

AQUATIC PLANT
CONTROL

30%

Lands , easements , and rights of way
included as a portion of share.
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TABLE V
COST SHARING ALLOCATION UNDER WRDA 1986
PURPOSE

NON-FEDERAL SHARE

CONSTRUCTION

10%
25%

Cost of construction for project depth ~ 20 ’
Cost of construction for project depth >20 ’
<45 ’

50%

Cost of construction for project depth >45
Provision of lands , easements , rights of
way and relocations , and disposal areas.

0%
50%

Project depth <45 ’
Project depth >45 ’

E’LOOD CONTROL
Structural

5훌

25%

50%
Non-Structural

25%

HYDRO-POWER

100%

MUNI/INDUS.
WATER SUPPLY

100 훌

AGRICULTURAL
WATER SUPPLY

35%

RECREATION

50%
50%

HURRICANE AND
STORM DAMAGE
PROTECTION

35%

AQUATIC PLANT
CONTROL

50 훌

Of total Project costs
Minimum contribution. (Includes value of
local provision of lands , easements ,
right-of-way disposal areas and
relocations (LERRD).
Maximum of total project cost. (5% cash
is not waived.)
Of total Project costs. Cash contribution
during project construction not required.

Separable costs of harbor/inland harbor project.
Joint and separable costs allocated to recreational navigation.
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As the tables reveal , the passage of the WROA 1986
represented a substantial shift toward increased non-Federal
financial participation in project construction and
maintenance.

Moreover , the percent-by-feature rates may

understate the full impact of the shift as non-Federal
sponsors are required to provide (for flood control
projects) a five percent

(5 웅)

of project cost cash

contribution even when LERRO meets the twenty-five percent
(25웅)

minimum contribution.

Table VII illustrates the

financing options provided in the WROA 1986 by project
purpose.
How significant is the shift in financial terms?

The

impact of the shift is depicted in Table VIII which provides
comparative data on a sample of early cost shared projects.•
The mean non-Federal share (cash and LERRO) for the
twenty-seven proj.ects listed in Table VIII under traditional
financing arrangements was an estimated $10 , 999 , 000.

The

estimated mean non-Federal share for those projects with
cost sharing was $23 , 463 , 000 , an increase of
When discussing

co~t

113 옹.

sharing and the impact of

transferring a portion of the development and construction
financial burden from the Federal interest , it is critical
that an appreciation of the concepts of nominal , effective ,
and composite cost sharing be achieved.

In the case of the

WRDA 1986 , such an understanding is most important due
the front-end or "pay-as-you-go" financing requirement
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lDl(d) of the Act.

In the estimation of some analysts , this

represents a greater burden to non-Federal sponsors than
does the overall requirement to cost share project
construction.

This requirement was ostensibly advocated by

the administration to make difficult congressional grants of
payment amnesty or to cancel debts incurred under the cost
sharing arrangement , a scenario reminiscent of the
congressional exemptions granted for reclamation payback
provisions (McCool 1987 , 203).
The nominal cost share rate is the rate established by
statute or regulation for a particular feature , function ,
etc.

The nominal cost share rates for the WRDA 1986 were

set out in Table V.

The effective cost share rate is

derived by calculating the Federal and non-Federal
contribution of the capital cost of the project , their
respective contributions to annual operating and maintenance
costs , and an accounting for deferred non-Federal
contributions to project cost.

The effective composite rate

includes all cash contributions , creditable contributions ,
O&M costs , the repayment period interest rate , and any
special transfers that accrue to the non-Federal interest.
For a single purpose flood control project with a
nominal cost share of twenty-five percent

(25옹)，

the

nominal cost share rates for the Federal and non-Federal
interests would be seventy-five
percent respectively.

(75ξ)

and twenty five

(25옹)

If , however , all O&M costs over the

100
life of the project accrued to the non-Federal interest ,
the effective cost share rate for the non-Federal interest
would be greater than twenty five percent
project cost.

(25 옹)

of total

conversely , if the non-Federal interest were

allowed to extend payment for construction cost interest
free over the life of the project , the Federal subsidy
would be considerable and so reduce the effective rate for
the non-Federal interest by some proportion.
Table II provided an overview of pre-WRDA 1986
effective , composite non-Federal cost share rates for the
Corps of Engineers and twenty other Federal agencies
involved in water resource development. 6
The WRDA 1986 established funding during construction
as a principal requirement of the non-Federal interest for
both navigation (Sec. 10 ], (a»
103(a».

and.flood control (Sec.

Arguably , the impact of pay-as-you-go financing

will be most acute for those projects (generally flood
contro~)

whose outputs are non-vendible and will require

sponsors to engage in some form of bond financing for the
local share.

The Act provides that for projects authorized

under Sec. 103 , the Secretary of the Army may permit
payments made by the non-Federal interest over the course
。f

construction to be without interest , to defer initial

payment for one year after construction has begun , or

t。

provide for repayment with interest over a period of not
more than 30 years from the date of completion of the

101
project or separable element.

As of 1992 , the data

revealed , somewhat surprisingly , that only two flood
control projects had applied for such relief under the Act.
Both projects were granted relief by the Secretary.
Though not explicitly referenced in the Act , the WRDA
1986 establishes de-facto a purpose-linked incentive
structure which acknowledges the variability of features
(variable cost share ratios for navigation , recreation ,
water supply , etc.) and the magnitude of proposed activities
(variable cost share ratios for deep draft projects where
final depth is the determinant).

Analysis of this

combination of intergovernmental cost reallocation and the
existence of incentives embedded in the legislation suggests
the possibility of a set of anticipated or induced behaviors
that one might conclude non-Federal interests would

en당age

in to offset the additional financial burden imposed by the
increased cost share requirement.
The literature on cost shared water resource
development , both the political and the economic , is
largely concerned with the tractability of implementing
large scale programs which involve significant policy
redirection and the impact of policy change on program
。utput.

This research focuses on three aspects of the

process addressed as significant issues by the literature:
1) The significance of issues raised by the
literature regarding the criticality of a
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plausible "theory" underlying the implementation
effort;
2)

An examination of evidence of actual program
for purposes of comparison with what the
literature suggests those outputs should be;

。utputs

3) To provide a context for discussion of the
findings on the implementation process analysis
and to establish the linkage between the
negotiated design outcomes of actual project and
the implementation process.
Tractability concerns involve the extent and severity of
the condition being considered for treatment.
problem solvable?

Is the

Clearly , goal definition has a great deal

to do with the issue of tractability.

Eradicating poverty

is a worthy goal , but so stated the goal is sUfficiently
imprecise as to be practically unachievable.

The

tractability issues associated with cost sharing are more
circumscribed , and thus easier to measure and analyze.
Earlier sections of this chapter set forth both the
theoretical foundations for establishing cost share
legislation and the cost share formulas established by
project function in the WRDA 1986.

With this framework in

place , the analysis of programmatic outputs proceeded.
The literature establishes a set of expectations as

t。

how the non-Federal interest will react to cost sharing
both as a rational economic actor and a political
constituent.

Marshall (1969 , 1982) established the

theoretical case for application of the Association Rule
which calls for charging local beneficiaries a percentage of
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the project cost equal to their marginal benefit for that
project which reflects the nationally efficient project
design.

Absent such a procedure , local interests will be

induced to argue for a project that maximizes local benefits
without regard to national benefits.
As the WRDA 1986 applies cost share ratios across the
board by project function without regard to individual
projects , it is reasonable to assume that non-Federal
interests would exhibit some strategies to influence
project design both with regard to maximization of local
benefits and their ability to fund the preferred project.
For ease of analysis it was presumed that no one project
would be exempted from cost sharing and that , while the
percentages may change due to subsequent legislation , the
application of charges would be consistent across projects
。ver

time.
In broad terms , the available literature , including

the pronouncements of the water resource development
industry , suggested that local optimization strategies
would likely focus on cost reduction to the non-Federal
interest and would consist of: 1) shifting cost elements of
a project to a Federal purpose , 2) staging or phasing
construction so as to reduce the initial capital outlay
requirement , 3) reducing the overall size or scope of the
planned project , 4) eliminating project features that may be
legally deleted from the plan.

Having established these
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predicted behaviors , the research will proceed to evaluate
the relationship between such incentives and the study
assertions established above with the empirical data
available on cost shared projects in an attempt to identify
the impacts of cost sharing on projects designed and
constructed under cost share criteria.
strategic planning on the behalf of local interests
has , of course , implications which extend well beyond the
design of the approved project.

Notwithstanding their

inability to modify the legislated policy , policy opponents
may attempt policy redesign through the negotiation of
incremental compromise with their bureaucratic counterparts
。n

project particulars; implementation as the "continuation

。f

politics by other means" (Bardach 1977).

Indeed , the

impact of implementing cost sharing on the plan formulation
and project development model employed by the Corps of
Engineers may well be as significant as the cumulative
impact on project design.
The financial impact of cost sharing , at least in a
macro sense , is relatively simple to appreciate. What is
not so readily evident is the impact of that financial
shift on project design and the development of a
restructured partnership arrangement between the Federal
government , the Corps , and the non-Federal interest.
Former Assistant Secretary of the Army for civil Works
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(ASACW)

,

Robert Dawson , optimistically noted that ,

One of the great advantages of cost sharing is
that there ’ s going to be a renewed challenge of
Corps criteria because those who will be paying a
big share of the cost are going to demand that
things be reasonable" (ENR April 23 , 1987 , 24).
Reasonableness , in this case , is a complex construct
that will be reflected both in the evolution of the design
and scope of projects as a result of cost sharing and the
interorganizational dynamics of the tiered partnership in
project planning envisioned by the WRDA 1986.

An empirical

analysis of those "reflections" and the questions raised in
this summary of the literature is· the sUbject of the
following chapters.
CONCLUSION
The literature set forth in this chapter on the
implementation research , the theoretical framework of cost
shared water resource development , and the historical
antecedents of the WRDA 1986 encompass a broad and rich area
。f

study.

The literature reviews were established

independently by subdivision so as to provide the framework
within each to raise issues specific to that literature.
is , however , the relationships and interdependencies of
those issues that are the focus of this research.
With respect to the literature on the policy
implementation process , this research will attempt
examine the explanatory capacity of a theoretical

t。

It
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implementation model to the process of implementing the WRDA
Specifically , the research will seek to identify and

1986.

test implementation variables , independent conditions that
contribute to the success or failure of policy
implementation initiatives.

It will then proceed to address

issues raised in the literature regarding the impact of
position in the intergovernmental implementation hierarchy
。none ’ s

perspective of the identified variables.

A

detailed discussion of the approach the research proposes

t。

provide data on these issues and the development of testable
hypotheses is set forth in Chapter III.
The questions raised by the cost sharing literature
deal more precisely with a body of theory that suggests how
rational actors within the pUblic sector will perform given
limited resources to commit to water resource development
and a specified set of incentives.

A significant portion of

that literature , previously discussed in this chapter , deals
with the optimal sizing of projects and suggests how
projects planned with and without cost sharing restraints
may differ in important ways.

utilizing the passage of the

WRDA 1986 as the catalyst event , this research proceeds

t。

focus on issues related to the empirical impact cost sharing
has on

p~ojects，

and to develop and test assumptions

established in the literature related to the sizing of
projects under cost shared planning principles , construction
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scheduling of cost shared planning , and the influence of
cost shared planning on project environmental features.
Chapter III establishes the set of hypothesesand
assumptions that will serve as the focus of this research
and the basis of subsequent inferential findings and
discussion.
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ENDNOTES
1. For a thorough accounting of market mechanisms and
efficiency criteria with respect to water resources see John
Krutilla and otto Ekstein ’ s classic , Multiple Purpose River
Development , 1958.
2. The NED plan will be referenced and discussed
throughout this researchwith particular attention paid t。
the effects of employing environmental quality protection as
a planning constraint and the role of plan acceptability as
a qualifying factor.
3. For the sake of simplicity let us assume that the
majority of benefits from the project will accrue to an
identifiable population within specified geographic and
jurisdictional boundaries.
4. For a thorough treatment of how project demand
functions are derived see Harold E. Marshall ’ s discussion in
The Relationship Between Local Cost Sharinq and Efficient
Water-Resource Develooment , and unpublished Doctoral
dissertation submitted to the Graduate Council of George
Washington University in 1969.
5. For a particularly concise yet thorough treatment
the history see Beatrice Hort Holmes ’ Historv of Federal
Water Resource Proqrams and Policies , a two volume
pUblication of the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture. Volume 1
covers the period 1800-1960 and volume 2 the period 19611970.
。f

6. For a thorough discussion and treatment of the
distinction between cost share rate and finance alternatives
see the U"S. Water Resources Council ’ s section 80(c) studY.
Part 5A. ootions for ootions for Cost Sharinq:
Implementation and OM&R Cost Sharinq for Federal and
Federallv Assisted Water and Related Land Proqrams , 1975.

CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Implementation analysis may be process oriented
(focusing on the inter-institutional dynamics of getting a
program "on the ground")

, impact oriented (assessing program

achievements which occur as result of mediated conflict
during implementation)

,

or some combination of analyses that

attempts to portray the broader picture.

This research

effort is of the latter variety insofar as it seeks

t。

evaluate and measure the implementation of legislation
within the parameters of a structured model as well as
explore the empirical impacts cost shared project
development has on the final product.

Because this research

attempts to explore dimensions of both process and empirical
impact a variety of methodological tools and procedures ,
both qualitative and quantitative , were selected for
application.
As the process analysis and impact analysis proposed
by this research require different methodological approaches ,
the study is divided into logical subdivisions which address
the specific process or phenomena under examination and
provide a discussion of the research methodology employed.
For purposes of clarity , the discussion of hypothesis
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derivation , research protocol , and data analysis shall
be handled independently for both the process and impact
analysis.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT: ANALYSIS OF IMPLEMENTATION VARIABLES
The literature on the application of methodology

t。

implementation is , if possible , even less positive than that
。f

the early implementation analysis literature.

criticism and qualifications appear legion.

The

A sampling of

the criticism in the literature , though by no means
exhaustive , would include the following:
1. Application of a logical positivist
paradigm has led to a narrow focus on goals
achievement that may fail to account for intangible
and long term policy effects (Rossi and Wright
1985) or lead researchers to confuse the
consequence of implementation , the product (program
。utcomes) ， with the process (policy implementation)
(Goggin 1986 , 330).
2. Case studies , while they have been useful
in constructing general explanations for policy
implementation successes and failures have not been
helpful in differentiating among type of
implementation outcomes , the causal patterns
associated with these outcomes , or the relative
importance of the various independent variables
(Lester 1987 , 205).
3. Data gathered from the application of the
various implementation models and analytical
frameworks has not been integrated into a coherent
systematic body of knowledge that would support
theory development research (Palumbo 1987 , 91).
4. The increasing complexity of the analytical
frameworks employed has led to a loss of parsimony
and intractable methodological problems as
identified variable mUltiply in number and
complexity (Ingram 1987).
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The foundation of the problem rests with the lack of
agreement as to what factors generally contribute to the
success or failure of implementation.

As there is

n。

general agreement on a predictive theory of implementation ,
particularly one that has application across program type ,
there is also no agreement on what variables are most
important to consider (0 ’ Toole and Montjoy 1984).

This

condition is further complicated by the case study method of
analysis

which suffers from a condition where the number of

variables outstrips by orders of magnitude the number of
cases.

The complexity of the analysis , in addition to being

methodologically intractable , makes it difficult to reduce
the number of variables to the few that are "critical" or
understand the relative importance and independent effects
。f

each independent variable (Goggin 1987 , 21).
This subdivision deals specifically with a discussion of

a process oriented research design which seeks to address
limited concerns of the literature involving the viability
。f

developing and ranking selected implementation variables

and the impact the perspective of the rater imposes on that
ranking.
Selection Of Model
As discussed in Chapter II , there exists a number of
models that have been employed to explain the policy
implementation process.

Though there exists some scholarly
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disagreement on the number of generational sUb-groupings the
models may be divided into

(0

’ Toole

1986 , Lester et. ale

1987 , Goggin et. ale 1990) it is generally conceded that
there has been a progressive evolution of research both in
terms of the overall complexity of the models advanced ,
the cumulative nature of the design , and its ability
to integrate prior research.
For the purpose of this research , it was necessary

t。

first identity those models which addressed the broader
theoretical concerns of implementation rather than those
which focused more narrowly on the descriptive framework of
the process.

This decision was not made to discount the

richness and utility of the early case study research as a
good deal of the insight and knowledge resulting from that'
research is herein referenced.

The case study approach'is ,

however , inherentlY limited in that its findings do not
easily lend themselves to generalization nor does that
promote the systematic identification of theoretically
critical variables.

As this research focused on an

appreciation of the nature and role of implementation
variables in the policy implementation process , it was
necessary to first eliminate models that did not offer a
general theoretical framework and a developed position on
implementation variables.
Following a survey of existing models in the
literature , two were determined to meet the necessary
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evaluation criteria.

Selected for comparison were Mazmanian

and Sabatier ’ s multivariate implementation model (1983) and
Edwards critical factors model (1980).

Each addressed

theoretical concerns , was mindful of the need for parsimony
in the variable identification process , focused on the
explanatory capacity of their approach , and offered a set of
conditions or variables which served as a basis for the
evaluation of observed relationships in the implementation
process.
Mazmanian and Sabatier ’ s multivariate implementation
model was selected as the preferred model for this research
primarily due to it ’ s adaptability to intergovernmental
pOlicy evaluation , the thoroughness of the model's formal
structure , and because it provided the most comprehensive
list of

'’ factors" (Lester 1987 , 203) associated with the

implementation process.

While Edward ’ s model offered an

excellent and insightful analytical framework it was
rejected due to: 1) the breadth of its four "preconditions"
to successful implementation made them difficult
。perationalize

t。

for measurement; and 2) the model offered a

less than fully realized systems

dia당ram

that might be used

to explain the interaction of the preconditions with respect
to other activities occurring in the implementation process.
As previously discussed in the literature review , the
model 'set forth by Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) provides
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perhaps the most thorough identification of independent
variables whose presence or absence influence the
implementation process and determine the ultimate
effectiveness of programs associated with that process.

In

this instance , the choice of the model was made both because
。f

its comprehensiveness and , when compared with competing

models , its ability to lend itself to measurement of the
dimensions under examination in this research.

Most

importantly , the model specified an intergovernmental
implementation hierarchy that accurately reflected the
actual implementation environment of the WRDA 1986.
The model necessarily makes certain assumptions about
how implementation effectiveness should be measured.

These

assumptions have been challenged by competing researchers.
It is thus helpful here to briefly discuss their usefulness
in light of this research.

Mazmanian and Sabatier argue for

evaluation that focuses on the attainment of the legal
。bjectives

of legislation , the intended outcomes and

。bjectives

of conscious policy choices made by the

legislative branch of government.

Where there exist clear

and precise legal objectives there exist also evaluative
criteria against which program outputs can be measured.

A

clear advantage of such an approach rests with the ability
to specify , and perhaps quantify , legislative goals against
which performance can be measured.
Given the range of opinion on implementing cost sharing
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as an integral component of water resource development , it
was considered particularly crucial that the selected model
be able to account for measurable differences in assessment
。f

the implementation process in general and critical

factors in particular.

Mazmanian and Sabatier ’ s model ,

mindful of the need to recognize the iterative nature of
policy reformulation and the contributions sub-system
personnel make to policy adjustment , acknowledges the
significance of the role of perspective in the
implementation process.
Three perspectives are identified in the model: the
드르nt르흐，

the nucleus of policy formulation , the oerioherv ,

field level officials in charge of program implementation ,
and the

1르.rg르호，

or group at whom the pOlicy is directed.

Mazmanian and Sabatier note that each population is likely
to perceive policy implementation and evaluate its success
differently , though each would ostensibly share a common
desire to see the intended legal objectives of the policy
accomplished.
In certain cases outright conflict may exist
between two or more of the group perspectives regarding the
appropriateness of objectives.

This is most likely to be

the case when the target group is in basic disagreement with
the selected policy or where the method , manner , or
resourcing of implementation is contested by administrative
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personnel. (In bottom-up models , value

jUd당ments

on these

inevitable differences make measurement of successful
implementation very difficult as the goal is constantly
compromised by the ongoing analysis of the merit of the
intended policy.)

Open intergroup conflict will , of course ,

demonstrably add to the difficulty of successfully achieving
intended objectives.

In fact , there is an equally good

chance that under those conditions there will be not be
agreement on the character or magnitude of outcomes.
SUbsequent adjustments and policy reformulation exercises in
such cases lend credence to the theory that policy
implementation is a good deal more recursive than linear.
A more normative assumption would be one that assumes
general group agreement on broad intended objectives with
differentiated views of process effectiveness.

Under such

conditions , all three groups will generally concur on the
correctness of an intended policy (at least with regard

t。

intended outcomes) though there may be disagreement on the
regulatory interpretation by administrative agencies , the
criteria by which success of the policy will be measured
(quantity of service delivered versus measurable
remediation)

,

or , as Mazmanian and Sabatier so correctly

note , a failure to appreciate the incentive structure
required to promote change in the target population.
Consistent with the model ’ s formulation , there existed ,
within the implementation process for the WRDA 1986 , three
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hierarchical groups are identified as follows for purposes
。 f this research: 1
Center - Staff personnel from the Headquarters ,
Army Corps of Engineers (HQUSACE) or HQ level
policy personnel.
Periphery - Corps of Engineers implementing
personnel at the District or Division level.
Target - Local sponsors (non-Federal interests) of
cost shared water resource development projects.
A word here about the determination of groups is
appropriate.

Typically , according to Mazmanian and

Sabatier ’ s model , the Center is composed of legislative
policy makers.

However , for the purpose of this research it

was determined that headquarters level agency personnel
would better represent the Center.

This determination was

based on the fact that Headquarters , US Army Corps of
Engineers (HQUSACE) staff personnel had lengthy and close
professional involvement with and knowledge of the
legislative process related to the development of cost
sharing legislation.

In fact , most of the data used by

legislative proponents of the WRDA 1986 was prepared or
provided by the COE.

Moreover , the Assistant Secretary of

the Army for Civil Works (ASACW) and Corps HQUSACE were
responsible for promulgation of initial regulations
implementing the legislation consistent with the intent of
the legislative language and history.

Lastly , these

individuals were far easier to identity (as significantly
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involved in research related issues)
more accessible than congressmen.
。f

,

and were relatively

As it was also the intent

this research to quantify and compare intra-agency

perceptions it appeared reasonable to so identify the
groups.
The identification of the Periphery was a relatively
straightforward procedure consistent with the theoretical
framework of the model.

Field level implementing officials

within the COE are typically District level project
management personnel.

with the advent of life cycle project

management (LCPM) in 1989 the task of identification was
made even easier as COE project managers at the District
level were designated at project inception (typically
referred to as the reconnaissance study phase) and remained
functionally responsible for project status throughout
construction.

Thus , it was possible to identify an

accountable individual who was directly responsible for
interpreting and implementing cost sharing regulations

t。

Target group personnel. (previously , managers were assigned
responsibility for managing a scheduled portion of project ,
e.g.

,

the planning phase.)
Similarly , the Target group was easily identified for

research purposes as either executive representatives of the
non-Federal interests (all of whom represent pUblic sector
sub-Federal units of government or development agencies)
involved in negotiations of Local Cooperation Agreements
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(LeAs) for water resource development projects between 1986
and 1991 or personnel from associations representing the
interests of the non-Federal interest community in water
resource development legislation.

Understandably , the true

Target population would include the full range of interests
and institutions associated with water resource development.
The views of this larger population are explored in the
several chapters devoted to developing the historical and
theoretical backgrounds of cost sharing.

However , in

specifying both project recipient interests and
"institutional" interests from development associations the
Target population comprised a reasonably broad sample whose
views were thought to be highly consistent with those of the
total population.
For ease of analysis , the terms non-Federal interest ,
local interest and sponsor are used interchangeably in the
following chapters.

Where the non-Federal interest position

is represented by a formal association or professional group
the association/group is identified.
Mazmanian and Sabatier ’ s implementation framework
provides a flow diagram of variables involved in the
implementation process and a logical sequencing of events
which they refer to as dependent variable stages (see Table
IX).

Seventeen independent variables are combined into three

broad categories , each of which will be discussed in detail
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below.

Prior to examining the composition of the

independent variables it is important to first grasp an
appreciation of the composition of the broad categories.
Tractabilitv Of The Problem.

The first major category

is identified as Tractability of the Problem , and as the
name implies , is composed of variables which attempt

t。

measure the "difficulty" of the problem behavior or
condition.

The model notes that some problems are simply

much more difficult to ameliorate.

The four variables which

comprise the category involve:
1. Technical difficulties associated with the
solution;
2. The diversity of the behavior sUbject
treatment;

t。

3. The size of the Target population as a
percentage of the total population;
4.

The extent of change required.

Mazmanian and Sabatier note that though each variable may be
considered separately , they also be combined to provide a
summary index of tractability (See Table IX).
The task of implementing cost sharing is admittedly
quite different from that of eradicating poverty or
providing shelter for the homeless , and it is different in
some important , if obvious , ways.

There is ample

evidence that a significant number of authorized projects
have successfully negotiated Local Cooperation Agreements
and there is no evidence that the policy is being considered
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TABLE IX
MODEL FLOW DIAGRAM

Tracta 삐 Ityofthe

Problem
1. Technical difficμIties
2. Diversity of target group
behavior
3. Target group as a percentage 이 the population
4. Extent of behavioral
change 얘quir，뼈

•
Ability of Stat띠eto
Structure Implementa·
tion
1. Clear and consistent
objectives
2. Incorporation of adequate causal theory
3. Initial allocation of financial resources
4. Hierarchical integration
within and among implementing institutions
5. Decision rules of implementing agencies
6. Recruitment of implementing officials
7. Formal access by outsiders

|

•
Nons뻐tutory Variables
Affecting Implementation
1. Socioeconomic conditions and technology
2. Public support
3. Attitudes and resources
of constituency groups
4. Support from sovereigns
5. Commitment and leadership skill of implementing officials

Stages (Dependent Variables) In the Implement 삐삐 Proc빼빼
Policy outputs of
Compliance
implementing ~ with p미icy ~
agencies
outputs by
target groups

Adual
Perceived
Major revision
impacts ~ impacts ~ in statute
of policy
of policy
outputs
outputs

Source: Implementation and PUblLc_Policv. Daniel
Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier (eds.). Scott , Foresman and Co.
1983.
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for elimination.

The cost sharing principles were

reauthorized in the Water Resources Development Acts of 1988
and 1990.

Indeed , in her testimony before the House

Subcommittee on Public Works and Transportation ASACW Nancy
Dorn noted that cost sharing remained a guiding principle of
water resource development in times of fiscal austerity.
"Cost sharing serves as a market test of a project ’ s merits
and insures active participation by project sponsors"
(1992) •
Notwithstanding the previously discussed political
difficulties associated with enactment of cost sharing
legislation , the data of the past eight years indicates that
successful implementation of the policy is a manageable if
not always easy task.

Thus , Tractability.of the Problem , and

the associated sub-variables , are not included in the
technique survey. , This action is consistent with the
caveats of the model wherein Mazmanian and Sabatier observe
that attempting to measure tractability complicates the
utility of estimating the potential for implementation
effectiveness (1983 , 42).
The sub-variables under Tractability are not
theoretically trivial , however , and are not dismissed by
this study.

They will be addressed the discussions which

follow on the theoretical foundations of cost sharing and
referenced in Chapter V wherein the empirical impacts of
cost-sharing on project development are evaluated.
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Abilit~of

Statute_to

StructureImplementa~ion.

The

seven independent variables which comprise the subcategory ,
Ability of Statute to Structure Implementation , may be
thought of as measures of the extent to which pOlicy makers
have attempted to structure a rational and coherent
implementation strategy , a measure which Mazmanian and
Sabatier assure us is a predictor of successful attainment
。f

legal objectives (1983 , 25).

The variables within the

sub-category include:
1. Precise and clear ranking of legal objectives.
The precision with which objective can be
unambiguously stated correlate positivelywith the
likelihood that policy outputs will be the intent
。 f the directive(s).
2. Validity of causal theory. Policy objectives
and implementation plans , implicitly or
explicitly , involve a theory which seeks t。
explain the linkage between the desiredobjectives
and the implementation strategy; the reason for
believing that a particular combination of
actions , resources , etc. will result in a specific
and predictable outcome. Inadequate causal
theory , while seldom considered during "on the
ground implementation" is frequently the
underlying cause of failed implementation
3. Initial allocation of financial
resources. Obviously ,‘ there is some positive
correlation between the resourcing of an effort
and the potential for desired outcomes.
Inadequate funding may so impair a program ’ s
potential that failure by virtually any measure· is
inevitable and so suggests an initial lack of
support or commitment from policy makers.
4. Hierarchical integration within and among
implementing institutions. Hierarchical
integration represents the extent to which groups
within the implementation chain are integrated or
committed to compliance with the program.
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Mazmanian and Sabatier and note that such
commitment may be measured by the willingness of
individuals within the chain who represent veto/
clearance points to acquiesce to the larger goals
and legal objectives of policy makers.
5. Decision rule of implementing agencies. similar
to the provision for precise and clear objectives ,
legislation can stipulate the parameters for
decision rules promulgated by the implementing
agency; thus further ensuring compliance with
broad objectives and reducing the potential for
interpretive deviancy by agency personnel.
6. Recruitment of implementing official ’ s. The
strong commitment of implementing agency officials
to support the attainment of legal objects is
imperative; conversely , a weak or restrained
commitment by those officials may serve to defeat
attainment or permit the substantial modification
。 f implementation strategy from that intended.
T。
the extent that it is practicable , policy makers
through implementation legislation may choose or
influence the choice of implementing officials
that share a similar commitment to the objectives
。 f the legislation~
7. Formal access by outsiders. statutes which
provide for formal access in the implementation
process by affected outsiders (often Target group
members) or other advocates of the intended legal
。bjectives are more likely to have their
。 bjectives met.
This observation confirms the
potential of institutionalized pUblic support.
Nonstatutorv variables.

Subvariables under the third

category , Nonstatutory Variables Affecting Implementation ,
acknowledge the impact politics and social change have on
the implementation process.

Mazmanian and Sabatier note

that while a carefully crafted statute may assist the
attainment of legal objectives , a number of non-legal forces
will serve to support or undermine the viability of programs
to effect change.

Among these forces which may be
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。perationalized

as variables are:

1. socioeconomic conditions andtechnology.
Successful implementation may be adversely or
favorably affected by economic swings and/or
socioeconomic adjustments that markedly change the
magnitude of the problem under treatment or
result in shifting political preferences among
Target groups. Technological advances may s。
radically modify the composition of the solution
set that the problem being treated requires
redefinition.
2. Public support. The ability of a policy issue
and its associated program solution to maintain
pUblic support (funding) over time may have a
significant effect on the success of
implementation , particularly in those instances
where long range solutions call for a constant
application of resources.
3. Attitudes and resources of constituency
groups. Changes in the potency of constituency
groups , whether opposed or in favor of program
。bjectives， will influence their ability t。
intervene and influence the implementation
process.
4. Support from sovereigns.. Mazmanian and
Sabatier define sovereigns as the institutions
which control the legal and financial resources of
an implementing agency. These typically include
legislative bodies , the executive branch , the
courts. etc. When conflict exists between
sovereigns with respect to legal objectives the
implementing agency may align itself with the
sovereign that will likely provide the greatest
level of long term support.
5. Commitment and leadership skills of
implementing officials. The model suggests that
the variable which most directly affects the
attainment of objectives is the commitment of
implementing officials to the objectives and the
skill with which they are able to marshal
resources , including consistent internal support ,
to achieve those objectives.
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THE CONDITIONS OF EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION
Having delineated a detailed subset of variables
Mazmanian and Sabatier admit that the list is somewhat
"imposing" for a practitioner attempting to perform an
implementation analysis (1983 , 41).

The same observation

may be made with regards to methodological interpretation.
Pretests were conducted which asked a limited sample
population to rank order the full range of sub-variables.
The findings indicated a general criticism that the coding
scheme was ineffective due to both the large number of
variables and the fact that , in the minds of the evaluators ,
a number of variables were so similar as to be
indistinguishable for purposes of measurement.
Recognizing that parsimony is imperative in generating
"on the ground estimates ," the model performs what amounts
to a factor analysis of the established sub-variables and
defines a set of six sufficient conditions of effective
implementation.

The model goes on to assert that these

conditions , if met to a high degree , virtually assure the
accomplishment of implementation goals.

The conditions ,

which are readily recognizable as a recombination of the
sub-variables from the aforementioned sUbcategories are as
follows:
1. The enabling legislation or other legal
directive mandates policy objectives which are
clear and consistent or at least provides
substantive criteria for resolving goal conflicts.

127

2. The enabling legislation incorporates a sound
theory identifying the principal factors and
causal linkages affecting policy objectives and
gives implementing official sufficient
jurisdiction over Target groups and other points
。 f leverage to attain , at least potentially , the
desired goals.
3. The enabling legislation structures the
implementation process so as to maximize the
probability that implementing officials and Target
groups will perform as desired. This involves
assignment to sympathetic agencies with adequate
hierarchical integration , supportive decision
rules , sufficient financial resources , and
adequate access to supporters.
4. The leaders of the implementing agency possess
substantial managerial and political skill and are
committed to statutory goals.
5. The program is actively supported by or잉anized
constituency groups and by a few key legislators
(or a chief executive) throughout the
implementation process , with the courts being
neutral or supportive.
6. The relative priority of statutory objectives
is not undermined over time by the emergence of
conflicting pUblic policies or by changes in
relevant socioeconomic conditions which weaken the
statute ’ s causal theory or political support.
Mazmanian and Sabatier observe that while the first
conditions must always be met at least moderately well

tw。

t。

achieve effective implementation , achievement of the latter
four may be relaxed depending on the degree of change
required.

They do not , however , suggest any order of

criticality beyond that.
As previously mentioned , a first question of this
research considered whether to conduct a survey on the basis
。f

the full set of independent variables or restrict the
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survey to the sUfficiency conditions outlined in the model.
A pretest utilizing a survey which called for a relational
rating of all variables within the statutory and nonstatutory sUb-categories was administered to a sample of
management personnel from the Corps of Engineers , all of
whom were familiar with the cost sharing program.

The

results were unpromising with many of the respondents
reporting that the survey was unworkably complex and several
noting that significant overlap between variables made it
difficult to rate individual variables independently.
Moreover , it was felt that project managers ofthe nonFederal interests would have even greater difficulty
responding to the survey as they were less likely to have
specific information on variables which dealt with intraagency organizational structure , the relationship between
the COE and constituent institutions , etc.

As the research

was designed to compare ratings of variable criticality
across groups and perspectives , this
a major impediment.

shortcomin당

represented

Therefore , it was determined that the

gain in specificity associated with surveying across the
full set of independent variables was more than offset by
the potential for confused' , inaccurate , or incomplete
responses.
For the reasons stated above , the decision was made

t。

substitute Mazmanian and Sabatier ’ s sufficient conditions
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for the full set of independent variables in conducting the
analysis.

This determination was made because: 1) the

survey of combined variables was far simpler to complete and
interpret and , thus , more likely to render accurate
responses; 2) Mazmanian and Sabatier ’ s work in interpreting
program implementation utilizing the

measuremen~

of

sUfficiency conditions offers evidence that such analysis is
both methodologically feasible and capable of providing
information on implementation that is of sufficient quality
to be useful in theory development.
It is assumed , then , for the purpose of this research
that the sufficient conditions delineated by the model
include the "true" set of significant factors.

Moreover ,

the sufficient conditions will be hereafter referenced as
implementation variables (VAR1 through VAR6) defined by the
model unless specifically otherwise identified.
Hvpotheses
Having established the choice of an implementation
model and set forth its salient characteristics , the
research then focused on specifying·that set of critical
issues raised by the literature which would serve as the
basis for formulation of testable hypotheses.
Acknowledging the criticisms in the literature with
respect to the lack of data on variable significance and the
need for such theory building information , the
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research focused on two aspects established by the model: 1)
the perceived significance of variables established by the
model; 2) the effect of position in the implementation
hierarchy on rating the significance of the defined
variables.
with regard to the first area , data on rank。rdering

the variables were collected and statistically

evaluated to establish an overall ranking of significance.
The model does not suggest a theoretically normative ranking
against which statistical tests could be applied , but does
note that the first two variables must always be met
moderately well whereas successful implementation may be
achieved when fairly low ratings are recorded for variables
3 through 6.
While Mazmanian and Sabatier attempted to test for the
extent to which a particular variable was "met" within a
specific implementation environment they did not go on

t。

test whether the assumptions of the model regarding variable
criticality were shared by the participants of the process.
Their findings rest on empirical observations which suggest
that the legal objectives of a policy will most likely be
met when all six variables are met , and that failure is most
likely to occur when variables 1 and 2 are not met.
This assertion implies that individuals involved in a
policy implementation exercise would , consistent with the
theory , rank variables 1 and 2 higher on a significance
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scale than variables 3 through 6.

To address that

assumption the following null hypothesis was tested.
Hypothesis (1): The clarity of enabling
legislation and the soundness of its supporting
theory are not considered significantly more
important than other variables in the
implementation process by individuals involved in
the implementing of pUblic policy.
Mazmanian and Sabatier and Sabatier note that the three
perspectives identified by the model may view the
implementation of any program quite differently.

Likewise ,

it is reasonable to ask whether those differences would be
reflected in rating the significance of the models
implementation variables.

The very existence. of the ’'bottom

up" school of implementation suggests that significant and
meaningful differences on "what ’ s important" may extend
beyond simple disagreement with what and how a service is
being delivered , and that the gap between Periphery and
Target groups may be less than that between the Periphery
and the Center (Lipsky 1980).

It follows that it is

then theoretically important to assess whether these
。bserved

differences extend to evaluations of what

constitutes the necessary conditions of successful
implementation.
To address these issues , the following two null
hypotheses were tested to determine the effects of
intergovernmental and intragovernmental perspective on the
implementation process and the ordering of implementation
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variables.
Hypothesis (2): The hierarchical position of an
implementing activity within a federalist
framework has no significant effect on the
determination of variable criticality.
Hypothesis (3): Within-agency orderings of
variable criticality are consistent across the
span of the organization.
GENERAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Selection of Samnle
As previously discussed , the recombinant variables from
the model were chosen to facilitate operationalization and
measurement.

It should be noted however , that ·the top-down

emphasis of the model suggests an intergovernmental dichotomy that may prove misleading.

For example , whereas the

model is sensitive to the role of third partiesin the
implementation process and the difficulties associated with
。btaining

coordinated action among semi-autonomous agencies ,

it is less mindful of the potential for intra-agency
conflict.

The potential for such conflict is particularly

great where the chain of command within the implementing
agency is hierarchically and geographically extended.
In an effort to account for and attempt to measure the
magnitude of this phenomenon , the survey was designed

t。

sample opinion across the hierarchy of the implementing
agency.

In the case of this research , the District ,

Division , and Headquarter comprise the three levels of the
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COE organization.

This approach permitted the data to be

compiled on cohort samples at discrete levels of the
。rganization

and capture data that was acceptable for the

analysis of intergroup comparisons.
The broad populations from which samples were taken
were defined previously in this Chapter in the section on
Model Selection.

The sample survey groups were selected

non-randomly on the basis of expertness.
。f

For the purposes

this research , expertness is linked to experience and is

broadly defined as having had substantial participation in
the implementation of cost sharing policy at some level of
the implementation hierarchy.
。n

No restrictions were placed

the type of experience the individual had as it was

understood that individual roles might vary greatly
depending on which group they were associated with.
Implicit in the selection is the notion that the
。pinions

of the individuals selected are highly valued as a

result of their being considered expert opinion.

The

utility of expert opinion is not generally agreed on by
scholars and practitioners.

Turoffargues that expertness

is a secondary concern as there are no experts , only
advocates and referees who contribute a quantifiable or
analytical estimation about the issue (1970 , 151).

Sackman

criticizes the use of experts for effectively neglecting the
standard of documentation of the professional experience and
qualifications of experts selected.

Additionally , he
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asserts that choosing anonymous expert panels in unspecified
ways increases the likelihood of an elitist sample (1976 ,
19-42.)

A similar criticism is voiced by Quade (1975 , 193)

who notes that such sampling bias in the selection of
experts along standard academic lines will likely be toward
conservatism as the expert sample will tend to represent
currently acceptable views.
A related and common selection problem in identifying
experts is that the employment of "notoriety" criterion is
。 ften

arbitrary and may lead to the selection of people

wh。

have little substantive knowledge of the area under research
but who act as figureheads (Benarie 1988 , 150).

This caveat

had particular import for this research as interviews
revealed that organizational rank and direct experience with
the implementation process were not always positively
correlated.
Pill , on the other hand , argues that experts could
really be defined
inputs (1971 , 52).

anyone who can contribute relevant

a~

Turoff implies that experts ,

particularly when compelled to evaluate policy issues ,
become promoters of efficiency and rational action and thus
act in contradistinction to and compete with policy
advocates (1975 , 84).
Finally , in an argument that virtually renders the
issue of sampling error moot , Sackman points out that a
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significant number of technological forecasting studies
employing expert as well as non-expert samples have found

n。

statistically significant demonstrable difference between
groups in their ability to predict (1976 , 42).
For the purpose of this study it was determined that
expertness , when defined experientially , was a critical
attribute in the rendering of opinion on the implementation
process.

Thus , the relevant criteria for participation in

the survey were established as:
(1) Direct and substantial experience with the
development of cost sharing policy or implementing
regulations.
(2) A substantial understanding of the
complexities of the implementation process of WRDA
1986 based on research or supervision of directed
research of that topic.
(3) Direct and substantial experience in the
negotiation of an LeA or management of that
process.
Though all members of the sample were required to meet
at least one of the standards it was not considered
necessary for any member of the sample to meet more than
。 nee

Members of the target population , for example , would

likely not have had experience in criteria (1) or (2) though
they may have had direct input in providing testimony
through industry channels on the original legislation.
Likewis~，

members of the center may have little direct

experience with criteria (3).

Nevertheless , all candidates

were selected on the basis of their having had direct ,
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significant experience in some phase of the implementation
process of the WRDA 1986 and held positions within the
implementation hierarchy that were clearly identifiable with
respect to the Center , Periphery , and Target populations.
Survev And Instrument
The survey instrument (see Appendix A) was administered
to all participants selected for the sample.

Respondents

were asked for basic demographic data related to age , sex ,
level of education , occupation , years with current
。 rganization，

etc.

Respondents were then asked to rank the

survey variables in order of importance employing the
split-100 (S-100) technique.

Points were to be assigned

t。

variables in accordance with the respondent ’ s opinion of the
significance of the variable.

Apart from the fact that the

respondent was advised to distribute all 100 points no further
restrictions on the distribution of points were offered.
Given the positive data on the correlation between
group confidence and accuracy of the group estimate (Dalkey
1972 , 46) respondents were asked to self-rate their
confidence in the accuracy of their responses.

An ordinal

level adjective scale from 1 to 5 was employed to derive
group self confidence estimates for each variable response.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Very confident of accuracy of response.
Confident of accuracy of response.
Somewhat confident of accuracy of response.
Unsure of accuracy of response.
Just guessing
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Though confidence estimates were noted for purposes of
discussion , the individual responses were not weighted on
the basis of self reported certainty of response accuracy.
DATA ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING
As a first step in the analysis , a ranking based on the
sample mean for each variable was derived.

This ranking

included data from the entire sample population.

The data ,

which represents a best estimate of the perceived
criticality of the sUbject variables , was then evaluated in
terms of how such information might be used to extend the
predictive utility of the model and as a basis for a
discussion of the potential use of the data in practical
applications.
It is recognized that scaled responses to questions of
value do not always constitute interval level data , a
condition that greatly restricts the range of statistical
applications if rigidly observed.

What is not clear is the

relative seriousness of the distortion produced by assuming
interval scales (Blalock 1964 , 34).

Thus , interval level

methods , where employed in the research to derive and
compare group scores , are undertaken with full awareness
that the resultant inferential assumptions are sUbject

t。

challenge.
To test the null hypotheses it was necessary to first
evaluate the data for within group and between group
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differentials on variable ranking.

It was thus important

t。

select a technique capable of evaluating the relationship
between high or low scores registered on anyone variable
and the category (or group) of the respondent.

Put

differently , the necessary test was whether absolute
differences recorded between group scores were greater than
what might have been recorded had the groups been randomly
selected.

This approach was adopted as it allowed for

inference as to the impact group association had on
evaluating what is critical to successful implementation.
Additionally , the approach allowed for a test of whether the
model explained criticality equally well across hierarchical
populations.
The statistical technique selected to perform this
analysis was a oneway analysis of variance (ANOVA).

ANOVA

is related to a set of statistical techniques generally
referred to as linear regression analysis.

As ANOVA is a

linear model technique , it assumes a linear relationship
between a variable to be predicted and a potential
determinant.

It is generally a preferred technique when the

independent variable is measurable only on a nominal scale
and the dependent variable measurable on an interval level.
(Iverson 1976 , 5-8).

More importantly , the technique

permits the comparison of a variation of means (on a
dependent interval level variable) within a group with the
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measured variation between groups.

Thus , in the case of

this research , the technique was employed to determine if
mean ranking scores on the individual variables varied more
between the identified groups than within groups; and if so ,
to what extent.
The analysis proceeded along the lines set forth in the
forma~

ANOVA model' for use with a single independent

variable.

A more formal and detailed of description of the

selected technique will be set forth in Chapter IV , Data
Analysis.

with respect to the stated hypotheses:

Hypothesis (1) will be examined by comparing the
aggregated and disaggregated rank ordered means of
the variables.
Hypothesis (2) will be examined by testing for
the significance of the difference in means with F
values and significance levels between the three
groups.
Hypothesis (3) will be examined by testing for the
significance of the difference in means with F
values and significance between the two COE
samples (Center and Periphery samples.)
Use of Multiole Data Sources
A significant issue addressed in the research was the
impact project specific inter-group conflict would have on
the rating schema.
。ne

It is reasonable to assume that , for any

grouping defined by the model , the quality of the cost-

sharing experience with regard to administrative
cooperation , receptivity of other hierarchical groups
input , etc. would influence their perception of the

t。
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implementation process.

For example , a target group which

experienced a particularly rancorous LCA negotiation with
Corps officials may have been inclined to rank the
significance of (and need for) implementing agency
managerial skill higher in relation to other variables than
it might have had the negotiations proceeded more smoothly.
In such an instance , the issue is whether the respondent is
providing data on the implementation process generally or
ascribing attributes to a unique experience associated with
that process.
To some extent , the concern is not significant as a
degree of random conflict will be present in all
implementation efforts and the need to reduce or
constructively address such conflict is well understood.

A

sUfficiently large sample will likely reflect examples of
individual conflict but will mediate the extremes.
Moreover , it would be methodologically awkward to attempt
separate "expert" opinion from "emotional" opinion; or

t。

t。

suggest the theoretical implications of such a division.
The model accounts for the significance of the incentive
structure of groups , particularly Target groups , when it
asserts the criticality of the linkage between incentive
change and the desired behavioral change.

t。

It is asserted

that clarity of purpose will not be enough to ensure
successful implementation if substantial behavioral change
is required of the Target population.
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Nevertheless , it became apparent that for the purpose
。f

this research , analysis of the raw data gathered on

implementation required an understanding of the "background
noise" in the implementation environment and an appreciation
。f

the fundamental geography of the "partnership" proposed

by cost sharing.

This observation is generally reinforced

by Yin ’ s observation (1982) that structured interviews and
survey formats tend not to provide the quality of data
necessary to fully appreciate the dynamics of the
implementation process.

yin ’ s assessment of the

methodological strengths of exemplary implementation studies
revealed that such studies exhibit a bias toward multiple
sources of evidence (1982 , 51).

MUltiple sources were

generally employed to address concerns roughly analogous
internal and external validity.

t。

Emphasis here is placed on

the explanatory power of the unstructured response which
。 ffers

insight into complexities of the process under

examination that are not easily quantified or captured by
use of a constrained surveyor interview format.
Thus , to gain an appreciation of the status of that
partnership and to establish a richer , more complete
framework from within which to analyze the survey findings ,
a variety of data sources were either generated or
consulted.

MUltiple sources were employed to confirm the

reliability of trends or patterns evidenced by the survey
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data (external validity) in an effort to expand the
generalizability of the findings.

It should be noted that

while the "type" of data from the sources is similar to that
elicited by the survey instrument (App. A)
made to construct an experimental design.
。 ften

,

no attempt was
The data , though

presented in a statistical format , was sought

t。

provide supplemental longitudinal , descriptive information
。n

the process and the findings of the research.
A first effort at soliciting secondary data sources

involved focused interviews conducted by this researcher
during the Summer of 1987 with thirty-one (31) Corps project
managers (from Districts and Divisions) and twenty (20)
local sponsor representatives.

Because the sample

represented personnel from projects that had been authorized
under traditional cost arrangements and reauthorized under
cost sharing criteria , it was skewed slightly toward
individuals associated with projects which had undergone
changes or experienced difficulties associated with
implementing the requirements of cost-sharing.
It is recognized that , as a measurement device , the
。pen-ended

interview format is faulty owing to the non-

comparibilty of one interview with another (Kidder 1981 ,
198).

The intent of the interview process here , however ,

was not to derive data for statistical analysis of
intergroup differences but to explore the range of opinion
and attitude on the implementation of cost sharing policy.
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Moreover , the purpose of the interview process was not

t。

derive quantitative data on direct questions but information
。n

the nuances and complexities of the implementation

process and the underlying sentiments of the respondents.
The structured interview is considered an excellent tool for
that type of inquiry (Kidder 1981 , 153).
During the course of this research additional data sets
。n

related research were made available.

In December of

1989 , a joint workshop sponsored by the National Association
。f

Flood and Stormwater Management Agencies (NAFSMA) and the

COE was convened to explore the evolving relationship
between the COE and non-Federal interests in the development
。f

cost shared projects.

Of particular interest was an

evaluation of the partnering model of project development.
The goal of the workshop was the development of " ••• a
common understanding of the changes envisioned in the 1986
and 1988 (WRDA 1986 and WRDA 1988) laws" (NAFSMA 1990 , 7).
The product of that meeting was a report that presented a
detailed analysis , including survey data , of the
implementation process from the perspective of the COE
participants and the non-Federal interests.

The survey

results are set forth in Appendix B.
A second data set which was made available during
the course of the research was the report from the
General Accounting Office (GAO)

,

Water Resources: Local
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Sponsor ’ s VLews on CQrps ’ Implementation of Cost
Sharina (U. S. General Accounting Office , 1991).

The GAO

survey identified 605 projects that were sUbject to cost
sharing provisions of the law and subsequently met screening
criteria established by the GAO.

The screening criteria

generally dealt with issues of project viability and

s。

eliminated projects from the sample that would clearly not
qualify for authorized future construction. Questionnaires
were sent to 448 local sponsors of the 605 projects included
in the sample.

Following analysis of the returned surveys ,

the universe of projects was further reduced to 563
represented by 448 local sponsors.

While the GAO noted that

random selection was not employed , the survey sample
population was sufficiently large to make a strong case for
the utility of the data as a validity check (U.S. GAO 1991 ,
5-7) •

The supplemental data sets were used primarily

t。

"flesh.out" and lend credence to the findings of this
research.

They provided both additional information

directly related to the topics under examination and
supported efforts to more fully develop a dimension of the
larger issue at hand , an appreciation of the complex network
。f

influences which shape water resource development policy

implementation.

The data contained in these supplemental

studies is discussed in depth in Chapter IV , Data Analysis.

145

The ImDact Of Cost Sharina On Proiects
The analysis of empirical project impacts , which
receives narrative and analytical treatment in Chapter V,
was conducted with reference to a set of assumptions
established in the formal literature on cost sharing set
forth in Chapter II and in the section which discussed the
legislative history of the WRDA 1986.

This section of the

analysis focused on assessing impacts in three areas where
it was asserted by the literature and cost share advocates
that change was likely to occur as a result of the
implementation of cost shared project development and where
empirical data was available to compare outputs of the
implementation process with anticipated outcomes.

The areas

evaluated in this portion of the research involve the impact
。f

cost sharing on the magnitude of the project (project

size)

,

the construction schedules of large civil works

projects , and the environmental component of project
planning.
While a variety of questions are raised in the
literature , both political and economic , the assumptions
cited on the next page emerged as the likely outcomes of
cost-sharing legislation by opponents and advocates alike.
Moreover , they were selected for directed study by the ASACW
in 1987 to provide data on the effects of cost shared
legislation.

It is not intended to be an exhaustive list of

impacts but one that indicates how the implementation of
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cost shared water resource development mightmaterially and
measurably alter the end product.

These assumptions were

selected for analysis because they are recognized to be
sUbstantively important in both a theoretical and applied
sense.

If true , they will potentially shape the future of

federally assisted water resource development in rather
profound ways.

They are as follows:

Assumption (1): Cost shared project development
will lead to the formulation and authorization of
smaller water resource development projects.
Assumption (2): Cost shared project development
will lead to the formulation and authorization of
projects that involve phased or staged
construction schedules.
Assumption (3): Cost shared project development
will lead to a reduction in environmental impacts
associated with Federal water resource development
projects.
Selection of Samnle
The basis of the analysis for each assumption involved
a comparison between non cost shared projects and projects
developed under cost-sharing.

Thus , to perform the analysis

it was necessary to identify to data from two distinct
project samples.

Data on the samples could then be compared

to determine if significant differences existed in areas
related to project scope , construction schedules , project
mitigation levels , etc.

Clearly , this method posed some

thorny methodological problems.
equatin엔

Chief among these was

and evaluating the observed differences in pre and
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post-WRDA 1986 projects.
It is generally recognized that projects planned under
cost sharing constraints may exhibit significant differences
from those planned under previous funding guidelines , but it
is not possible to infer that all the differences are
attributable to cost sharing.

Moreover , in this research

the treatment , the imposition of cost shared planning , is
imposed on legislative and agency implementation processes ,
not a strictly defined sample population.

Thus , a seemingly

straightforward approach such as comparing a pre-WRDA 1986
sample population of projects and one selectedpost-WRDA
1986 in fact may offer comparisons that are sUbstantively
different in ways which would influence the analysis but
were not related to the imposition of cost shared planning.
A solution to this challenge presented itself in the
form of a unique project sample that provided an attractive
alternative.

Projects authorized by the WRDA 1986 including

projects originally authorized in the 1985 Supplemental
legislation (P.L. 88) were initially developed under preWRDA 1986 planning parameters.

Thus , reconnaissance

estimates , feasibility studies , and general design memoranda
were initially developed without cost sharing constraints.
Subsequent to passage of P.L. 88 and the WRDA 1986 , the
projects were reformulated to accommodate cost-sharing
requirements.

Ostensibly , the resulting project
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modifications in size , schedule , mitigation plans , etc. were
then attributable to the imposition of a single significant
reformulation constraint , cost sharing.
As the sample was discrete , the basis for project
modification in the areas under study was attainable either
by evaluating data on reformulation submittals or phone
interview with project managers.

Thus , it was determined

that a single sample was capable of providing both pre and
post cost shared planning data.

Furthermore , it was

determined that the accuracy of the data on the impact of
cost sharing for this single sample would likely be better
than that achieved from merely selecting a random sample of
projects from the pre and post-WROA 1986 eras.
This approach assumed that the initial sample of
projects defined by Public Law 88 and the WROA 1986 were
essentially similar to projects planned and authorized prior
to the implementation of cost-sharing legislation.
Initially , it was thought that such a cross sample
comparison could be verified by identifying and evaluating
salient project features such as constant dollar cost ,
weighted benefit-cost ratio , percentage of LERRO to total
project cost , etc.

Analysis , however , revealed that , owing

to the extreme variation of project design and type over
time , and shifting regulatory requirements; such an analysis
was both infeasible and unlikely to provide data of
sufficient quality to either confirm or dismiss the
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assumption.

This finding was validated in conversations

with staff of the Board of Engineers of Rivers and Harbors
(BERH).2

Thus , absent evidence to the contrary , the

assumption was allowed to stand.
The selected sample consisted of that set of projects
authorized (or reauthorized) by the WRDA 1986 which required
negotiation of an LCA.

Unlike the goals associated with

sweeping social programs (eliminate poverty in the inner
city , reduce unemployment , etc.)

,

the empirical goal of cost

sharing would appear to be quite straightforward.

Projects

are either successfully accomplished under a cost sharing
format or they are abandoned.

Execution of an LCA

represents successful implementation of the program insofar
as the sUb-objectives of cost sharing are thus met and
reflected in the terms of the LCA.
This analysis , of course , to some extent oversimplifies
the process as it does not account for differences (physical
and schedule related) between the contemplated project as
。riginally

designed and the constructed project.

This

research attempts to define the substantive changes

t。

projects attributable to cost shared planning and to compare
those findings with the development patterns anticipated by
the literature.
sixteen flood control projects were identified as
having incorporated sponsor initiated changes into the final
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project design.

Nine

(56옹)

of those projects so identified

reported modifications to the authorized project design
involving a reduction or deletion of design elements ,
reduced recreation or staging of construction.

As

previously mentioned , such changes are considered design
changes for both flood control and navigation projects when
the unconstructed separable element(s) will require the
negotiation of an independent LCA.
It should be noted that some projects represented in
the selected sample were downsized on the initiative of
Federal interests prior to the initiation of cost shared
development.

This may have been in response to local

dissatisfaction with proposed features of the project that
did not enjoy pUblic support , even when non-Federal
financial obligations would have been quite minimal.

Thus ,

limiting the scope of the analysis to only those project
features that were revised during negotiation of the LCA may
reflect a conservative bias in the estimation of negotiated
changes and understate the responsiveness of the Federal
interest to accommodate local concerns.
Furthermore , it is crucial to note the potential for
project size and scope reduction where a new LCA must be
negotiated prior to the initiation and construction of
subsequent project phases.

Absent an executed LCA there is

no guarantee that separable project elements , though
congressionally authorized , will ever be constructed.

For
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that reason , staged projects for the purpose of this
research , are considered de facto short range size
reductions when deriving estimates of the impact of the
legislation on project design.

This approach , which was

selected after a series of interviews with non-Federal
interest project/program managers errs on the conservative
side and may tend to overstate the impact of cost sharing.
As the data collected for this portion of the research
was independent of the data on the implementation process
analysis it was deemed necessary to also set forth the
analysis separately to preclude confusion of technique or
findings.

Individual subsections of Chapter V complete with

supplemental background information are reserved for an indepth discussion of the assumptions and an analysis of
sample research data on collected on projects.

152

ENDNOTES
1. To distinguish between physical groups identified in
by research and theoretical concepts , the terms Center ,
Periphery , and Target shall hereafter be capitalized when
they refer to the cohort of individuals selected as samples
for this research.
2. The BERH provides an executive level review of all
civil works water resource development projects submitted by
the Army corps of Engineers for Congressional authorization.
In 1989 it was reconstituted as the Washington Level Review
Center and charged with expediting the project process.

CHAPTER IV
SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS
This chapter examines the survey and supplemental data
collected for the process analysis portion of this research.
As previously established in the preceding Chapter , the data
employed for this component of the research was limited

t。

survey data collected on the WRDA 1986 implementation
process , either by the researcher or an independent source. 1
This first subdivision of the Chapter deals specifically
with the statistical analysis of the data collected on the
survey instrument (Appendix A) for purposes of testing the
established hypotheses.
Data from the survey was coded for use with the
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).

A

variety of statistical procedures were utilized to analyze
the data.

Explanations of the techniques and basic findings

are set forth below.

The raw data tabulations and derived

computations from the survey are also incorporated in
tabular format.
RESPONDENT ASSESSMENT OF VARIABLE IMPORTANCE
The first statistical analysis was a straightforward
derivation of the mean score for each group on each
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variable.

The findings are set out in Table X.

Variables

were then ranked for each group in accordance with the
mean (Table XI).

Because it was logistically difficult

t。

develop a shorthand acronym for each variable , variables are
simply described in the analysis as VAR1 through VAR6.

The

legend provided in Table X below may be used as a
reference.
TABLE X
MEAN DISTRIBUTION SCORES FOR IMPLEMENTATION VARIABLES
VAR1: The enabling legislation or other legal
directive mandates pOlicy objectives which are
clear and consistent or at least provides
substantive criteria for resolving goal conflicts.
GROUP
TARGET
PERIPHERY
CENTER
TOTAL

COUNT

MEAN

STANDARD
DEVIATION

STANDARD
ERROR

10
16
11
37

16.0000
15.6250
20.9000
17.3243

11.8739
1 1. 0868
14.96 7
12.4232

3.7548
2.7717
4.5135
2.0424

VAR2: The enabling legislation incorporates a
sound theory identifying the principal factors and
c~usal linkages affecting policy objectives and
gives implemen~ing official sufficient
jurisdiction over target groups and other points
。 f leverage to attain , at least potentially , the
desired goals.
GROUP
TARGET
PERIPHERY
CENTER
TOTAL

COUNT

MEAN

STANDARD
DEVIATION

STANDARD
ERROR

10
16
11
37

17.8002
15.6250
15.0000
16.0270

11. 7644
17.7834
12.0414
14.4193

3.7202
4.4459
3.6307
2.3705
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TABLE X
MEAN DISTRIBUTION SCORES FOR IMPLEMENTATION VARIABLES
(continued)
VAR3: The enabling legislation structures the
implementation process so as to maximize the
probability that implementing officials and target
groups will perform as desired. This involves
assignment to sympathetic agencies with adequate
hierarchical integration , supportive decision
rUles , sufficient financial resources , and
adequate access to supporters.
GROUP

COUNT

MEAN

STANDARD
DEVIATION

10
16
11
37

21.1111
20.6250
13.6364
18.6436

8.9938
12.3659
10.9752
11.3290

TARGET
PERIPHERY
CENTER
TOTAL

STANDARD
ERROR
2.8441
:L 0915

3.3091
1. 8625

VAR4: The leaders of the implementing agency
possess substantial managerial and political skill
and are committed to statutory goals.
GROUP

COUNT

MEAN

STANDARD
DEVIATION

STANDARD
ERROR

10
16
11
37

18.9000
25.0000
15.7273
20.5946

10.4291
13.7840
9.8396
12.2440

3.2980
3.4460
2.9686
2.0191

TARGET
PERIPHERY
CENTER
TOTAL
VAR5:

The program is actively supported by
constituency groups and by a few key
legislators (or a chief executive) throughout the
implementation process , with the courts being
neutral or supportive.

。rganized

STANDARD
GROUP
TARGET
PERIPHERY
CENTER
TOTAL

COUNT

MEAN

DEVIAT 工。N

STANDARD
ERROR

10
16
11
37

16.0000
15.6250
20.1727
17.1081

8.4327
9.8107
15.5505
1 1. 3786

2.6667
2.4527
4.6887
1. 8703
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TABLE X
MEAN DISTRIBUTION SCORES FOR IMPLEMENTATION VARIABLES
(continued)
VAR6:

The relative priority of statutory
is not undermined over time by the
emergence of conflicting public policies or by
changes in relevant socioeconomic conditions which
weaken the statute ’ s causal theory or political
support.
。 bjectives

GROUP

COUNT

MEAN

STANDARD
DEVIATION

STANDARD
ERROR

10
16
11
37

10.2000
7.5000
14.0000
10.1622

5.8080
4.4721
10.1622
7.5994

1. 8367
1. 1180

TARGET
PERIPHERY
CENTER
TOTAL

3.3039
1.2493

TABLE XI
RELATIVE VARIABLE RANKINGS BASED ON MEAN BY GROUP

TARGET
(Mean)
CENTER
(Mean)
PERIPHERY
(Mean)
Composite
Total
(Mean)

VAR1

VAR2

VAR3

VAR4

VAR5

VAR6

4

3

l

2

5

6

16.10

17.80

21.00

18.90

16.00

10.20

l

4

6

3

2

5

20.90

15.00

13.63

15.72

20.27

14.00

4

3

2

l

5

6

15.62

15.62

20.62

25.00

15.62

7.50

3

5

2

l

4

17.32

16.02

18.64

20.59

17.12

8
10.16

Table XII provides a frequency distribution of
scores across the variables.
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TABLE XII
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION TABLE OF VARIABLE RANKINGS
Varia 박르-후

Value Label

Value

o
5
6
10
15
20
25
30
40
50
Total
Mean
Mode
Kurtosis
S ESkew
Maximum

17.324
10.000
1. 161
.388
50.000

Frequency
3
2
1
10
6
5
5
l
2
2

Percent
8.1
5.4
2.7
27.0
16.2
13.5
13.5
2.7
5.4
5.4

Valid
Percent

Cum
Percent

8.1
5.4
2.7
27.0
16.2
13.5
13.5
2.7
5.4
5.4

8.1
13.5
16.2
43.2
59.5
73.0
86.5
89.2
94.6
100.0

------------------37
100.0
100.0

Std err
Std dev
S E Kurt
Range
Sum

2.042
12.423
.759
50.000
64 1. 000

Value

Frequency

Median
Variance
Skewness
Minimum

15.000
154.336
1. 113
.000

Variable 2
Value Label

o
5
10
15
20
25
30
33
35
70
Total
Mean
Mode
Kurtosis
S ESkew
Maximum

16.027
10.000
3.976
.388
70.000

Std err
Std dev
S E Kurt
Range
Sum

6
5
8
4
3
4
2
l
3
1

Percent
16.2
13.5
2 1. 6
10.8
8.1
10.8
5.4
2.7
8.1
2.7

Valid
Percent
16.2
13.5
2 1. 6
10.8
8.1
10.8
5.4
2.7
8.1
2.7

------------------37
100.0
100.0
2.371
14.419
.759
70.000
593.000

Median
Variance
Skewness
Minimum

Cum
Percent
16.2
29.7
51. 4
62.2
70.3
8 1. 1
86.5
89.2
97.3
100.0

10.000
207.916
1. 547
.000
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TABLE XII
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION TABLE OF VARIABLE RANKINGS
(continued)
Variable 3
Value Label

Value
nu

r그 「l ”。

’ nu
4
’4
’4
’4
”‘nu
껴‘ 『‘‘

r3

A

nu

nu

,J cJ
“1

Total
Mean
Mode
Kurtosis
S ESkew
Maximum

18.649
10.000
-.483
.388
40.000

Frequency

Percent

Valid
Percent

Cum
Percent

8.1

8.1

8.1

4

29.7
10.8
2.7
2.7
16.2
5.4
10.8
2.7
10.8

29.7
10.8
2.7
2.7
16.2
5.4
10.8
2.7
10.8

37.8
48.6
5 1. 4
54.1
70.3
75.7
86.5
89.2
100.0

37

100.0

100.0

3
11
4
i
l
g

2
4
l

Std err
Std dev
S E Kurt
Range
Sum

1. 862
1 1. 329
.759
40.000
690.000

Value

Frequency

Median
Variance
Skewness
Minimum

17.000
128.345
.463
.000

Variable 4
Value Label

Rd

A
1

R」

1iCJ
F그

nu

Total
Mean
Mode
Kurtosis
S ESkew
Maximum

20.595
10.000
.213
.388
50.000

Std err
Std dev
S E Kurt
Range
Sum

’4

”。.

,‘nu
”‘“
‘‘
”J nu
1 ,‘‘
‘

”‘
， 。『
J ，。

I」

’ nu
4
’4

’」

nu

F3

’4

‘‘
‘‘
37
2.013
12.244
.759
50.000
762.000

Percent

Valid
Percent

Cum
Percent

8.1

8.1

8.1

5.4
16.2

5.4
16.2

13.5
29.7
37.8
54.1
56.8
73.0
86.5
89.2
94.6
100.0

8.1

8.1

16.2
2.7
16.2
13.5
2.7
5.4
5.4

16.2
2.7
16.2
13.5
2.7
5.4
5.4

100.0

100.0

Median
Variance
Skewness
Minimum

20.000
149.914
.352
.000
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TABLE XII
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION TABLE OF VARIABLE RANKINGS
(continued)
Variable 5
Value Label

Value

o
5
10
15
20
25
30
33
40
50
Total
Mean
Mode
Kurtosis
S ESkew
Maximum

17.108
20.000
.824
.388
50.000

Percent

Valid
Percent

Cum
Percent

3
3
l
1
1

13.5
5.4
13.5
18.9
24.3
8.1
8.1
2.7
2.7
2.7

13.5
5.4
13.5
18.9
24.3
8.1
8.1
2.7
2.7
2.7

13.5
18.9
32.4
5 1. 4
75.7
83.8
9 1. 9
94.6
97.3
100.0

37

100.0

100.0

Frequency
5
2
5
7
g

------- ------- -------

Std err
Std dev
S E Kurt
Range
Sum

1. 870
11. 377
.759
50.000
633.000

Value

Frequency

Median
Variance
Skewness
Minimum

15.000
129.432
.584
.000

Variable 6
Value Label

o
5
10
12
15
20
25
34

Mean
Mode
Kurtosis
S ESkew
Maximum

10.162
10.000
1. 525
.388
34.000

6
6
16
1
l
5
1
l

Total

------37

Std err
Std dev
S E Kurt
Range
Sum

1. 249
7.599
.759
34.000
376.000

Percent

Valid
Percent

Cum
Percent

16.2
16.2
43.2
2.7
2.7
13.5
2.7
2.7

16.2
16.2
43.2
2.7
2.7
13.5
2.7
2.7

16.2
32.4
75.7
78.4
8 1. 1
94.6
97.3
100.0

------100.0

------100.0

Median
Variance
Skewness
Minimum

10.000
57.751
.975
.000
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Hvpothesis ( l ) : The clarity of enabling
legislation and the soundness of the its
supporting theory are not considered significantly
more important than other variables in the
implementation process by individuals involved in
the implementing of public policy.
Hypothesis 1 is confirmed.

The data confirms that

Variables 1 and 2 are not considered more
important/significant than other identified implementation
variables.
Analvsis: Hvpothesis 1
The survey data does not confirm the assumption of the
model that the clarity of enabling legislation and the
soundness of the its supporting theory are considered
significantly more important than other variables in the
implementation process by individuals involved in
implementing public policy.

Indeed , only variable 1 was

ranked first or second in order of significance by any_
cohort in the sample.

It should be noted that because of

the small sample sizes of the individual groups and the
range of scores registered , it ’ may have been impracticable
to use arguments regarding rejection in the

5옹

region even

had variables 1 and 2 been rated as more significant.
Virtually all scores for the individual variables
exhibit overlapping confidence intervals at

95 훌.

Nevertheless , the survey data clearly exhibits that only one
group (Center) rated VAR1 (clarity of legal mandates) as
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most significant. No group rated VAR2 (sound theory) higher
than third in order of importance.
。 ffer

The composite ratings

substantial evidence in support of the null

hypothesis.
A possible explanation of this finding rests on the
。bservation

that if the conditions of VAR1 and VAR2 are met ,

participants in the implementation process will tend

t。

discount their true significance and focus attention on more
proximate issues involving available resources , management
skills of the implementing agency , etc.

However , it is not

possible to determine statistically from the survey data if
this was the case as there is no evidence that respondents
felt the conditions of VAR1 and VAR2 were materially met.
Confirmation of the null hypothesis , however , adds little
。ur

understanding of alternative interpretations of the·

data.
。n

t。

The findings suggest that VAR3 and VAR4 which focus

the skills , attitudes , and resources of the implementing

agency may be viewed as more significant than the conditions
represented by VAR1 and VAR2.

A review of the score

distribution in Table XII supports this alternative and
suggests that this view may be more strongly held by Target
and Periphery groups than by the center.

Indeed , the

Center ’ s ranking of VAR1 as most significant is highly
consistent with the model ’ s assumption regarding the proper
concerns of top down analysis.
Wh ile

VAR3 was rated most highly by the Target
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population and VAR4 most highly by the Periphery , the Center
rated neither variable higher than third.

This finding is

not wholly inconsistent with the model insofar as it
suggests that Target and periphery groups may tend to focus
。n

the enabling aspects of the implementing agency more

than does the agency itself.

s。

The agency , acting as the

Center , is arguably more concerned with the substantive
policy and legal issues they are assigned.
It also may be asserted that variables 3 and 4 are
somewhat more "hands on" than are 1 and 2 , which is to say
they are more closely related to the proximate issues of
,

program administration.

As the survey was conducted while

the participants were actively engaged in the implementation
process , there may have been a tendency to

over~rate

the

significance of variables directly related to the day to day
problems and frustrations of the respondents.

There was ,

however , no direct evidence offered by respondents in
support of such'bias.
While the survey data does not provide a solid
statistical basis for other than rejection of the model ’ s
assumption with regard to VARl and VAR2 , the existence of
group score variance provides clear evidence that estimates
。f

significance may vary across populations and may be

linked closely to one ’ s position in the implementation
environment.

The significance of the group score variance
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is addressed in detail in the discussion which follows on
ANOVA.
Because the data collected on variable criticality were
。f
。ne

an opinion nature , a simple difference of means on any
variable would not indicate the absolute magnitude of

difference between groups.

Though the scaling instructions

suggested that respondents submit observations on an
interval scale (a variable receiving 30 points would be
considered three times as important as one receiving 10
points)

,

the scaling technique could be fairly criticized

for rendering results that were , in fact , ordinal.

For that

reason , the data analysis associated with hypotheses 2 and 3
proceeded along the lines of formal oneway ANOVA but with
particular interpretive attention paid to the ordering of
the variables.
ANOVA involves an evaluation of variance in mean
scores.

Clearly , as can be observed in Table XII , there is

a quantifiable variation in means for the dependent variable
。f

each group.

The issue , however , is whether the observed

variation is large enough to
significant difference. 2

consti~ute

a statistically

The data from one-way ANOVA on the

six implementation variables and survey groups is set forth
below followed by an independent analysis of the technique
for each variable.
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TABLE XIII

R
>

v·

때
뺑

ONE WAY ANOVA
IMPLEMENTATION VARIABLE BY GROUP

MEAN

F

F
PROB.

C.F.

SUM OF
SQUARES

SQUARES

BETWEEN GROUPS

2

202.54

10 1. 27

.6432

WITHIN GROUPS

34

5353.5591

157.45

REGION OF REJECT.

TOTAL

36

5456.1081

SOURCE

RATI 。

.5319

(5 훌)

3.28

월 ;ected

VAR2
By Group

MEAN

C.F.

SUM OF
SQUARES

SQUARES

2

45.62

22.81

WITHIN GROUPS

34

7439.3500

218.80

TOTAL

36

7484.9730

SOURCE
BETWEEN GROUPS

F
RATIO
.1043

F
PROB.

.9013

REGION OF REJECT.
(5%)
3.28

B르j르드E르브

VAR3
By Group

D.F.

SUM OF
SQUARES

MEAN
SQUARES

BETWEEN GROUPS

2

394.13

197.06

1. 5854

WITHIN GROUPS

34

4226.2955

124.30

REGION OF REJECT.
(5%)

TOTAL

36

4620.4324

SOURCE

F

F

RATIO

PROB.

3.28

.2196

B르i르드흐르브
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TABLE XIII
ONE WAY ANOVA
IMPLEMENTATION VARIABLE BY GROUP
(continued)
VAR4

By Group
SOURCE
BETWEEN GROUPS

D.F.
2

SUM OF
SQUARES

SQUARES

599.83

299.91

2.1257

141.0906

REGION OF REJECT.

WITHIN GROUPS

34

4797.0818

TOTAL

36

5396.9189

MEAN

F
RATIO

F
PROBe
.1349

(5%)
3.28

월 jected

VAR5

By Group
SUM OF
SQUARES

MEAN
SQUARES

2

157.63

78.81

WITHIN GROUPS

34

450 1. 9318

122.4098

TOTAL

36

4659.5676

SOURCE
BETWEEN GROUPS

D.F.

F
RATIO
.5953

F
PROBe
.5571

REGION OF REJECT.
(5 훌)

3.28

Rejected

VAR6

By Group
SOURCE

D.F.

SUM OF
SQUARES

BETWEEN GROUPS

2

275.4202

WITHIN GROUPS

34

1803.6000

TOTAL

36

2079.0270

MEAN

SQUARES
137.71
53.0471

F
RATIO
2.5961

F
PROBe
.0893

REGION OF REJECT.
(5 훌)

3.28

E르jected

The data on hypotheses 2 and 3 are evaluated below.
A review of Table XIII reveals that no variable registered a
significant F ratio at the

95 웅

confidence interval.
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Analysis of the score spread for each group (see Table
XIII) reveals that the spread was sUfficiently large

t。

suppress F values below a point which would allow dismissal
。f

the null hypothesis.

Thus , while important between-

group variations were present , the recorded differences
were not large enough to be statistically significant.

The

examination and discussion of hypotheses 2 and 3 with
respect to the study variables is , therefore , conducted
with this caveat in mind.

Supplemental data , when

available , is presented to suggest possible findings and
conclusions in the absence of statistical support.
Hypothesis (2): The hierarchical position of an
implementing activity within a federalist
framework has no significant effect on the
determination of variable criticality.
Variable 1. The enabling legislation
(Congressional authorization of the project and
cost sharing program) or other legal directive
mandates policy objectives which are clear and
consistent or at least provides clear criteria for
resolving goal conflicts.
The variation of means on VAR 1 were statistically
insignificant (F=.643).

It is not surprising , however , that

the Center would rate VARl as high or higher than Periphery
and Target groups.

The Center , in this case the executive

staff of the implementing agency , is directly involved with
the promulgation of implementing regulations , provision of
procedural guidance , and other activities specifically
associated the policy objectives of the sUbject legislation.
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The task is made considerably more difficult when
legislation fails to provide substantive criteria upon which
to develop regulatory guidelines.
Vague or poorly crafted legislation may have an impact
。n

Target and Periphery groups.

The effect , however , may

not be as readily attributable to "lack of clear legal
mandates" by such interests simply because those groups
are not forced to deal with the legislation so much as they
are exposed to resulting programs and regulatory guidelines.
Target and Periphery groups frustrated with program
administration or support are more likely to target
administrative and resourcing agencies for criticism than
identify defective legislation as the problem.
Moreover , the model suggests that while clarity and
consistency of the legal mandates are critical in the short
term , they are probably less critical in the long term in
relation to changing socioeconomic conditions and the
support of various constituency groups (Mazmanian 1983 ,
277).

Arguably , over time , Target and Periphery groups

become more concerned with "on the ground" problem solving ,
and less concerned with the linkages between operating
policy and Congressional intent expressed through
legislation.

The Center , on the other hand , will be more

regularly concerned with revisiting the legislation and its
authors.

Thus , the substantive context of legislation and

its associated policy is a realtime concern of the Center. 3
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Variable 2. The enabling legislation
(congressional authorization of the project and
cost sharing program) incorporates a sound theory
identifying the principal factors and causal
linkages affecting policy objectives and gives
implementing officials sufficient jurisdiction
。ver non-Federal interests , members of the water
resource development community , and other points
。 f leverage to attain , at least potentially , the
desired goals.
The variation of means on VAR 2 were statistically
insignificant (F=.1043).

Interestingly , the Center ranked

the variable relatively lower (fourth) than either the
Target or Periphery (third).

This is somewhat surprising

given the fact that one of the principal components of the
variable deals with the awarding of sufficient authority
the implementing agency.

An interpretation of this finding

will be offered in the discussion of hypothesis 2.
Variable 3. The enabling legislation
(Congressional authorization of the project and
cost sharing program) structures the
implementation process so as to maximize the
probability that implementing officials
(representative of the Corps of Engineers) will
perform as desired. This involves assignment to a
sympathetic agency with clear , hierarchical
。rganizational structure , supportive decision
rules , sufficient financial resources , and
adequate access to supporters.
The variation of means on VAR 3 were statistically
insignificant (F=1.5854).

However the rankings were

consistent with the observation that the Target , which
ranked VAR3 as most significant , places great emphasis
。n

the ability of the bureaucracy to respond to the

partnership.

t。

VAR3 is directly related to the capacity of
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the implementing agency to "follow through" on decisions and
determinations which must be made and executed during the
implementation process.

A more detailed analysis of this

concern is offered in the following subdivision on analysis.
Variable 4. The leaders of the implementing
agency (Corps of Engineers) possess substantial
managerial and political skill and are committed
to the success of the program.
The variation of means on VAR 4 were statistically
insignificant (F=2.1257).
。utside

Though the means rankings fell

the region of rejection , it is interesting that VAR4

was rated most significant by the Periphery.

In this

instance , the rating assumes a dimension of self reflection
as the Periphery is , to some extent , evaluating the
importance of their personal commitment and abilities

t。

effect change as well as that of their superiors at the
HQUSACE level.

It is , then , not surprising that this

population would view their role in the process as vital and
significant to the success of the policy initiative and the
implementation effort.
Somewhat surprising is the fact that the Center , by
contrast , rated VAR4 only third in order of significance ,
though the composite rating for all groups identified VAR4
as the most significant.

Notwithstanding the relative

ranking of the Center , it appears that , based on mean
scores , VAR4 is considered by all three groups to be a most
significant variable in the implementation process.
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Variable 5. The cost shared water resource
development program is actively supported by
。 rganized constituency groups and by a few key
legislators (or a chief executive) throughout the
implementation process , with the courts being
neutral or supportive.
The variation of means on VAR 5 were statistically
insignificant (F=.5953).

Though the mean scores for Target

and Periphery groups were not significantly different the
Center ranked this variable as second most critical.

This

is not surprising given the political difficulties the COE
has had with Target group interests and with pressure from
some legislative concerns to "go back" to the old way of
doing business.

Indeed , it begs the question of whether the

constituency for cost shared water resource development
extends beyond the Executive branch of government.
Whereas the Target and Periphery groups find this
variable to be moderately important they view it as
significantly less so that does the Center.

This dichotomy

is likely the result of the Center ’ s agenda for overall
program success being perceived as far more politically
"sensitive."
The data supports the conclusion that the Center is
sensitive to and sOlicitous of the support of organized
constituencies.

A detailed discussion of this effort in

included in the following subdivision on analysis.
Variable 6.

The relative priority of statutory
is not undermined over time by the
emergence of conflicting pUblic policies or by

。bjectives
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changes in relevant socioeconomic conditions which
weaken the legislation ’ s causal theory or
political support.
The variation of means on VAR 6 were statistically
insignificant (F=2.5961).

VAR6 was generally considered of

lesser importance by all groups.
Analvsis: Hvpothesis 2
Clearly , one ’ s position within the hierarchical
framework established by the model exerts influence on the
rating of implementation variables though the direction and
magnitude of that influence is not consistent across
variables. Because the null hypothesis is concerned with
data on all six variables , rejection is predicated on the
。 bserved

differences of means for all variables.

As F

ratios for all variables were found to be statistically
insignificant , the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. This
does not rule out , however , a discussion of findings that ,
while statistically fragile , contribute to an understanding
。f

the model and the implementation process.
Two broad trends which emerged upon examination were 1)

the tendency of the Target to rate variables related

t。

clarity and consistency of program administration high and
2) those at the apex of the intergovernmental hierarchy
tended to rate highly variables which addressed issues of
constituency and interest group support for the policy.
Though difficult to defend methodologically , there is an
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intuitive logic to this finding.
Target groups , now resigned to operating in a costsharing environment , have decided to focus on the
administrative processes in an effort to reduce operational
friction , streamline approval processes , and generally
negotiate a more equal "partnership."

The center , aware

that criticism of the administrative process may translate
into an attack on the policy itself , is properly concerned
with broad support from the water resource development
"industry" as well as its own internal administrative
machinery.
The concern of the Target population for effective
administration by the Center and the Periphery represents ,
in this instance , a straightforward acknowledgement that
Target resources are committed to that administrative
process.

Supplemental data collected in 1987 involving

thirty-one COE project managers and twenty (20) local
sponsor representatives (see discussion in Chapter III , Use
。f

Multiple Data Sources) asked the following questions

regarding the implementation of cost shared planning:
1. Did cost sharing increase the amount of time
spent engaged in negotiating project design ,
schedules , etc. with local sponsors over what
would have been spent prior to the implementation
。 f cost sharing?
2. If additional time was spent what was the
effect/impact of this additional effort? Positive
。r negative?
Twenty-eight of the thirty-one respondents

(90옹)

173
indicated that project planning under cost sharing required
additional time.

The requirement of additional effort was

most often attributed to:
(1)

Increased technical design coordination and review.

(2) Increased general coordination of correspondence and
communications.
(3) Resolution of crediting for prior work performed by
sponsor.
(4)

Coordination of sponsor ’ s financial plan.

Notwithstanding the perception that the partnership in
planning model requires additional time and staff resources ,
a surprisingly large number of project managers indicated
that implementation of cost shared planning had a positive
impact on the project formulation process.
presents the data.

Table XIV

Interestingly , the data collected on

process impacts in 1987 is consistent with that collected in
the 1990-1991 time frame. (See survey data contained in
NAFSMA Survey , Appendix B.)
TABLE XIV
PROJECT MANAGER SURVEY FOR COST SHARED PLANNING
Increased Time

Impact of cost
Cost Shared Planning Model

17

Yes

positive

9

Yes

Neutral (no change)

2

Yes

Adverse

N。

No change

(N)

3
31

(55웅)

(6 훌)
(10 옹)

(29 웅)
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The two most frequently cited positive impacts
associated with cost shared planningwere:
(1)
Plan support as result of improved cooperation
with local sponsor and interest groups.
(2)
Development of a better plan as a result of
sponsor input.
Adverse impacts identified most often consisted of the
following:
(1)
Delays in project formulation associated with
sponsor inability to arrange financing.
(2)
Disputes over issues of appropriate crediting for
non-Federal interest LERRD or reimbursable work.
(3)
Delays and confusion associated with direct
negotiation between sponsors and HQUSACEjASA(CW) staff.
The Project Manager sample represented projects that ,
generally , were authorized by P.L. 99-88 , the Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1985 or the WRDA 1986 and involved some
negotiated change to the authorized project.

Thus , it would

be expected that these individuals were attempting
implem딛nt

t。

cost sharing in an environment that was at best

volatile and characterized by change and relative policy
instability.

Given that , the data on Project Managers is

encouragingly positive.
Interestingly , the development of a close , positive
working relationship between the sponsor and COE District
personnel acts to illustrate the point that
intergovernmental alliances and positions of advocacy are
shaped more by a commonality of interests than
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。rganizational

affiliation.

In most instances the direct

communication link between the non-Federal sponsor and the
Corps will be at the District level.

This linkage is

critical both in terms of establishing a consistent chain of
command for the processing of information and decisions and
because of the potential for relationships to develop
between local sponsors and District Corps personnel that are
significantly more complex than those defined by the LeA.
similar intergovernmental relationships have been addressed
at length in the literature most notably by Bernstein ,
whose early work on regulated industries led to the
development of the "capture" thesis (Bernstein 1955).4
Corps Project Managers reported that they were
frequently sUbject to competing pressures when negotiating
an LCA.

Pressure was exerted by the sponsor (their partner)

to adapt the terms of the agreement to meet local concerns
and constraints.

Management at the Periphery exerted

pressure to keep the project "on track."

Pressure from the

Center generally focused on the submission of standardized
submittals and the need to adhere to the formal policy
guidance and models set forth in ER 1165-2-131.
The decision environment was further complicated when
local sponsors sought to engage in direct , non-coordinated
negotiations with HQUSACE or ASA(CW) personnel to appeal a
District position or seek final jUdgment on apparent
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deviations from the model LCA format.

Such behavior from a

sponsor ’ s perspective represented a perfectly rational
attempt to expedite the LCA process.

Unfortunately , it

als。

raised serious organizational questions with regard to the
ability of Districts to negotiate with authority and
contributed to further policy instability.

This observation

is supported by the survey data on VAR3 for the Target group.
Hypothesis (3): within-agency orderings of
variable criticality are consistent across the
span of the organization.
The statistical test for hypothesis 3 involved use of
。neway

ANOVA with a means comparison on VAR1 through VAR6

between only the Center and Periphery.
。ut

The findings are set

in Table XV.
TABLE XV
ONE WAY ANOVA
COMPARISON OF CENTER AND PERIPHERY
VAR1
SOURCE

BETWEEN GROUPS

D.F.
l

SUM OF
SQUARES

MEAN
SQUARES

182.0076

182.0076
163.3864

WITHIN GROUPS

25

4084.6591

TOTAL

26

4266.6667

F
RATI 。

F
PROBe

1. 1140

.3013

REGION OF REJECT.
(5%)
4.24

.B르j르드흐르브
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TABLE XV
ONE WAY ANOVA
COMPARISON OF CENTER AND PERIPHERY

(continued)
VAR2

SOURCE
BETWEEN GROUPS

D.F.

SUM OP’
SQUARES

MEAN
SQUARES

1

2.5463

2.5463

WITHIN GROUPS

25

6193.7500

247.7500

TOTAL

26

6196.2963

F
RATIO
.0103

F
PROB.
.9201

REGION OF REJECT.
(5%)
4.24

Rejected

VAR3
SOURCE
BETWEEN GROUPS

D.F.

SUM OF
SQUARES

MEAN
SQUARES

l

318.3712

318.3712

WITHIN GROUPS

25

3498.2955

139.9318

TOTAL

26

3816.6667

F
RATIO

F
PROS.

2.2752

.1440

REGION OF REJECT.
(5 훌)

4.24

월 jected

VAR4

SOURCE
SETWEEN GROUPS

D.F.

SUM OF
SQUARES

MEAN
SQUARES

1

560.4848

560.4848

WITHIN GROUPS

25

3818.1818

152.7273

TOTAL

26

4378.6667

F
RATIO

F
PROS.

3.6698

.0669

REGION OF REJECT.
(5%)
4.24

Rejected
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TABLE XV
ONE WAY ANOVA
COMPARISON OF CENTER AND PERIPHERY
(continued)
VAR5

SOURCE
BETWEEN GROUPS

D.F.
l

SUM OF
SQUARES

MEAN

SQUARES

140.8089

140.8089
154.4773

WITHIN GROUPS

25

386 1. 9318

TOTAL

26

4002.7407

F
RATIO

F
PROB.

.9115

.3489

REGION OF REJECT.
(5%)
4.24

욕르i르드E르브

VAR6

SOURCE

D.F.

SUM OF
SQUARES

MEAN
SQUARES

BETWEEN GROUPS

1

275.4074

275.4074

WITHIN GROUPS

25

1500.0000

60.0000

TOTAL

26

1775.4074

F
RATIO

F
PROB.

4.5901

.0421

REGION OF REJECT.
(5%)
4.24

욕으드르121;.르브

The data on hypothesis 3 presents an interesting
picture.

Rejection of statistically significant differences

for five of the six variables supports the hypothesis that
scoring across the organization is comparable.

However , the

magnitude of the relative ranking differences between Center
and Periphery merit attention.

For that reason it was

important toassess the differences measured on individual
variables and evaluate the basis for such variation.
variable 1. The enabling legislation
(Congressional authorization of the project and
cost sharing program) or other legal directive
mandates policy objectives which are clear and
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consistent or at least provides clear criteria for
resolving goal conflicts.
The variation of means on VAR1 were statistically
insignificant (F=1.114).
Variable 2. The enabling legislation
(Congressional authorization of the project and
cost sharing program) incorporates a sound theory
identifying the principal factors and causal
linkages affecting policy objectives and gives
~mplementing officials sufficient jurisdiction
。ver non-Federal interests , members of the water
resource development community , and other points
。 f leverage to attain , at least potentially , the
desired goals.
The variation ofmeans on VAR 2 were statistically
insignificant (F=.0103).
Variable 3. The enabling legislation
(congressional authorization of the project and
cost sharing program) structures the
implementation process so as to maximize the
probability that implementing officials
(representative of the Corps of Engineers) will
perform as desired. This involves assignment to a
sympathetic agency with clear , hierarchical
。rganizational structure , supportive decision
rules , sufficient financial resources , and
adequate access to supporters.
Tbe variation of means on VAR 3 were statistically
insignificant (F=2.2752).
Of note , however , is the large relative rank order
spread with the center determining this the least important
variable while the Periphery considers it second most
important.

While not supported by a statistically

sufficient F ratio , the positional differences here suggest
that the "resourcing and mechanics" of implementation are of
greater importance to the Periphery than the Center.

As the
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Periphery is the direct recipient of such resources and
guidance , the finding is of intuitive (if not statistical)
significance.
Variable 4. The leaders of the implementing
agency (Corps of Engineers) possess substantial
managerial and political skill and are committed
to the success of the program.
The variation of means on VAR 4 were statistically
insignificant (F=3.6698).
The high rating (first) for VAR4 supplied by Periphery
respondents may in some ways be linked to frustration
experienced with the vertical flow of communication and
approvals and so reflect an appreciation of how critical
managerial and leadership skills are within the
。rganizational

hierarchy.

The Center , however , also rated

VAR4 as significant (third).

There appears to be shared

appreciation for the criticality of capable implementing
personnel.
。bserved
。n

Given the statistical insignificance of the

differences it is impractical to speculate further

the relative differences of the rankings.
Variable 5. The cost shared water resource
development program is actively supported by
。rganized constituency groups and by a few key
legislators (or a chief executive) throughout the
implementation process , with the courts being
neutral or supportive.
Th~

variation of means on VAR 5 were statistically

insignificant (F=.9115).
The basis for the observed within-agency variance
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likely rests in the focus of the Center (broad programmatic
perspective) vice that of the Periphery (individual project
。r

single non-Federal interest.)

While the Periphery group

may appreciate the necessity of organized constituency
support it is clear that matters of "political support" is
better understood by the Center which must routinely deal
with organized constituency pressure on a national scale.
Whereas members of the Periphery would likely deal with
local components of organized constituencies they would be
less likely than the Center to depend on direct organized
constituency support of policy initiatives.
variable 6 •

The relative priority of statutory
is not undermined over time by the
emergence of conflicting pUblic policies or by
changes in relevant socioeconomic conditions which
weaken the legislation ’ s causal theory or
political support.
。 bjectives

The variation of means on VAR 6 were statistically
significant (F=4.5901).

However , as both Center and

Periphery groups rated this variable as least or near-least
in significance the confirmationof statistical differences
is not analytically relevant.
Analvsis: HVDothesis 3
As was the case with hypothesis 2 , observable but
statistically insignificant differences were recorded
between within-agency elements , e.g. Center and Periphery
groups.

While the subject groups did not offer comparable

rankings on the variables the recorded differences in scores
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between groups were not large enough to affirm statistically
significant differences between the Center and the
Periphery.

Rejection of the null hypothesis is not

supported by the data.

The most significant differences

between groups was registered on VAR3 which involved the
resourcing of the implementation initiative and VAR5
involving the support of constituency for the
policy/legislation.
With regard to VAR3 , the higher ranking registered by
the Periphery was likely influenced by the difficulty Corps
field personnel had with non-Federal interests on matters of
interpretation and out-of-chain communication efforts.

The

perceived need for a supportive structure is reflected in
this ranking and confirmed by supplemental data.sources
(primarily Corps project managers) cited throughout this
study.

In this instance , the statistical insignificance of

the data may be a result of the variable being perceived as
important by both groups , though not equally so.

The

recorded differences provide limited evidence of an
important difference in perspective.
The findings on VAR5 are consistent with the model in
that the Center is more directly inv01ved with constituency
group' "negotiation'’ than are components of the Periphery

wh。

are typically engaged in implementing policy "on the ground"
for individual projects.

Whereas constituency and special
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interest

당roups

may attempt to exert influence over

individual projects (particularly when such projects are
large scale or represent an opportunity to set policy
precedent)

,

they more typically focus their energies on

effecting substantive legislative policy change.

That was

clearly the case in the development of the WRDA 1986 as was
reflected by the legislative history set out in Chapter II.
The data on VAR5 suggests that the perceived significance of
constituency group support may vary across the organization
by a meaningful , if statistically insignificant amount.
This observation is an important one and will be discussed
in greater detail in Chapter VI where the evolution and
status of the planning "partnership" is evaluated.
CONCLUSION
Data on the process analysis portion of this research
provides a mixed picture with regard to Mazmanian and
Sabatier ’ s conceptual framework of implementation and its
theoretical foundations.

The survey data , though generally

supportive of the model , is

inconcl~sive

as a result of

statistically insignificant findings and the fact that the
sample groups tended to reject the models contention that
clear legal mandates and sound theory would be perceived by
individuals

~nvolved

in the implementation'process as the

most critical of effective implementation conditions.
Whereas the findings of the ANOVA do not in most cases allow
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for the inference that the recorded scores of the Target ,
Center , and Periphery are significantly different , the
differences are not meaningless.
。n

The recorded differences

variables one through six indicate patterns that are

consistent with both the conceptual framework of the model
and much of the general theory of organization (Mazmanian
1983 , "20).

The discussion of inter-group differences set

forth in this chapter will be continued in chapter VI
wherein the findings of the process analysis will be
evaluated in conjunction with the data on empirical project
impacts (Chapter V) and the independent supplemental data
sources referenced in Chapter II to provide an overview and
summary analysis of the implementation research.
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ENDNOTES
1. See Chapter III , subdivision , Use of MUltiple Data
Sources , for a full explication.
2. Anova allows for an analysis of the difference of
means relative to the spread of the scores within and
between groups. Significance levels , determined by F
ratios , are then computed. For purposes of this research ,
the 95웅 confidence interval is used to establish
significance.
3. Because Federal water resource development
legislation is typically authorized via biannual
appropriation this condition is particularly relevant.
4. The "capture" model , and criticism of its impact on
democratic decision making has been authoritatively treated
in general administration theory by a number of scholars
including McConnell (1966) and Lowi (1969) , who provide
excellent critiques of the application of the theory in the
administration of natural resources. Counter-theorists
include James Q. Wilson (1980) who argue that "capture"
theory fails to appreciate the political basis of regulatory
policy.

CHAPTER V
THE IMPACT OF COST SHARING ON PROJECT DEVELOPMENT
The analysis in this Chapter proceeds somewhat
differently from that of the previous Chapter in that ,
rather than deal directly with theoretical aspects of
implementation theory , the discussion focuses on an
assessment of the design impact cost shared water resource
development has had on projects.

The WRDA 1986 did not set

forth specific goals in the legislation with regard to the
type of projects which would emerge.

Indeed , the

introductory narrative of the Act was

rem~rkably

brief:

To provide for the conservation and development of .
water and related resources and the improvement
and rehabilitation of the Nation ’ s water resources
infrastructure. (P.L. 99-662 1986)
The brevity of the formal comment in the legislation
was , however , compensated for by the swirl of argument and
posturing which preceded passage of the WRDA 1986.

For the

purpose of this analysis a set of three assumptions were
established in Chapter III to serve as a framework from
within which the impact of cost-sharing on physical project
development could be evaluated.

This Chapter addresses the

background and substance of each of those assumptions in
greater detail and evaluates each in light of data collected
。n

cost shared water resource development projects
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authorized since the inception WRDA 1986.
IMPACT ON PROJECT SIZE
During the next few years we expect the make up of
。ur construction program to shift to smaller
scaled projects , made up mostly of flood control
and commercial navigation projects ••• The ability
to fUlly fund a project , or to do it in stages ,
stems from such institutional constraints on the
sponsor such as debt ceilings and the willingness
。 f the beneficiaries to assume additional costs.
Robert Dawson
Former Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Civil Works
We believe that increased non-Federal cost sharing
has benefits which ga beyond reducing Federal
expenditures. For instance , I believe the planned
projects will more closely reflect the need of the
specific sponsor. The change also will cause a
shift to smaller more easily financed projects and
the phased construction of larger projects .•• cost
sharing of the feasibility phase study will assure
a more effective participatory role by the
sponsors , focus the evaluation of alternatives on
those that are tailored to the sponsor ’ s financial
and institutional capabilities and produce
authorized plans that can be implemented with the
full support and participation of the sponsor.
L.T. General E.R. Heiberg III
Chief of Engineers , USACE (Ret.)
(Source: Testimony before Congressional
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development.)
The first assumption established in Chapter III dealt
specifically with the impact of cost-sharing on the project
size: 1) Cost shared project development will lead to the
formulation and authorization of smaller water resource
development projects.

The second assumption regarding the
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trend toward staged or phased cost shared projects is
similar in so far as staging and/or phasing the construction
。f

separable elements (elements of a total project that

could function independently as a separately identified
project) may be considered an interim reduction.

As each

element of a phased project requires negotiation of a
separate LeA , the interim solution may never be realized if
the Federal or non-Federal interest decides to
further development.

工n

foreg。

those instances , the total project

as originally conceived is never constructed.
These assumptions , and their common logic , are central
to the argument that smaller , fewer , and better projects
will result from a cost shared planning model.
so?

Why is this

Because , the requirement for additional non-Federal

interest financial commitment to project construction , in
conjunction with the increased planning role of the nonFederal interest , will reduce the incentive of non-Federal
interests to negotiate for large scale/large capacity
structural solutions and induce them to negotiate for
reduced capacity solutions that more directly address the
problem from the perspective of the local interest.
Alternatively , the non-Federal interest may agree

t。

the full project size in principle but fund construction in
phases of increments thus reducing the initial financial
burden while providing an opportunity to evaluate the
benefit stream of the completed portion.
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In either case , cost sharing dramatically altered the
calculus as it shifted the burden of project proponency from
the Corps of Engineers to the non-Federal interest now
responsible for building and maintaining pUblic and
political support for the life of the project (Kelly 1989).
The assertion that cost sharing will lead to reductions
in project size presupposes a number of conditions and
responses to economic incentives and financial inducements
established by the legislation. (see Chapter II on the
theoretical foundations of cost sharing.)

Principal among

them are the following: 1) Corps project design (and the
associated planning processes) has traditionally reflected a
conservative approach to risk and uncertainty assessment; 2)
Sponsors , constrained by limited financial resources and
competing demands for pUblic

당。ods

production will award

preference to the lowest cost "acceptable" alternative; 3)
Sponsor participation in the planning process will lead
projects that vary in design as well as magnitude and

t。

s。

will better reflect local preferences as well as financial
capabilities.
Arguments supportingthis assumption are

als。

frequently offered as evidence of why Federal projects in
general , and Corps projects in particular , have historically
been

C!

riticized f.or being "overbuilt."

。verbuilding

Arguably ,

or designed-in overcapacity is far less
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frequently a criticism expressed by project beneficiaries of
Federally funded projects than an observation on behalf of
individuals who are dissatisfied with the political
allocation of Federal development dollars.

Critics are

als。

frequently disinclined to support water resource development
which impose structural solutions.

Nevertheless , based on

the economic inducements which have been historically
available to the non-Federal interest and the long standing
criticism (and literature) of

’ψ。rk

barrel" resource

development , charges of project over-design and the
authorization of marginal projects can neither be easily nor
summarily dismissed.

Indeed , no less an authority than

former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works
(ASACW)

,

Robert Dawson in defending the Administration ’ s

cost sharing proposals admitted that , "The old epithet of
pork barrel , which was justifiably , at times , hung around
。ur

neck , just won ’ t be available to a critic anymore"

(National Journal 22 November 1986 , 2824).
While it is not the case that projects are planned
without regard to returns on investment , and has not been
since the implementation of benefit-cost analysis was
required by the Flood Control Act of 1936 , the
institutionalization of preferences (e.g.

,

selection of the

National Economic Development (NED) Plan as the preferred
alternative) clearly suggests a selection criteria with a
bias is quite different from one that would reflect a purely
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local bias.

The critical dimension with regards

t。

formulation of the NED Plan is the explicit goal of
maximizing net national economic development consistent with
the Federal objective{s) (Principles and Guidelines 1983 ,
Part V, iv).

Indeed , with implementation of the Principles

and Guidelines , mUlti-objective planning was superseded by a
model which featured single objective planning (maximization
。f

economic benefits) with constraints {environmental

preservation).l
The net benefits decision rule established in the
Principles and Guidelines optimizes economic efficiency
without regard to the first cost of the selected
alternative.

Application of these criteria would not

necessarily lead to selection of the same project
alternative as would be chosen by local sponsors (project
beneficiaries) whose assessment of risk and return on
capital are far less likely , in the absence of legal
inducement or financial incentive , to consider the
advancement of national economic goals a desirable planning
。 bjective.

Indeed , it has been asserted that the central

problem of implementing cost sharing rests with design of a
cost sharing system that induces non-Federal interests

t。

select the same project as prescribed by the NED (Marshall
'1 969).

Thus , Federal projects may be perceived to be overbuilt
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by critics who compare the magnitude of the authorized
project with a conception of what would have been
constructed to remedy the instant and local situation (be it
flood control , navigation , etc.) had the project funding
been wholly non-Federal.
The Influence of Risk Assessment on Pro;ect Desian
An alternative explanation for perceived overbuilding
by the Federal interest involves risk assessment.

All

developed water resource projects , irrespective of
authorized purpose{s)
uncertainty.

,

involve an assessment of risk and

The Principles and Guidelines identifies the

planner ’ s primary role in dealing with risk and uncertainty
as describing the areas of sensitivity clearly so that
decisions can be made with knowledge of the degree of
reliability of available information CU. S. Water Resources
Council 1983 , 5).

The process , however , is far from

straightforward as the planning process is characterized by
the uncertaintyassociated with stochastic meteorological
and hydrologicprocesses and systems.
The traditional solution has been to increase the
quality and quantity of information available and to then
assess how much confidence can be placed in the available
data .(Manual for Risk and Uncertainty Analvsis in Corp ’ s
civil Works Plannina 1989 , 2.2).

The remaining uncertainty

is a critical and unstable variable that must be factored
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into the planning and decision making process.
That process in not dissimilar to what a sponsor would
engage in when assessing the risks of alternative project
designs , sizes , etc.

Nevertheless , risk assessment ,

notwithstanding the rigor of the formal analysis , remains an
exercise that is largely sUbjective , albeit expert , jUdgment
designed to arrive at a "sufficient reduction" solution
(Fischoff , et. ale 1981 , 105).

That solution will be

largely dependent on the decision analyst ’ s criterion for
buying down risk which , in the case of cost shared projects ,
is complex because it is not a unilateral determination.
。 ne

can , with little difficulty , imagine the increase in

difficulty associated with arriving at a negotiated multiparty consensus on mutually acceptable risk.
It is this potential difference in willingness

t。

accept risk (in the case of choosing flood protection
levels) or avoid risk (in estimating return on investment
for vendible projects) that may contribute to sponsor
selection of project alternatives which are smaller (or
larger) than what is proposed by

th~

Federal interest.

In

either case , the NED Plan may be challenged by the local
alternative thus leading to negotiation on project scope
and , ultimately , dialogue about the primacy of Federal
regulations in a relationship characterized as a partnership
in planning.
Federal estimates of risk assessment may tend to err on

194
the conservative side for a variety of reasons.
projξcts

allotment from Federal flood control
risk.

Risk

is assigned

Assigned risk is risk that is determined by

regulation , statute , etc. , and so is appreciably different
from acquired risk which may bought down by local
beneficiaries who express a risk preference by "purchasing"
a level of risk.

In the case of flood control , risk

preference may be reflected in the level of protection local
beneficiaries would "purchase" if they were constructing the
project.
There has been an understandable reluctance on behalf
。f

Federal interests to underestimate such risks; partly

。wing

to concerns for the welfare of project beneficiaries

and partly because of a desire to ensure the long term
integrity of the project and the associated agency.

Indeed ,

from a Federal perspective the opportunity costs associated
with project failure may be far greater than that increment
。f

actual project c9st which would accrue from

。verassessment.

Failure of Federal projects , as was

demonstrated by the collapse of the

Bur~au

of Reclamation ’ s

Teton Dam in 1976 , has serious implications for an agency
dependent on pUblic support and trust or who must compete
for pUblic works with other agencies.

For an agency such as

the Corps , whose principle strength rests with the
perception that it is the Federal government ’ s center of
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technical expertise for engineering design and construction ,
there exists great incentive to err on the conservative side
。f

risk assignment.

Decisions which lead to overly

conservative design will almost invariably produce effects
far less acute than those associated with a policy that can
be linked to a disaster condition.
Interestingly , such a conservative bias in the
selection of a project design is theoretically supported by
。bservations

made by the those engaged in decision research.

Selection of a preferred design for a flood control project
constitutes what decision analysts refer to as "unique
choice" risk which means simply that once a project design
(or a particular construction requirement procedure is
selected ) there are relatively few opportunities to make a
second or third real time choice as there would be in a
repetitive choice scenario (e.g. , taking a "hit" while
holding 17 during a Blackjack session).

The data on unique

versus repetitive choice behavior suggest that people tend
to be more risk averse when faced with a unique choice
decision (von winterfeldt 1986 , 215).

Thus , there may exist

a human tendency when selecting a risk related project
design to choose conservatively.
Moreover , Federal projects do not compete , in a strict
market sense , with other capital project demands as is the
case with capital projects funded at the local level.

This

latter point is critical and worthy of closer examination.
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While it is true that Federal agencies compete for dollars
within a political allocation model , the Corps of Engineers
has not traditionally designed projects to meet bUdget
constraints nor is the Corps directly concerned with the
competing capital or social needs of project beneficiaries.
The Corps is authorized by law to engage in water
resource development projects , i.e. projects that improve ,
increase , or support the primary factors of economic
production , not curb and gutter maintenance , road
improvements , pUblic housing , etc. 2 That is clearly not the
case for local governments.

Capital expenditure at the

local level represents a resource investment for which there
is a competing demand that may represent an equal or higher
rate of return on investment or invite consideration on the
basis of distributional equity.

Overassessment of risk for

anyone probable event , and the resultant overinvestment of
constrained resources , may lead to neglect of other areas
that warrant attention (Fischoff '1981 , 36).
Thus , local governments , or project sponsors , are more
likely to perceive risk reduction as having certain and
quantifiable opportunity costs and to choose a level of risk
that is acceptable from the standpoints of fiscal efficacy ,
efficiency , and political acceptability as well as one that
satisfies minimal safety concerns.

It must also be noted

that the ongoing pUblic and political support for such
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projects is now largely the responsibility of the nonFederal interest.

Thus , from the perspective of the local ,

long term capital project tradeoffs must be factored

int。

the decision.
Deep draft navigation projects also present risk
assessment issues that may be evaluated differently by
Federal and non-Federal interests.

Channel width , size of

turning basins , underkeel clearance , and traffic projections
represent project design issues for which there exist
standard Federal design and assessment guideswhich the
Corps employs to derive project feature size estimates. 3
Here too , in the case of a Federally funded project , there
exist incentives to engage in a conservative assessment of
risk and design accordingly.

Wider and deeper channels ,

bends , and turning basins are certain to meet with the
approval of shipping and harbor interests as will promoting
a design that will accommodate long range projected growth.
Nevertheless , in the absence of full Federal funding ,
naγigation

requirements are sUbject to assessment by sponsor

interests who must share both first costs (construction and
interest costs) and , in some cases , operation and
maintenance costs associated withthe project.

Risk

assessment in this instance is further complicated by the
cost share ratios set out in WRDA 1986 which are
"progressive" with respect to dredging activity.

The non-

Federal construction share doubles beyond a forty-five foot
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depth
pay

(25웅

50 훌 。 f

to

50 웅)

and non-Federal interests are required

t。

operation and maintenance dredging beyond the

forty-five foot depth.
A revealed preference of local risk assessment may
differ both in the level of acceptable risk for a given
feature and the selected method of risk reduction.

For

example , the use of tug assisted turns in turning basins may
be substituted for the development of expanded basins.

The

choice of alternatives in this example may represent a
rather straightforward preference for tug assisted turns
。ver

the provision of adequate space to permit unassisted

ship maneuvers.

It shou.ld be noted , however , that whereas

turning basin construction is a cost shared feature , tug
fees may be charged directly to the using vessel and

s。

generate a revenue stream for the sponsor while requiring
neither first costs for construction nor the development of
additional cost recovery mechanisms.

The point is simply

that revealed risk preference is frequently not a decision
made in isolation or on the basis of risk alone.

It is a

decision made in conjunction with a'host of other project
considerations and financing strategies.
The Principles and Guidelines acknowledges that , in
principle , the government should be neutral toward risk and
uncertainty in evaluating alternatives.

It is clearly the

case that de facto "risk standards ," particularly with
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respect to design safety , may be identified throughout the
Corps of

En당 ineers

Engineering Regulations series which

specify design standards for a wide variety of functional
project types. 4 While such standards are thought to reflect
good "engineering jUdgment" based on engineering theory and
a broad history of application , they also reflect
institutional preferences regarding risk assignment.
Sponsors who opt to choose riskier or less risky
solutions are confronted with the necessity of negotiating
not only with the engineering expertise of the local Federal
interest but also challenging a large body of existing
Federal regulation and law that frequently appears to leave
little discretion with respect to prescribed design
standards , a position sponsors are likely to feel violates
the commitment to true "partnersh,i p in planning."

The

situation begs the question of whether the non-Federal
interest contribution extends beyond a financial commitment
to include serious consideration of alternative engineering
solutions.
A critical challenge for the planning partnership will
be the review of Federal regulatory guidance to determine
that which is necessitated by law and that which is the
product of convention , and so represents pOlicy sUbject
negotiation with sponsor interests.

t。

Sickles , in his

assessment of the future of intergovernmental relations for
the Corps of Engineers , calls for a determination of new
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allowable standards to supplement risk assessment procedures
and argues that these standards should be the product of a
broad consensus of state and Federal engineers (Sickles
1986 , 153).
The Influence of Budaet Constraint on Pro;ect Desian
A third , and by no means less significant , force
driving project size reduction is the sponsor ’ s funding
constraint.

The planning process acknowledges that the

financial limitations of sponsors may lead to economic sub。ptimization

in selection of project design. Each plan

formulated for a particular project is evaluated in
consideration of four criteria: completeness , effectiveness ,
efficiency , and acceptability (Ee 1105-2-115 1983 , iv).
Acceptability has been interpreted to mean financially
acceptable to the. non-Federal interest though the
distinction is somewhat muddied as when a "constrained NED"
is put forth as the NED plan rather than classified as an
alternative which might otherwise require Agency Secretary
level approval.

Interestingly , it argued that this same

constraint (beneficiary payment) acts positively to put
pressure on local interests to be more attentive to cost
effectiveness in project design and scale (Shabman and
Dickey 1986 , 361).
There are a number of ways in which a project may be
reevaluated to meet financial constraint requirements and
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not all of them actually involve anticipated reductions in
the size or scope of the project.

Phasing and staging are

two construction strategies which have enjoyed some
popularity , particularly in the navigation project arena.
Assertions regarding phased or staged construction of
separable elements differ in important ways from those
associated with scope reduction , though both are linked

t。

local budget constraints.
The concept of the separable element is fundamental

t。

appreciating the application of staging and phasing , and ,
indeed , to understanding key economic criticisms of the
statute ’ s implementation which shall be discussed later in
this chapter.

A separable element is defined by the WRDA

1986 (Sec. 103(f»

as a portion of a project which is

physically separate from other portions of the project and
which has benefits separately identifiable.

Though the

statute does not specifically identify separable elements
for navigation projects , conceptually , components of a
navigation project can be staged or phased in a manner
similar to that employed for flood control projects. 5
The staging or phasing of construction does not
necessarily imply that the NED Plan is rejected in favor of
a smaller alternative plan.

Moreover , if full project

construction is completed over an extended schedule due

t。

staging , the overall project costs will likely be increased
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as a result of inflation and price escalation.
Adoption of a phased construction schedule by the nonFederal interest may generally be considered a strategy

t。

reduce the first costs of construction and is occasioned by
either: 1) insufficient available financing to go forward
with the full NED plan or; 2) a desire to examine the
project benefit stream by stages before proceeding with
financing of the fully authorized project.

The latter case

is a particularly important influence where project outputs
(e.g. , revenues from induced shipping traffic) are vendible
and actual benefit accrual may be compared with planning
estimates.
with regard to planning estimates , it should be noted
that the potential for error in projected cargo estimates
constitutes risk of another variety , investment risk , which
the sponsor must assess in determining an appropriate level
。f

capital obligation.

Whereas there is evidence that there

exist considerable barriers to the use of formal risk
assessment methods , sponsors conducting a financial analysis
will look carefully at the projecteq benefit stream and may
choose to select an alternative that allows for the
realization of initial benefits before expanding to meet
future needs.
While it would be incorrect to suggest that project
staging representsthe selection of a reduced scope
alternative it would be equally misleading to assume that
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staging will not in some cases lead to "partial"
construction.

Chapter III offered adiscussion of this

condition and how it would be treated methodologically in
this research.

only observation over time of the sUbject

projects will offer evidence of the extent to which phased
construction actually represents project downsizing.
The focus of the preceding discussion has largely
concerned what individuals would purchase given a choice of
alternatives.

It is also necessary to discuss the absolute

constraints that are factored into that decision.
Affordability has become a salient issue in the
implementation of WRDA 1986 owing primarily to discussion
(and possibly some confusion) about whether plan
affordability should be linked directly to the financial
capacity of the sponsor to generate share revenues (ability
to pay) or determined by the sponsors willingness

t。

transfer moneys from competing demands to purchase some
level of project

ou~put

(willingness to pay).

The

distinction is a crucial one and merits at least summary
discussion.
Ability to pay is a measure of the capacity of an
individual or pUblic body to raise and commit resources

t。

meet measured needs , in this case the financial capability
。f

the non-Federal interest.

For flood control projects

under cost share principles this capability is established
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by formula , the calculation of which was pUblished as an
interim rule in the Federal Register , Wednesday , September
23 , 1987.

Section 241.4(b) of the interim rule states that

the test shall not be used to affect project scope or

t。

change bUdgeting priorities among projects competing for
scarce funds.

Notwithstanding such regulatory admonitions ,

it would seem less than prudent or pragmatic for the Federal
interest to push for a cost effective design that is clearly
beyond the capacity of the sponsor to fund or maintain.
Likewise , modifications that result in significant
project cost growth are a concern to sponsors who view the
Federal interest as having no true cost ceiling on a project
bUdget. There is a body of evidence that suggest the Corps
has become increasingly sensitive to the expressed concerns
。f

the non-Federal interest on these sUbjects.
Ability to pay is , then , a relatively straightforward

index of the capacity of a jurisdiction or multijurisdictional combine to generate revenues derived
primarily from calculation of an eligibility factor (EF)

,

a

component of state and county per capita income as a
percentage of the national average (PCI Index).

The test is

applied not only to jurisdiction(s) which encompass the
project area but also the financial condition of the state.
The state , though not itself a direct sponsor , is deemed a
potential and likely source of financial assistance.
Jurisdictions which qualify for relief may be eligible for a
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reduction in the non-Federal share though in no case will
the non-Federal share drop below five percent (Federal
Register 23 September 1987 , 242.4(f»).
The test does not attempt to measure or otherwise
account for sponsor expenditure preferences , current
indebtedness , or level of tax effort.

Indeed , the

guidelines specifically assert that " ••• the borrowing
capability of the local sponsor should not be a factor in
the ability to pay determination."
。 ne

As of March , 1992 only

project formulated under cost share principles had

qualified for a reduction in share and a second project ’ s
application was under review.
Notwithstanding formal admonitions that the sponsor ’ s
ability to pay and credit rating shall not impact on the
。verall

approach to project planning and plan formulation or

matter , the data suggests that non-Federal interest budget
constraints do and will continue to have a profound
influence on project formulation.

A GAO survey conducted in

1991 indicated that in approximately twenty-five percent
(25 옹)

of the surveyed projects that had progressed

t。

preconstruction engineering and design (PED) the non-Federal
interest indicated "moderate" to very great "difficulty" in
meeting the requirements for local share of construction
costs (GAO 1991 , 41).
Ability to pay should not be confused (though it seems
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frequently to be in discussions regarding sponsor choice)
with willingness to pay (WTP).

This function is better

represented by construction of the consumer ’ s indifference
curve rather than calculation of actual financial capability
。f

the non-Federal interest to incur additional debt.

Willingness to pay (WTP) is a "market-like" index of what an
individual would pay for a particular good or service or ,
what they would pay to sustain a level of benefit or avoid
the threat of loss.
WTP is generally considered an appropriate measure of
benefits because it leads to an accurate valuation of
。utputs

by consumers/beneficiaries.

As such , WTP is the P&G

prescribed standard by which benefits are derived in
benefit-cost analysis. In the case of flood control
projects , the good may be generally considered flood damage
reduction and the WTP an aggregated sum of individual WTPs
across the range of project beneficiaries.
WTP for either individuals or groups should
theoretically reflect the stated preference for a
combination of the ability of the beneficiaries to pay and
recognition of the competing demands for resources , i.e.
budget constraint.

,

a

Thus WTP does not operate in any

practical sense independent of the financial capacity of
beneficiaries to exercise a preference and , notwithstanding
a determination by formula that project beneficiaries are
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financially capable of paying , the estimate will likely
reflect mediated preferences.
Benefitcapture and Jurisdictional Externalities
WTP is closely linked , at least theoretically , to the
existence of pUblic goods and extra-market transactions.
The principal concern to project sponsors , and potential
financial institutions , is the ability of the sponsor

t。

translate benefits , as projected in plan formulation ,

int。

revenues in the case of projects which produce vendible
。utcomes

or to reduce the threat of damage (avoided damage

benefits) as is the case for flood control projects.

The

problem of benefit capture may become particularly acute for
those projects where benefits are largely non-vendible , as
is frequently the case for local flood control projects , or
where jurisdictional boundaries do not coincide with
patterns of benefit distribution.

Each of these conditions

acts to constrain the ability of the sponsor to recover
invested capital and may thus potentially result in
。verinvestment

(from a local perspective) or diminished

future financial capability due to unbalanced debt service
for the project. 6
Political and

ge。‘~raphic

correspondence between the

boundaries of the jurisdiction and area of project related
benefits is considered crucial for maximum efficiency in the
production and delivery of pUblic goods.

In a perfect

208

correspondence model the population of the jurisdiction that
determines the level of a public good includes precisely the
set of individuals who will consume and benefit from
production of that good.
Moreover , it is argued , that , provided costs of
provision are similar for service producers at any level , it
is al¥ays more efficient for local government to provide a
level of pUblic goods for local consumption than for a
centralized government to provide a uniform level of service
across all jurisdictions (U.S. ACIR Perspective Summer/Fall
1987 , 36).

This is so for a variety of reasons involving

collective preferences and the existence of
interjurisdictional externalities.

Indeed , the conventional

research on local government organization affirms that a
mUltiplicity of governments

linke~

interactively may serve a

number of useful purposes including increased sensitivity
citizen preference , closer match of benefit distribution

t。

t。

the eC9nomic demand of the community , and increased elected
。 fficial

accountability to a specific community of interest

(U.S. ACIR December 1987).
In cases where it appears that pUblic goods outputs
will not achieve efficient levels of production due to the
existence of interjurisdictional externalities or other
efficiency constraints on recovery , and in the absence of
potential for jurisdictional cooperation , centralized
(Federal) funding provides an interim solution by assigning
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costs over the universe of beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries alike.

The solution , however , forgoes the

efficiencies associated with correspondence.

Local

interests who pay for only a negligible portion of a project
are less inclined to express concern with non-contributing
beneficiaries and are subsequently induced to request higher
levels of output than what would have been purchased had a
pure user payor collective decision model been employed
derive demand.
。f

t。

The result is demand driven overproduction

a good or level of service.
Benefit CaDture: Flood Control.

Flood protection

projects present a difficult combination of cost recovery
constraints for local interests who may be the principal but
not exclusive beneficiary because: 1) flood damage
prevention is largely a non-vendible benefit with an
indefinite pay-back and , 2) there exist competing demands
for constrained capital budgets.

Flood protection is a non-

vendible output in so far as it is difficult to exclude
contingent properties from protection once the protection
has been provided.?
In that fashion , flood protection acts like a public
good and so must typically be paid for by extraction of tax
revenue~.

Raising taxes or assessments against property is

never a popular activity and is made less so when the
linkage between tax increase and total benefit is uncertain
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as is so frequently the case with flood protection benefits.
Moreover , flood protection benefits have an indefinite time
horizon.

Property values and development in the protected

zone may increase but the magnitude of the benefit stream ,
absent a recurring flood of record , is decidedly uncertain
when compared with investment alternatives.

Absent actual

flood damages , it is difficult to sustain the political
coalitions necessary to support development of a (Federal)
project that may take in excess of 20 years to move from
conception to construction.
Cost sharing for local flood protection may be thought
。f

as functionally comparable to an intergovernmental

matching grant designed to generate pUblic goods production
within a specified area.

Figure 3

illust~ates

how such

$.

X
I 』T

o

Units of X

Fiaure 3 Indifference curve for pUblic goods.
Source: Oates , Wallace E. , Fiscal Federalism ,
Harcourt , Brace , Jovanovich , Inc. , 1972.
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transfers reduce the unit price of goods production
project benefit recipients.

t。

Assume that curves I and III

represent community indifference curves between a pUblic good
(X) and all other goods.

In the absence of sUbsidy and with

a budget constraint of MN , the consumption of X would be OA.
If a unit subsidy were provided that generated bUdget
constraint MT , the consumption of X would increase to OB.
Cost sharing , where the non-Federal interest share is less
than

100옹

,

may be thought of a unit sUbsidy as it decreases

the price of a good (project) across a range of project
s1zes.
still it must remembered that while the unit price of
flood protection is being sUbsidized , the sponsor ’ s budget
constraint for capital projects is not otherwise adjusted ,
as might be the case were the transfer unconditional.

Thus ,

pressure to meet competing capital demands within the
jurisdiction will continue to act as a constraint.
Benefit CaDture: DeeD Draft Naviqation.

For deep draft

navigation projects the problem of interjurisdictional
externalities is somewhat less consequential than for flood
control projects owing to characteristics of the benefit
stream that increase the likelihood of full recovery' of
invested capital.

Deep draft navigation and harbor

improvement generate vendible benefits but non-Federal
sponsors generally must recover project share outlays
through conventional cost recovery mechanisms such as
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dockage fees , wharfage fees , facility leasing , etc.

The

WRDA 1986 section 208 , Port or Harbor Dues , provides that
the non-Federal interest may levy port or harbor dues

t。

recapture project outlays but are restricted from levying
such dues on vessels that could have used the port or harbor
prior to project improvements.

Thus the recovery mechanism

is limited by law to induced traffic whose draft exceeded
the handling capacity of the port prior to navigation
improvements associated with the project.
Ports have understandably shown extreme reluctance

t。

initiate new fees on such traffic as it is that very traffic
which must be induced to realize the benefit stream
associated with the project.

The imposition of a "new

traffic" fee would serve as a disincentive in a highly
competitive market and has been largely dismissed by
ports as a viable cost recovery alternative.

Presumably ,

cost recovery will be achieved through the collection of
normal fees , rents , etc. or transfers from state or local
legislative bodies in support of economic development.
It is also the case that implementation of section 208
levies represents an administratively complex procedure
requiring review and comment in the Federal Register , filing
。f

proposed dues schedules with the Federal Maritime

Commission , and periodic audits by the Comptroller General
to ensure legal compliance with provisions of the Act.

In
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practice , no ports have attempted to implement direct
section 208 fee recovery for project outlays owing primarily
to an unwillingness to weaken their competitive position in
the market.

Like flood control project sponsors , port

project sponsor ’ s WTP will be time sensitive and linked
closely to benefits that are materially tangible and
recov무rable.

DATA ON PHYSICAL IMPACTS
Project data on projects reported to have known cost
share impacts were separated by project purpose , flood
control or navigation , so that differential impacts by
project type might be identified.
Cost Trend for Cost Shared Flood Control Proiects
A rough measure of trend in cost shared projects is an
annualized comparison , adjusted for inflation , of the
current working estimate of the project.

This computation

is at best an indirect measure of design elasticity as it
does not account directly for changes in project cost
estimates unrelated to cost sharing.

Such changes are , of

course , not insignificant and may represent cost increments
。r

decrements as well as cost reallocations either toward or

away from the non-Federal interest. 8 Nevertheless , if
project downsizing represented a broad trend among cost
shared flood control projects then one would expect to see a
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decrease in the current working project estimate (adjusted
to constant dollars) from that originally authorized.
MUltiyear cost estimate data was available for fourteen
。f

the sixteen flood control projects identified as having

design changes attributable to cost sharing.

For each of

these projects the FY-89 total project cost estimates ,
adjusted for inflation utilizing the Engineering News Record
Construction Cost Index , were computed as a percentage of
the original authorized project estimate.

The formula is

provided below.
xi

Q=

xa
X~=

Initial Project estimate
Xi= Project adjusted for annualized inflation
Q듬 Adjusted index (옹) price comparison
Only scheduled construction estimates were employed so as

t。

account for the impact of phasing and the uncertainty of
future construction.

n
짧꽉

Subsequently , a sample mean was computed where:

x=

N

x= arithmetic mean
N= number of observations
When computed in this fashion , the means of the samples
are merely suggestive of cost growth or decrease over a
range of projects.

The authorized estimate for the
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project(s) is used as a base (1.00) against which the FY-89
cost estimates may be compared.
The mean FY-89 cost estimate of the sample was .929
(92.9웅)

of the mean authorized project estimate.

The average authorized total cost estimate for the sample
was $58 , 854 , 000.
For purposes of comparison , a sample (n=20) of flood
control projects which required LeAs but did not appear

t。

have changes directly attributable to cost sharing were
evaluated employing the same methodology.

The resultant mean

FY-89 cost estimate for the sample was 1.06 or

106웅 。 f

the

mean of the initial authorized cost estimate for the
projects.
The average authorized estimate for the no change
sample was $19 , 274 , 000.

The average for all flood

cont~ol

project new starts (requiring LeAs) from the 1985
Supplemental Appropriations Act through FY-87 was
$47 , 812 , 680.

See Table XVI.

The data on flood control projects , at best , presents a
mixed picture and computations or findings based on gross
project estimates should be viewed with caution as , for each
project , there exist potential cost shifts that are not
directly attributable to either Federal or non-Federal
initiatives.

Also , the variance among individual projects

is extreme enough to call into question what may be inferred
from an application of the mean as a measure of central
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tendency.
Whereas the post-LCA Little Dell , Utah project is
approximately half of the originally authorized project
size , some cost shared flood control projects have
experienced growth in real dollar terms.

It should be noted

that considerable cost estimate variance over time was

als。

found among those flood control projects where cost sharing
was not considered a factor in the ultimate project design
and schedule.
TABLE XVI
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1
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47.8

There would then appear to be statistical evidence
that , on balance , the net impact of cost sharing on flood
control projects will lead to a reduction in project' size ,
particularly for large projects.

There is no evidence ,

however , that projects will trend toward uniform size
reduction.

Cost shared modifications associated with flood

control projects tend to be far less uniform than for
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navigation projects and frequently involve the adoption of
alternative engineering solutions rather than the addition
。r

deletion of a project feature.

Such changes are

frequently agreed upon during the feasibility study stage
and so become difficult to separate and identify as products
。f

cost sharing.
Based on a comparison of the average total dollar of

projects which experienced changes as a result of cost
sharing and those which did not , it may be inferred that
large dollar projects may be more "sensitive" to cost
sharing than small dollar projects.

This finding is

consistent with the view that pay-as-you-go financing
represents a serious constraint for projects whose outputs
are non-vendible and/or where the local interest must rely
。n

bond financing for the generation of revenues to fund the

non-Federal share.
Cost Trend for Cost Shared Naviaation Proiects
The analysis of cost shared impacts for commercial
navigation projects is somewhat

mor~

straightforward than

that for flood control owing largely to the fact that the
rates of return on individual project investment are more
easily calculated and the fact that navigation project
design features are comparable across projects.

Table XVII

provides a list of the 39 channel and harbor improvement
projects authorized by the WRDA 1986.

As of July , 1989 , the
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Water Resource Support Center reported that 15 ports had
signed LCAs (Skaggs 1989).

The magnitude of the impact of

cost sharing is particularly profound if one accepts the
premise that phasing and staging of construction in fact
represents a proxy condition for project size reduction.
TABLE XVII
WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1986
AUTHORIZED CHANNEL IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS
PORT

AUTHORIZED DEPTH

’
’
’

55
55
50
6 O Il---/
%
65 %
55 %
20
l 8
42
41
35
40
33
40
34
38
39
27
27
27
38
38
35
40
45
35
27
27
4 2 I/
42
4 5 Il
46

’
’
’
’
’
”
’
’
’
’
’
’
’
’
’
’
’
’
’
’
’
’

때 때

Mobile Harbor , AL
Miss i. ssippi R. Ship Ch. , Baton Rouge , LA to Gulf
Texas City Channel , TX
Norfolk Harbor & Channels , VA
Los Angeles & Long Beach Harbors , CA
New York Harbor & Adjacent Channels , NY & NJ
KodiaJζ Harbor , AK
st. Paul Island Harbor , AK
Oakland Harbor , CA
Richmond Harbor , CA
Sacramento Deep Water Ship Channel , CA
New Haven Harbor , CT
Palm Beach Harbor , FL (maintenance only)
Manatee Harbor , FL
Tampa Harbor , East Bay Channel , FL
Savannah Harbor , GA (widening only)
Hilo Harbor , HI
Grand Haven Harbor , MI
Monroe Harbor , MI
DUluth-Superior , MN & WI
Pascagoula Harbor , MS
Gulfport Harbor , MS
Portsmouth Harbor , NH (widening only)
Gowanus Creek Channel , NY
Kill Van Kull , NY & NJ
Wilmington Harbor & Cape Fear River , NC
Cleveland Harbor , OH (bulkheading & repairs only)
Lorain Harbor , OH (widening only)
Charleston Harbor , SC
Brazos Island Harbor & Brownsville Channel , TX
Blair & sitcum Waterways , Tacoma Harbor , WA
Grays Harbor , WA

’
’
’

’

,
’
,
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TABLE XVII
WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1986
AUTHORIZED CHANNEL IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS
(continued)
AUTHORIZED DEPTH

E으E및

East , West , & Duwamish Waterways , Seattle Hbr , WA
Saipan Harbor , Northern Mariana Islands
San Juan Harbor , PR
st. Thomas Harbor , VI
Fresh Kills in Carteret , NJ
Arthur Kill , NY & NJ
Lake Charles , LA

39 1

12 ’

40 ’
38

’

40 ’
41/40 ’
45 ’

Source: Renort of the Committee on Public Works
and Transnortation to Accomnanv H.R. 6. 1985.
Seventeen
evaluated.

navi딩 ation

projects requiring LCAs were

An abstract of design changes to on-going cost

shared navigation projects is provided below in Table XVIII.
Table XIX provides pre and post-LCA data on project costs
and their distribution.
The data on deep draft and harbor construction
projects tends to confirm assertions that anticipate
potential reductions in project size and phased
construction , particularly with regard to large projects
with indefinite benefit streams.

This trend was tested and

confirmed through selected interviews with sponsors of
navigation projects that had elected to phase construction
。r

otherwise reduce project features depth , width , etc.
Nine navigation project sponsors were interviewed.

sample can not be considered representative of all

The
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navigation project sponsors as the nine projects were
selected on the basis of sponsor initiated design changes or
phased construction.

Thus , while the "findings" do not lend

themselves to statistical generalization , they do offer
further insight as to why a navigation project sponsor may
be induced to press for design or scope modifications.
composite summary of interview responses as to why they
chose to proceed with smaller than authorized projects
suggests the following:
(1) Port sponsors are uncertain as to the
magnitude and timing of induced traffic benefits
projected in Corps planning models.
(2)

Sponsor initiated financial analysis focuses
the instant benefit increments that will be
realized with implementation of the project and
tends to discount benefits associated with induced
traffic for new commodity markets and benefits for
which there exist no in-place recovery mechanisms.
。n

(3) Sponsor behavior with respect t。
development is competition driven. Projects whose
features would provide or help maintain a
competitive market position are supported.
However , expansion of port capacity beyond what
may be thought of as the competitive margin and
which requires large front end capitalization
costs and increased operation and maintenance
costs is considered a high risk investment.
Sponsor investment behavior is "incremental" with
minor adjustments made to achieve or maintain a
market share.
(4) Sponsors are willing to assume greater
design risk than would be typically afforded by
Corps design standards. Where appropriate , nonstructural alternatives may be preferred ,
particularly if the cost of the alternative
solution is more readily recoverable or
transferable to shipping interests (e.g. , the use
。 f tug assisted tows rather than construction of
turning basins).
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General Pro;ect cost Trends
Whereas an assumption of discernible trends in
declining project size , and potentially declining numbers of
new starts is consistent with the available data on cost
shared projects it would be precipitous to suggest that
implementation of cost share principles initiated the trend.
Were that the case , one would expect to see , subsequent

t。

the implementation of WRDA 1986 , an identifiable downward
trend in .authorized project size , number of new starts ,
number of authorized studies , etc.

Longitudinal data on

such indicators , as provided in Table XX , does not support
such a conclusion.
TABLE XX
CORPS OF ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTION GENERAL EXPENDITURES
(In constant 1965 dollars x 1000)

•

FY
1967
1968
1969
1970
1973
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979.
1980
1981
1980
1983
1984

Actual Appropriation
965 , 955
967 , 599
862 , 714
711 , 992
851 , 178
1 , 025 , 084
1 , 203 , 943
873 , 589
966 , 338
1 , 237 , 151
1 , 430 , 195
1 , 537 , 820
1 , 343 , 711
1 , 659 , 752
1 , 593 , 892
1 , 429 , 992
1 , 508 , 405
926 , 804

Value 1965 $
965 , 955
920 , 253
778 , 849
586 , 126
649 , 916
703 , 666
726 , 796
502 , 346
501 , 177
600 , 374
618 , 289
618 , 674
506 , 440
580 , 661
514 , 327
431 , 768
415 , 873
241 , 009
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TABLE XX
CORPS OF ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTION GENERAL EXPENDITURES
(continued)
(In constant 1965 dollars x 1000)
FY
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

Actual Appropriation
947 , 500
879 , 830
1 , 148 , 918
1 , 200 , 175
1 , 184 , 735
1 , 199 , 790

Value 1965 $
234 , 326
216 , 062
269 , 129
266 , 987
252 , 391.
249 ， 085~

*Estimate of appropriation
Source: united State Army Corps of Engineers , HQ USACE
civil Works - Western Branch (1989).
Gross data on Federal aid to state and substate levels
。f

government confirms that the pattern of reduced Federal

assistance for water resource development. is consistent with
the larger trend of reduction in Federal transfers
subnational jurispictions for all programs.

t。

According

t。

data compiled by the U. S. Advisory Council on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) the trend is partially
attributable to a philosophy of decentralized Federalism and
partially to Federal deficits that work to constrain policy
choice to those programs that are essentially national in
character (u.S. ACIR Summer/Fall 1987 , 36).

See Figure

4. for a graphical analysis of this phenomenon.
The data shows that , whereas , federal aid to state and
local government rose in both real and nominal terms from
1950 through 1970 it ceased to do so in 1978.

The most
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The Rise and Decline of Federal Ai마 1958·88
(as a Percentage of State-Local Outlays)
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Fiaure 4. The Rise and Decline of Federal Aid
1958-1988. Source: U.S. ACIR , Summer/Fall 1987.
pronounced drop was in aid to local units of government.
Federal aid to local governments was 8.6 times as great in
1981 as 1970 whereas aid to states over that period
increased only

350훌.

However , while aid to states continued

to grow , direct Federal assistance to local governments
suffered a reverse.
40웅 。ver

By 1987 aid to states had increased by

1981 while aid to locals had decreased

Figure 5).

13 훌.

(See

This disparity is due largely to the fact that
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aid to states is more directly tied to means-tested
entitlements (Swartz 1990 , 100).
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F’iaure 5. Federal Aid to State and Local
Government per $100 of Personal Income , 1970-1987
(1987=100).

Figure 6. presents a graphic representation of federal
aid to state and local government as a proportion of their
general revenue.

Tax effort data presented in Figure 7.

reveals that tax effort , particularly for local governments , .
declined dramatically after 1979.

State tax effort , which

had declined from 1979 through 1983 , showed increases after
1983 though not in excess of the highs registered in 1979.
Similarly , aggregate local tax efforts , through the late
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1980s failed to return 1978 levels. (stonecash 1990 , 756757.
Interestingly , the expenditure patterns reveal that the
trend toward state centralization of direct service
provision continued to increase throughout the 1980s , though
the trend was slowed by the absolute decrease in Federal
transfers sUbsequent to 1987.

This observation is , of

course , consistent with the policy shift toward cost shared
water resource development planning with its emphasis on
state and local involvement in both planning and funding.
Of direct significance to this analysis is the observation
that pUblic support for all levels of pUblic investment
activity exhibited a reduced rate of growth sUbsequent

t。

1978.
The assertion that cost sharing will lead to fewer
projects acknowledges the potential. influence of the "market
like" requirements of cost share principles which , by
. design , inhibit continued activity on projects that lack
local support as determined by WTP.

It also accounts for

the impact of Federal budget constraints. on funding for
water resource development specifically and Federal
assistance to subnational units of government generally.
There is no question but what cost is a primary , if not the
principal concern. of sponsors.

When project sponsors were

asked which aspect of cost-sharing they had the greatest
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concern with , total study/project cost led the list of
issues by a large margin (U.S. GAO 1991 , 19).
Because the focus of the discussion has largely been
restricted to the financial capacity of the non-Federal
interest it is here important to note that the research
found evidence of significant restraining influences on the
"growth" of the water resources industry unrelated
sponsor resources or preferences.

t。

Since the inception of

the WRDA 1986 , the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has
routinely recommended fewer projects for inclusion in the
executive budget than are submitted for consideration by
Congress.

The Executive branch in this way argues both for

influence over the mix of projects authorized and the size
。f

the total Federal budget dedicated to water resource

development.

Thus , while cost sharing may result in fewer

projects competing for bUdget consideration , the relative
decline in appropriations for new start construction appears
to be associated as closely with budget constraints (at all
levels of government) as with the implementation of cost
sharing.
It is , of course , far easier to establish a funding
trend based on historical data than to predict the
probability of that trend being sustained over time by
future authorizations.

In an to effort evaluate the long

range impacts of cost sharing the research sought

t。

identify a set of indicators which were known to influence
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the project selection process.

A direct indicator of future

project activity is the volume of reports submitted to the
Washington Level Review Center WLRC (formerly the Corps of
Engineers of Board of Rivers and Harbors (CEBRH).

If cost

sharing will indeed lead to fewer projects as a result of
lack of sponsor commitment , that phenomena should be
reflected in the report traffic submitted to the Board whose
review authority includes , but is not limited to , all
feasibility studies for COE cost shared projects.
A review of WLRC activity in May of 1992 revealed that
the volume of reports sUbject to WLRC review had indeed
declined since 1986.

sUbsequently , the WLRC has reduced the

average review time for a project from

5놓

years to 11

months.
Concomitantly , if "better" projects emerge from cost
sharing one would expect to see the ratio of projects
reported out of the WLRC with a favorable recommendation
. increase.

Data" show that from 1975 to 1986 the WLRC

reported out 266

(49.7 옹)

unfavorable reports.

favorable reports and 269

(63 웅)

(50.3 웅)

During the post-WRDA 86 era , from 1987

to 1992 , the WLRC reported out 42
and 72

t。

unfavorable.

(36 옹)

favorable reports

Assuming no major shifts in

review criteria or application , the data does not confirm
that the overall quality of projects submitted for review
since"inception of cost sharing is sUbstantially greater.
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A companion argument to the "fewer new starts"
assumption involves the use of cost shared planning as a
market test of project feasibility.

This effort attempts

t。

identify early on local support and screen marginal projects
before large time and dollar study commitments are made
(stakhiv and Wright 1984 , Huddleston 1987).
studies , while they are funded

100웅

Reconnaissance

by the Federal interest

are , ostensibly , not engaged in unless potential sponsors of
sufficient capacity to support the project have been
identified.

Once the reconnaissance study is completed ,

favorable projects may not transition to the feasibility
study phase unless the sponsor is willing to engage in cost
sharing

(50훌 /50옹)

the feasibility study with the Federal

interest.
Has cost sharing effectively filtered

"wealζ"

projects

prior to implementation of the cost shared feasibility
study?

Again , the available data is limited and

inconclusive.

It would appear , however , that as only one

non-Federal interest during the FY 86-87 period (see Table
XXI) chose not to participate in a recommended feasibility
study the sample of favorably reported reconnaissance
studies enjoyed strong local support.
still , it is important to note that sponsor support of
cost shared feasibility planning , and the project that
emerges from that process , may differ significantly from
sponsor support of an authorized project formulated under
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TABLE XXI
RECONNAISSANCE STUDIES
STARTED IN FY 1986-87
Total Studies Started

62

Studies still Underway

12

Studies Terminated
Studies Completed
Unfavorable Reports
Favorable Reports

8*
42
7
36**

To be Accomplished Under Other
Program

3

Sponsor Refused to continue With
Feasibility

1

Awaiting FCSA
FCSA signed

16

* No information on reason for termination.
** Two reports generated from one study.
the prior doctrine of mandated Federal design.
would

~e

Sponsors

expected to express a preference for projects that

were designed cooperatively and for which they felt
"ownership."

For these projects , the previously discussed

Federal interest positions regarding risk , capital intensive
solutions , etc. will have been mediated by non-Federal
interest input during the feasibility planning process.
Conclusion
The argument that smaller projects or projects which
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employ phased construction will result from the application
。f

cost sharing is relatively widely shared and , at least

theoretically , appears firmly grounded on the presumption
that market-like incentives will act to reduce the size and
number of projects ultimately emerge from the process.

The

existing data is confirming , particularly for commercial
navigation projects.

While the correlation between cost

sharing and size reduction is significant the data may be
misleading to the extent that it overstates the case for
cost sharing as being a first order initiator of a trend
that the data indicates was observable nearly a decade prior
to the widespread implementation of cost share principles in
the field of water resource development.
In addition to general trends of reduced Federal aid
state and local government for all purposes , one must

t。

als。

consider the role of capitalization in "a maturing
industry."

(See Figure 8 below).

The private sector

analogy is here appropriate when one considers the history
。f

water resource development.
The transitional preference from hydropower projects

t。

navigation and flood control is indicative of an "industry"
that , at least in one sector , has matured.

Dollar

expenditures for the water resource systems would not
necessarily be reduced but shifted to operation , maintenance
and renewal of existing infrastructure (Cortner 1987 , 6).
The argument for maturity of the industry as a whole is
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further supported by the fact that in 1984 , for the first
time since the inception of the Corps ’ Civil Works mission ,
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Fiaure 8 • capital and Operating outlays for Water
Resource by All Level of Government. Source:
Apogee Research from congressional Budget Office.
the operation and maintenance budget exceeded the
construction budget while the civil Works workforce declined
from 33 , 000 in 1978 to 26 , 000

ln 1987

(Bowman 1986) •

In the

case of a pUblic goods industry , maturation does not suggest
that

。pportunities

for new development have been exhausted.

An argument may be made for private sector development of
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the remaining potential (as appears to be the case for
hydropower) or a call for a "slowdown ," an incrementally
reduced pUblic development effort.
While cost sharing clearly contributes in a significant
way to the observed trend , questions remain as to the extent
。f

change that can be directly linked to the impact of cost

sharing.

Future research is required on cost shared

projects , including projects that were planned and
constructed under cost sharing , and application of a
sophisticated mUltiple regression model able to account for
the discrete explanatory impact of cost sharing as a single
variable.

Absent such findings , it can only be said with

certainty that the implementation of cost share principles
have acted in concert with a larger body of

con~traints t。

lead to a "downsizing" of cost shared developed water
resource projects.

Among those constraints herein

identified would be the implementation of Federal deficit
·reduction criteria , local funding constraints , the
uncertainty of cost recovery for non-vendible project
。utputs，

reduced state aid to local governments for resource

development , the requirement for front end financing of cost
shared projects , and the cost of money.
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COST SHARED PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
To that end , the pragmatic consequence of these
financial adjustments (cost sharing ) may be much
smaller scale projects which reduce the absolute
level of social and environmental impacts , even
without emphasizing the attainment of social and
environmental objectives.
Eugene Z. Stakhiv (Stakhiv 1986 , 112)
The third assumption under consideration , that cost
sharing will lead to reduced environmental impacts , may be
evaluated positively (sponsor initiatives will lead to the
adoption of more environmentally sensitive plans) or
measured as a by-product of project size reduction.

Whereas

the outcomes are similar , there is merit in attempting

t。

distinguish between influences when measurable reductions in
impact are observed.
Early proponents of cost sharing and a number of
environmental groups find in the implementation of cost
share principles the promise of reduced environmental
impacts associated with water resource development projects.
Their optimism is attributed to the potential reduction in
impacts as a result of 1) smaller projects , 2) fewer
projects , and 3) projects that more fully account for the
environmental sensitivities of local (non-Federal)
interests.

Groups such as the National wildlife Federation

saw in cost sharing an opportunity for the ‘ Corps to " •••
identify ways to cope with a problem without building an
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enoz'mous project."

Other analysts , such as Kenneth RUbin , a

former budget analyst for the Congressional Budget Office ,
were less sanguine noting that , "If you don ’ t want a
structural solution don ’ t call the Corps" (National Journal
November 1986 , 2824).
Nevertheless , the assumptions associated with cost
sharipg led to general environmental support for the
legislation , though that support was largely attributable

t。

the Act ’ s requirements for submission of mitigation plans
with proposed project plans (Sec. 908) and implementation of
the mitigation plan prior to or concurrent with construction
(Sec. 906).
To assess the foundations of this line of reasoning , and
to test for continuing support of cost share principles
among organized groups

a~sociated. with

environmental issues ,

four environmental interest groups were selected to elicit
their views on the probable impacts of cost sharing: the
Izaack. Walton League , Friends of the Earth , wildlife
Management Institute and the National Audubon Society.
Phone

intervie짜s

were held with national headquarters

representatives of the selected groups.

The representatives

registered uniform support for cost share principles ,
largely for the aforementioned reasons.

The sentiment of

the environmental community was that smaller cost shared
projects more accurately reflected the "true needs" of the
sponsor/region and that pure "pork barrel" projects were
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less likely to be supported when cost share constraints were
applicable.

Concomitantly , the groups were unanimous in

their belief that cost sharing would lead to project size
reduction.
Though support for cost share principles was broad it
was not without reservation.

There was acknowledgment that

local sponsors , faced with cost sharing mitigation , may
attempt to trade off environmental quality (EQ) for
additional authorized benefits or attempt to defer
implementation of the
。f

miti당ation

plan.

It was the consensus

the environmental organizations that , should such

patterns emerge , a Federal response was appropriate.

Among

the recommended solutions was the targeting of Federal
assistance to support mitigation efforts.
The assertion that a direct correlation exists between
constructed project size and the magnitude of associated
environmental impacts has normative implications to the
-extent that it advances the position that water resource
projects specifically , and development generally , have a
negative impact on the natural environment.

That mayor may

not be true in the short run , depending on the nature of the
disruption and the capacity for· compensating mitigation.

It

may be even less true in the long run as it is unreasonable
to assume that , absent a project , lands will forever remain
undeveloped , particularly if they are near urban
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Indeed , large mUlti-purpose projects that

development.
。bligate

considerable land holdings , thus ensuring open

space over the life of the project , may represent increasing
environmental quality (EQ) value as contingent lands are
developed.

This phenomena is readily apparent where Corps ’

projects abut suburban developments providing both a growth
boundary and an environmental buffer.
Secondly , it is generally acknowledged that water
resource projects have an impact on site-specific ecology
。 ften

resulting in habitat substitution as a result of

mitigation efforts.

The environment is , in a sense ,

reorganized with the goal of achieving a balance between the
degradation or elimination of existing habitat and the
introduction of new or enhanced habitat. .In the case of
mitigation , habitat substitution results when non-equivalent
environments are substituted for lost habitat , an exchange
most wildlife ecologists consider ecologically adverse.
opposition to such tradeoffs is frequently based on the net
loss in ecological diversity.
environmental

chan딩 e

On the other hand , the net

may be positive where features are

added that enhance or stabilize the watershed and the
aquatic environment (Stakhiv , et. al. 1989 , 82).
The concept of "without plan" development is addressed
in the P&G , Chapter 5 of ER 1105-2-100.

The guidance

provides that "likely future conditions without a plan ,"
should be used in evaluating the impacts of alternative
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plans.

However , assessments of without plan environmental

degradation due to likely development are necessarily
conservative in the absence of knowledge about planned
activities and foreseeable land use changes.

Moreover , it

is highly unlikely that the pUblic perception of , and
attraction to , existing resources is properly discounted for
future non-plan encroachments.
Whereas a case can be made for a positive correlation
between project size reduction and a reduction in associated
impacts , it should not be presumed that reductions in impact
are proportional to reductions in project size , even when
the project feature experiencing reduction has direct ,
。bservable

environmental consequences.

The basis and

significance of this argument is presented below.
critical habitat destruction in the case of an
impoundment occurs with the subsuming of the stream and
riparian area as the reservoir is allowed to fill.

The

impactregisters irrespective of the projected reservoir
capacity.

studies reveal that lands that are subsumed at

the project periphery , and which may be reserved if the
project is scaled down , typically do not provide habitat as
rich as that found along the riparian borders.

Thus , while

reductions in net impact may be achieved by reductions in
project size (represented by a downsizing of reservoir
capacity) the added increments of EQ will not be
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proportional to the reduction in project acreage and may , in
instances where border lands are ecologically marginal , be
negligible.
Though environmental quality is often one of the
designed outputs of constructed projects the degree to which
that output is factored in as an objective of the planning
process will largely determine the extent to which a
preferred development alternative is allowed to impact
existing natural resources.
。bjective

It has been argued that multi-

water resource planning , as exemplified by

application of the criteria set forth in the Principles and
Standards (U.S. WRC 1973)

,

is sUbstantively different from

planning within the framework of a single purpose economic
efficiency model (Principles and Guidelines 1983).

The

principal distinction between the two approaches rests with
the treatment of EQ.

While the Principles and Standards

treated EQ as a project objective , the P&G approach treats
the protection of environmental quality as a planning
constraint.

Planning objectives are to be achieved with

minimal impact on the environment.

While the products of

the two models are theoretically comparable , one would not
anticipate similar environmental outcomes to emerge from
these distinct planning regimes (Stakhiv 1976).
For the purpose of this analysis it is important that
the distinction between "multi-purpose" and "multi。bjective"

planning be clearly identified.

MUlti-purpose
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projects are designed to provide for specific (multiple)
。utputs

etc.

such as flood control , water supply , recreation ,

objectives may best be thought of as goals which are

advanced by the production of project outputs; e.g. economic
development , social equity , environmental quality.
。bjective

Multi-

planning explicitly considers the achievement of

broad social goals in conjunction with the more constrained
assessment of monetary benefits associated with the
individual purposes for which the project is authorized
(Loucks 1986).
The production of environmental quality , whether it be
evaluated as a constraining influence or as a desired
。bjective

has assumed pUblic commodity status.

As such , EQ

embodies many of the attributes of a pure public good where
a level of quality is consumed by all within the "benefit"
area because no one individual can purchase a different
level of EQ.
。nly

。n

Thus , no true demand curve can be generated ,

an estimate of the value individuals place on EQ based

the amount their elected representatives purchase

(Freeman 1979 , 4).
In this model , individuals purchase EQ , or more
specificallya level of EQ.

In Figure 9. , AA ’ represents

the bUdget constraint of a set of poor individuals and 88 ’
that of wealthier individuals.

I and II represent the

relative indifference curves for EQ and other goods.
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Source: Baumol 1988 , 198.
Because the provision of EQ is a social decision , the
actual level of output will likely be a compromise
represented by point qs.

We would then expect for the more

affluent to argue for more EQ and the less affluent to argue
for'less given their stated preferences.

(Note that this

does not imply that the less affluent would prefer less EQ
if the acquisition of EQ did not involve tradeoff decisions
between EQ and alternative goods or services.)

An

appreciation of collectivechoice models and the potential
for selection of sub-optimal levels of pUblic goods is an
important first step in understanding the implications of
cost sharing with respect to distributional equity issues

245

and the impact of market forces on sponsor demand for EQ
benefits.
If the authorized EQ output is at qy it is unlikely
that the sponsor would argue for greater EQ though he may
wish to have greater participation in EQ planning.

Indeed ,

there would appear to be incentive to argue for less EQ as
‘

qy represents more EQ than anyone individual would
voluntarily purchase.

Similarly , an authorized EQ output at

qz would represent less EQ than any set of individuals would
purchase and pressure would be exerted for greater
expenditure for EQ (Oates 1972 , 76).
The model , particularly with respect to local flood
control projects , has significant implications.

Other goods

may be here thought of not as representing items of personal
consumption but competing local capital improvements for
which there exists a demand.

EQ output is "purchased" in

the sense that sponsors participate in the development or
approval of mitigation/enhancement plans and so are afforded
an opportunity to negotiate for increases or decreases in
the amount of EQ.

The choice of EQ , however , is neither

derived nor constrained solely by the sponsor ’ s ability or
willingness to pay.

Guidelines for minimum EQ may be

established by application of Federal interest planning
guidelines and by the input of state and Federal
environmental/natural resource agencies.
Output qy may be the preferred level of EQ by those
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agencies whose mission is directly related to preserving or
enhancing EQ and who individually bear no direct costs
related to the purchase of a specified level.
。utput

The directed

of project EQ by agency interpretation of regulation

is similar in concept , and probably impact , to the phenomena
。f

state mandated services to county or local jurisdictions

where'fund transfers do not accompany the mandated service
guidelines.
The argument that local sponsors may seek additional
environmental features or larger EQ outlays than would have
been provided without formal sponsor participation in plan
formulation cannot be made in the absence of data on the EQ
。utput

independently recommended by commenting resource

。riented

agencies.

Because these comments must be

considered and addressed in plan formulation (ER 1105-2-50)
they have the effect of establishing a "baseline minimum" of
EQ.

It is important to note that the baseline is derived

wholly'without regard to the sponsors willingness or ability
to pay for EQ at the recommended level.

The sponsor may

purchase higher EQ , though the purchase will be at a premium
as EQ that exceeds the amount required for mitigation is
considered enhancement and is cost shared

100옹

non-Federal.

Reduced EQ outlays are 'often infeasible as they are met with
stiff resistance by resource agencies and environmental
interest groups who are prepared to litigate.
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Data Collection on Cost Shared Proiects
To collect data on cost shared project impacts , 24
project managers and environmental resource specialists (all
Corps personnel) involved with cost shared projects were
interviewed by phone (June-September 1988).

Five

environmental interest groups were contacted and interviewed
by phone for their perception of how the application of cost
shared planning principles would impact project related
environmental planning.

A discussion of the issues and

findings are discussed below.
As is too frequently the case , data on environmental
impacts and compensating mitigation is difficult to track
even on a within-project basis.

This problem is

particularly acute where different methods of identifying
environmental dimensions and ecological values had been
employed across the life of the project.

One indirect

measure of environmental impact is mitigation in so far as
mitigation represents the "replacement" cost of the
environmental values that were.displaced by the project.
When output units of lost values (e.g. dollar values or
standardized habitat units) are non-comparable over time due
to variations in the methodology that was applied , point-intime comparisons of mitigation as a measure of environmental
impact are invalid.

Why are project impacts so difficult

assign and assess?

While the reasons are many and varied ,

t。
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three emerged from the interviews as being broadly
recognized impediments to accurate impact measurement.
A potential measure of the standard unit reduction of
impact in reduced scope projects would be a comparison of
mitigation required at the time of original authorization
with that required subsequent to negotiation of the LeA.
Unfortunately , such comparisons are for the most part
untenable as: 1) mitigation is not tracked as a line item
cost element in project budgets; 2) many cost shared
projects had mitigation plans that were developed under
planning criteria that are sUbstantially different from
those which would now be applied.

The potential for

meaningful cross-plan comparisons is thus greatly reduced.
This condition is further complicated when attempting.
to compare mitigation plans which do not require

100옹

mitigation of identified impacts as might be the case where
there exists insufficient acquirable replacement habitat or
where incremental analysis finds full replacement not to be
justified on efficiency grounds , a determination for which
there is currently no firm decision rule.

In those

instances , plans may be non-comparable on the basis of
differentiated outputs as well as estimated costs.
Design alterations , which may have a larger impact on
project related EQ than reductions in project size , mayor
may not be attributable to cost sharing.

Such modification

may be the result of a cost shared initiative or they may
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have emerged as a result of further "internal" engineering
and design study.
。n

Thus , treating all design modifications

cost shared projects as "outputs" of cost shared planning

will tend to overstate the impact of the process.

Moreover ,

interviews with project managers and sponsor representatives
confirm that proposed changes are frequently derived
coincidentally or emerge from an indeterminable source.

It

is , of course , difficult to assess the impact of cost
sharing where it cannot be determined which project features
are properly attributable to cost shared planning or how the
ultimate project would have looked in the absence of sponsor
participation in the planning process.
The identification and measurement of environmental
impacts (or avoided impacts) requires data generation and ,
in that respect , is not dissimilar to other forms· of
research requiring data collection in that there are
associated costs.

Interviews with project environmental

specialists revealed that small measures may be taken which ,
based on knowledge of the project environment and
professional jUdgment , increase EQi but the increment of
increase is not measured because the cost of assessment
would likely outweigh the benefit achieved.

Cost shared

projects may be particularly susceptible to the
incorporation of such "minor adjustments" which are
consistent with sound environmental planning as well as
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sponsor preferences but which go largely unreported and
unaccounted for.
Moreover , the "state of the art" in environmental
assessment has improved dramatically.

This fact is

reflected in the sophistication and level of detail
reflected in EQ valuation reports.

Valuations conducted

today on a proposed project would likely not yield
comparable findings to one conducted 10 or fifteen years
ago.
。ver

Project impacts , which may be empirically equivalent
time , may appear to vary

the methodology employed.

si인 nificantly

as a result of

Thus , a project reauthorized

under cost sharing legislation may incorporate a mitigation
plan which calls for a significantly larger mitigation
effort than that of the originally authorized project when ,
in fact , project impacts have changed little if at all.
Case studv Analvsis of Cost Shared Proiects
To test for the impact of cost sharing on environmental
impacts a sample of projects from the 1985 Supplemental
Appropriation and WRDA 1986 were selected for survey.

The

data collection focused on whether mitigation plans had been
revised as a result of sponsor initiated changes to cost
shared projects and whether the implementation of the
mitigation was concurrent with construction.

Bear in mind

that a finding of "no change" in the mitigation plan cannot
be directly interpreted as a finding of no change in project
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environmental impact.
XXII.

The findings are depicted in Table

The data on post authorization revision of mitigation

plans , at least for the selected sample , suggest that
relatively few changes in mitigation plans can be attributed
to cost shared changes except in those cases where large
scale dredging projects are scaled back dramatically.
工n

the case of flood control projects , the data shows

that environmental impact reduction was typically associated
with reduced elimination of wildlife habitat on project
lands.

In those cases where dams or levee reaches were

eliminated , reductions in effected lands were significant.
Generally , however , reported reductions in impact were less
substantial and only infrequently were such reductions
quantified in land or habitat units.

Notwithstanding the

lack of quantified data on reduction units , environmental
specialists involved with the sample projects reported that ,
where projects were reduced in size or scope , identifiable
if not.always clearly measurable reductions in environmental
impacts were realized.
Deleterious effects linked to dredging include removal
。f

habitat , resuspension of pollutants adsorbed

t。

sediments , physical damage to organisms , the creation of a
barrier to marine life , burial of habitat , change of flow
patterns , and turbidity (Herbich 1975 , 529).

Impacts

associated with reduced scope navigation projects are
primarily associated with reduced turbidity , reduced
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requirement for dredge material deposit , and less
"deadwater ’I in channels.

Of the nine navigation projects

surveyed six reported reduced environmental impacts
associated with reduced dredging requirements with the
largest impact reductions linked to decreases in dredge
fill.

Where beneficial use of dredged material is not an

。ption，

disposal becomes a costly and sometimes

environmentally critical issue.

Indeed , such issues may

determine the feasibility of navigation projects where the
environmental sensitivity of the area call for the long haul
transfer of spoil materials.

Two projects , Oakland Harbor

and Richmond (CA) Harbor , were forced to delay construction
pending the resolution of litigation on dredge disposal
sites.
Where contained sites are required , reduced fill has
the effect of conserving capacity and thus deferring or
eliminating the necessity and cost of developing new sites.
Interestingly , reduction in the volume of dredge material
and costs appear to increase geometrically rather than in a
linear manner as dredge depths are decreased.

A proposed

ten foot reduction in the channel depth of the Mobile Harbor
Deepening project reduced the estimated quantity of dredged
material from one hundred forty one million cubic yards
eighteen million cubic yards.

t。

The relationship , which is

not readily apparent when visually comparing alternative
depth dredge prisms , depends largely on changes in the
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density of the material being dredged , the extent of
sloughin당 。n

side slopes , and the rate of infill associated

with the deeper channels.

Exponential cost growth with

increased depth is linked to depth dependent productivity
loss , dredge disposal costs (particularly for upland or
。cean

off-shelf sites)

,

and maintenance of the deeper

channel.
Where upland disposal sites are used , reduced dredging
requirements may lead to reductions in land obligations for
mitigation.

Land obligations typically involve site-

adjacent lands being acquired to substitute for project
lands lost as habitat.

In the case of the Sacramento River

Deep Water Ship Channel a reduction of proposed channel
widening (400 ’ to 350 ’) resulted in a twenty seven percent
(27옹)

decrease in the acreage (sixty-three to forty-six)

required to mitigate project impacts.
Whereas the collected data on the linkage between
project size and associated environmental impact is
confirming , counter instances for both flood control and
navigation suggest that the correlation is more complex than
might at first be assumed.

In fact , design modifications

initiated by the non-Federal interest may lead to increased
impact.

Corps Environmental Resource specialists for

tw。

flood control projects reported design changes that either
directly or indirectly resulted in increased impacts.
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In the case of Mingo Creek the sponsor ’ s (City of
Tulsa , Oklahoma) proposal which accommodated design plans
for an unrelated airport project subsumed the original
habitat-rich mitigation land thus requiring the acquisition
。f

additional lands.

。riginally
set-a~ide

acres.

Whereas the mitigation plan for the

authorized project called for a thirty five acre

the plan now calls for one hundred twenty five

Mitigation for the project is planned at

100옹 •

The sponsor of the Lock Haven Flood Control Project
(City of Lock Haven , PA) requested that the airport runway
alignment be reconfigured (extended) rather than tilted , in
accordance with the originally authorized plan.

This

alternative allowed for new levee construction.

The

proposed realignment impacted two additional acres of
wetlands , impinged upon

~

site haying archaeological value ,

and required the purchase of a number of existing homes and
relocation of the residents.

In this instance , a broad

range pf impacts on the human environment , some quite
difficult to measure , were associated with plan
modification.
Whereas reducing the amount of dredge material
associated with a navigation or harbor improvement project
may lead to decreases in environmental impact there exists
the potential for quite an opposite effect when beneficial
uses for dredge material are proposed.

Channel depth

reduction for the Mississippi River Ship Channel project
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should result in less turbidity and reduced salt water
intrusion from the Gulf of Mexico.

However , as fill from

the project would have been used to replace marshlands lost
to subsidence the reduction in available fill may result in
a net negative impact on the regional environment.

As

previously discussed , such tradeoffs , though conceptually
straightforward , are almost impossible to accurately
quantify.
Conclusions
While the body of evidence tends to support the
assertion that environmental impact reduction is to some
degree positively correlated to reductions in project size
precise measurement is difficult.

For that reason , the

findings discussed below are offered with caution , the
specific concerns being established in the discussion of
each finding.
Based on specific projects where there were measurable
decrements in environmental impact associated with project
size reduction the assertion that project size reduction has
a positive impact on environmental impact is confirmed.
Their is no confirming evidence , however , that project
downsizing will lead to impact reductions in all cases , or
result in downward adjustments in impact proportional
size reduction.

t。

In specific instances , size reduction may

result in projects that , over time , actually increase rather
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than decrease regional impacts.
Cost sharing will lead to projects that more accurately
reflect local environmental interests but not projects that
are dramatically different from what would have been
authorized under pre-cost shared planning.
。f

Among the sample

projects surveyed , several reported sponsor initiated

(and adopted) EQ features.

Examples included avoidance of

disturbing cultural sites by realignment of floodwalls
(Richmond , VA - Flood control)

,

community participation and

contribution to mitigation of an urban flood control project
(Papillion Creek , Omaha , NB)

,

and sponsor initiated

enhancement that will have impacts similar to those which
would have resulted had the EQ Plan alternative been adopted
(Wildcat and San Pablo Creeks , Contra Costa County , CA).
The intent here is not to suggest that these cases
represent an exhaustive listing of cost shared projects that
have incorporated sponsor initiated EQ features but to offer
examples of ways in which sponsor EQ preferences manifest
themselves via cost shared planning.

What is perhaps most

notable is that sponsor initiated EQ recommendations tend
not to conflict with the general EQ positions advanced by
the Federal interest so much as they make the case for "fine
tuning" of the EQ plan.
The baseline for EQ is , for the most part , established
not by sponsor preference but by pUblic law , regulation , and
the review process required by ER 1105-2-100 , Principles and
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Guidelines.

This finding is not surprising when one

considers the technical complexity , thoroughness , and
intergovernmental character of the formal review and
coordination process.

The sponsor , while acutely aware of

environmental values and the political pressure that may be
brought to bear by environmental groups , is necessarily
committed to a solution set that places high priority on
achievement of the authorized purpose of the project , be
that flood control , navigation , etc.

Natural resource

agencies , on the other hand , have a statutory and
institutional obligation to exercise stewardship over pUblic
resources and remain unconflicted in their role as advisor
with respect to

development.

Irrespective of the

tremendous weight their comments convey in the review and
coordination process , resource agencies are perceived to be
。nly

tangentially involved in the partnership in planning

that cost sharing seeks to engender.
While coordination and review comments or permitting
actions may be negotiated , appealed , etc.
evidence on cost shared projects to

,

there is little

sug당 est

that sponsors

routinely attempt to negotiate or purchase more EQ than
would be produced as a result of agency request during the
review and coordination process.
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SUMMARY
This chapter has attempted to provide data on the
empirical impacts of cost-sharing on project planning and
construction.

This portion of the research was undertaken

primarily to test whether the initial and expected effects
。f

cost-sharing , consistent with microeconomic theory , were

in fact observed in the implementation process of the WRDA
1986.

Assumptions were generated and tests conducted for

the expected effects in three areas , project size ,
construction scheduling , and project related environmental
impacts.
The results of the analysis were generally confirming
though the findings on project sizing and scheduling suggest
that the intergovernmental behavior of Federal and nonFederal interests is far too complex and strategic to be
dominated exclusively by "market incentives."

The data

suggest that future cost shared projects will tend to be
smaller , but for a myriad of reasons , only some of which
bear a relationship to the additional financial burden
cost-sharing imposes on the non-Federal interest.

Further

study in this area is called for to better characterize the
underlying dimension of the phenomenon; perhaps employing
factor analytic techniques to reduce the set of identified
independent variables to a smaller set of hypothetical
variables with explanatory power.
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The data on environmental impacts is illustrative of
the manner in which the standards of a regulated bureaucracy
acts as a proxy for estimating what individuals would
。therwise

demand as a preferred level of EQ.

EQ is

regulated because it is essentially a pUblic good subject

t。

market failure , thus eliminating the possibility of
establishing a demand curve based on market price and
quantity (Freeman 1979 , 5).

The research finds that the

"baseline EQ" (one might think of this as a demand curve) is
generally established not through negotiation between
Federal and non-Federal interests but by state and Federal
regulation expressed via the agency comment process.
Overall EQ measurement is complicated by the absence of a
straightforward correlation between project size and EQ.
Notwithstanding ,. the non-Federal interest , as a result of
cost shared planning , does have more input on how the EQ
minimums will be achieved and whether enhancements will be
incorporated into the project.

Thus , while absolute EQ may

not increase as a result of cost shared planning , the
benefit estimation of resulting EQ by the non-Federal
interest may be higher as a result of their ability

t。

influence the final plan.
A second research consideration in the analysis of data
。n

empirical impacts relates back to a fundamental issue of

the model , tractability.

The research set forth in this

chapter provides further evidence that Target groups will not
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。nly

sign LCAs , thus acceding to cost shared development of

projects , but will generally execute their responsibilities
during the planning process in accordance with accepted
theory.

Thus it can be shown that the "problem"

(implementing cost shared water resource development) is
tractable across a range of populations (non-Federal
interests) with some degree of predictability as to the
。utputs

of the process.

This finding confirms the

correctness of the assumption established in Chapter II

t。

treat tractability as a given rather than include it as a
survey variable.
Lastly , this Chapter , along with the historical and
legislative data provided in Chapter II , provides a larger
and , hopefully , richer framework from within which
evaluate the survey findings.

t。

One can question individuals

as to their expert opinion on process absent data on the
。utcome

or output of that process; but to truly appreciate

their responses there should necessarily be some
understanding of results and the implications of those
results.

This chapter sought to focus on the resultant

projects of the implementation process and to measure the
extent to which those projects conformed to theoretical
expecta~ions.

That same data also contributes to the

rational analysis of the larger policy issues associated
with this research by establishing of measurable outputs
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which provide a context for discussion of the implementation
journey from law to constructed project.
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ENDNOTES
1. For a detailed analysis of this distinction see
stakhiv , Eugene Z. , Achieving Social and Environmental
objectives In Water Resources Planning: Theory and Practice ,
in social and Environmental Objectives in Water Resources
Planning and Management , Warren Viessman , Jr. and Kyle E.
Schilling Eds. , American Society of civil Engineers , New
York , 1986.
2. It is the case that there now exist OMB funding caps
which impose constraints on the mix of projects funded for
construction within a given fiscal cycle.
3. See EM 1110-2-1613 for a complete discussion of
standard Federal design procedures.
4. Principles & Guidelines guidance on risk and
uncertainty analysis is further supplemented by EC 1105-2179.
5. A significant example of phased navigation project
construction under cost sharing is the four phase deepening
。 f Norfolk Harbor and Channels.
Delayed deepening of the
。utbound channel at Norfolk reduced the non-Federal interest
。bligated share from $130 million to $17.5 million.
6. For a complete treatment of this topic see
u.S. Army COE , Institute for Water Resources Policy Study
84-6240.
7. For an excellent treatment of the identification
and estimation of flood control benefits see otto Eckstein ’ s
Water Resource Development , 1961 , Cambridge , MA: Harvard
University Press.
8. Special project legislation and clarification of
sponsor reimbursement policy are ready examples of variables
that may generate rather dramatic mid-project cost
reallocations.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY FINDINGS
As discussed in previous chapters , implementation
research , is properly concerned with the derivation of
strategies that maximize the possibility of achieving the
desired ends of policy initiatives.

With that purpose in

mind , data from this study was examined with an eye toward
extending the prescriptive component of the model being
evaluated and to suggest new research perspectives which may
be generally applied to the field of implementation
research.

It is recognized that the research presented

here , from a theory expanding perspective , is constrained.
The use of a single policy sector and the non-random
selection of survey participants raises legitimate questions
about validity and reliability shortcomings of the nonexperimental study design.
While the hypotheses advanced in the research are
generally supported , the survey portion of the research
involving the criticality of implementation variables
reveals a spread of recorded scores about the mean within
identified groups which suggests that expert opinion on the
foundation variables of successful implementation varies
widely.

This finding is not inconsistent with previous
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research efforts which have concluded that pOlicy
。bservations

are typically specific to the policy at hand

and difficult to generalize across policy types.

Moreover ,

the dominant thinking in the research field at this time
notes that data analysis for implementation research must
combine mUltiple data sources and techniques that are
long~tudinal

extensive

and comparative as well as intensive and

(G。당gin

1990 , 194).

While it is unlikely that anyone study will soon
provide a definitive solution , implementation research , and
studies such as this , continue to provide a research
platform where models are combined , tested , and refined; and
thus provide a foundation for the next generation of
research.
The data herein collected reveals much about the
implementation process and offers evidence on implementation
behavior that , it is hoped , will be of both theoretical and
practical significance.

A review of the empirical findings

established in previous chapters and supplemental
。bservations

are set forth below in what is intended

t。

serve as integrated summary of the research and its
contribution to our understanding of implementation
mechanics in an

inter당。vernmental

environment.

It is , perhaps , important to note that by virtually any
measure , the implementation of the WRDA 1986 and cost shared
water resource development was a success.

Though the
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implementation process has occasioned extensive negotiation ,
policy clarification , and organizational adjustment , the end
product , a biennial Federally authorized water resources
program appears to be on track following 16 years of
stalemate prior to the passage of the WRDA 1986.

This

assessment acknowledges the distinction between estimating
the success of the process and that of the output (product)
(Goggin et. a l. 1990 , 174) •

In this instance , both process

and product were measured

identify the extent to which a

t。

broad goal or objective was met; and the resulting data was
convincingly ’ if not overwhelmingly , positive.
Figure 10. reveals the manner in which typical
effective implementations proceed.

The level of achievement

and compliance associated with the implementation of the
WRDA 1986 suggest that the success of such an effort falls
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well outside reasonable expectations (Bardach 1977).

Most

importantly , contrary to assertions that mutual adjustment
during the implementation process will vitiate
program objectives (Berman 1980) or that adaptive strategies
will inevitably lead to a retreat from original objectives
(Wildavsky 1979)

,

the implementation of cost shared water

resource development has held the line on the application of
beneficiary pay principles.
From the enactment of the WRDA 1986 through 1992 , 177 LCAs
had been signed obligating Federal and non-Federal interests
to over seven billion dollars of development.

In that

period , an additional 85 feasibility cost-sharing agreements
have been negotiated committing in excess of $132 , 000 , 000
planning for future projects.

t。

The GAO determined in 1991 .

that a total of 563 projects nationwide were involved in
cost shared

plan~ing

or construction. The Bush

Administration ’ s position , set forth by Assistant Secretary
。f

the Army for civil Works (ASACW)

,

Nancy Dorn , in her

testimony on before the House on the WRDA 1992 unequivocally
declared that the future of water resource development
involves an adherence to cost-sharing and beneficiary-pay
principles by both the legislative bodies and the water
resource development community (Dorn 1992).
It would appear then that , absent a new administration
with a markedly different development philosophy and a far
smaller Federal deficit to contend with , the cost share
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principles established in the WRDA 1986 will continue

t。

direct Federally assisted water resource development

int。

the next century.

The

What will that future look like?

data on the assumptions related to the empirical impact cost
shared water resource development , though mixed , offers some
evidence as some definite patterns have emerged.
with respect to the assumption that cost shared
projects would tend to be smaller on average there is
confirming evidence.

The data as to causality , however , is

not conclusive in that the marginal downsizing of Federally
assisted water resource development projects may have
。 ccurred

even in the absence of cost shared planning

constraints.
。f

While there remains a tremendous "backlog"

projects to be considered , it is generally accepted

within the Corps of Engineers and the water resource
development community that the days of the massive water
impoundment projects are over.

The compelling economic

arguments that are mere topics for parlor discussion in an
era of plenty come to dictate pOlicy during periods of
scarcity.
Measured in constant dollars , the civil works program
。f

the Corps has been reduced

25 옹

since 1965.

Fewer

available sites , restricted funding , and environmental
constraints all act in concert to reduce the probability the
nation will return to the ’'Public Works" era.

Indeed , it is
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far more likely that available funds will be redirected

t。

provide maintenance for the $125 billion capital project
inventory that the Corps now possesses.
It is theoretically consistent , that future cost shared
projects will reflect a somewhat smaller scale than that
which would have been planned and built had the. funding
source remained

100웅

Federal.

That is so simply because the

non-Federal interests either can not or will not accede

t。

funding projects whose benefits far exceed their needs.
Concrete evidence of that trend is provided in Chapter V.
There is now ample evidence that: 1) cost shared projects
will not exceed the capacity of the non-Federal interest

t。

fund their portion of the design; 2) non-Federal interests
will argue to

li~it

initial costs by eliminating separable

elements or staging/phasing construction; 3) the Corps ,
while adhering to beneficiary-pay principles , is
increasingly willing to listen and accommodate the needs of
non-Federal interests.
The data on project size and project scheduling
assumptions set forth in Chapter V

~uggest

that cost shared

projects will likely result in designs that are negotiated
"at the margin" to produce projects that are both revenue
sensitive and reflect the engineering judgment of the nonFederal interest.

The likely result of that negotiation ,

based on availabledata , suggests a modest downsizing of
projects , particularly in the flood control arena.

This
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。bservation

is both consistent with the data available and

with the applicable theory established in Chapter II which
posits that non-Federal interests will tend to support
projects that have a direct and identifiable benefit stream
。ver

those where benefits are more long range or less

tangible.
As previously noted , operation and maintenance of the
existing water resource infrastructure will continue

t。

compete with new start projects and likely dominate budgets
to a larger degree than ever before. 1 . Twelve percent of all
Corps projects are now in excess of fifty years old and 172
。f

the 370 existing flood control reservoirs are in excess

。f

thirty years old.

By the year 2000 , a significant

portion of the inventory will have reached its design life
(Dorn 1992).
。utpace

There can be no question that O&M budgets will

investment in new structures.

Given the limited and

probably diminishing resource base , new investments will
likely reflect a conservative design bias that favors
"limited" projects and ease of maintenance. 2
The data on the impact of

cost-sha~ing

on environmental

planning reveals that while the cost shared planning model
induces

당reater

input by the non-Federal interest in

environmental planning there was little evidence of
resulting large scale changes in remediation or mitigation
plans.

The collected data supports a finding that the
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review and coordination process required by Federal and
state law and associated environmental regulations
effectively establishes a "baseline" for environmental
quality as an "output" that is typically equal to or in
excess of that which either the non-Federal interest or the
Corps advocates.

The planning partnership occasioned by

cost sharing has led to increased non-Federal interest
involvement in environmental plan formulation and that input
will likely be reflected in final design.

Thus , while the

data does not support a finding that project generated
environmental impacts will be greatly reduced as a result of
cost shared planning , there is evidence thatfinal plans
will more accurately reflect local preferences.
Notwithstanding this limited finding , the long range
impact of the WRDA 1986 environmental planning principles
may be of significance.

The Act provides in section 1135

that the Corps may modify the structures and operations of
projects it constructs for the purpose of improving
environmental quality.

Since the inception of the WRDA

1986 , thirty-eight studies have been funded under this
authority.

One project is under construction and two are in

the final review process.
Clinton

Importantly , both the Bush and

Administration (based on campaign positions) have

established fish and wildlife habitat restoration as a high
priority project purpose to be considered equally with
navigation and flood control.

As you will recall from the
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discussion in Chapter V, Stakhiv argues persuasively that
elevating environmental outputs to planning objectives
necessarily results in projects that are qualitatively
different from those planned under the environmental
"constraint" mode l .

(Water supply and recreation have been

deemed of lesser significance and are now considered
primarilya responsibility of the local beneficiary.)

The

FY-92 COE budget request included studies for nine
environmental projects for fish and wildlife habitat.

The

FY-93 request will include four additional studies (Darn
1992).
with respect to environmental impacts , the Act is not
deterministic.

The WRDA 1986 does not mandate new

environmental standards.

Rather , it provides non-Federal

interests an avenue to leverage local monies for project
related environmental enhancement if they so choose.

The

Administration has offered signs of support for such
initiatives provided cost share criteria are met.

Thus , the

ultimate impact of the Act on environmental planning will be
largely determined by the extent to which non-Federal
interests choose to exercise the section 1135 authorities
and their active involvement in mitigation planning.

As is

frequently the case in assessing broad scale implementation
efforts , it will be several more years before sufficient
data to reach a conclusion on the impact of the
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implementation effort is available.
The findings generated by the process analysis on
implementation variables are suggestive but inconclusive ,
and so are consistent with much of the research in the
field.

The excellent recent research done by Goggin ,

Bowman , Lester , and 0 ’ Toole lends further support to the
rather gloomy notion that no scientific principles of
implementation apply under all circumstances (Goggin et. ale
1992).

Importantly , the data suggests that research on

policy redesign should not focus exclusively on the
modification of sUbsequent authorizing legislation , as
previous research has recommended , but more appropriately
focus on an analysis of the functional and organizational
responses of the implementing agency to legislative
initiatives.
Though the implementation analysis model established by
Mazmanian and Sabatier provided and excellent vehicle

t。

assess how implementation "elites" view the process , the
data showed little support for the model ’ s assertion that
clear legal mandates and sound theory were the most
significant of the six conditions of effective
implementation.

Indeed , the composite survey sample ranked

those conditions third and fifth respectively in order of
importance.

This finding may be misleading in so far as the

conditions , while not ranked highly in the survey , appear ,
in fact , to have been met.

Much of the prior research on
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the model (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983 , Lester and Bowman
1986) has attempted , using various methodologies ,

t。

ascertain the extent to which the conditions were met rather
than assess their criticality to the process.
It should be noted that WRDA 1986 did not specify why
cost sharing was being implemented but how.

Thus , from the

perspective of the target and periphery , soundness of theory
is a relatively moot point , that discussion having been
settled once the Reagan administration determined that

n。

water resource development bill would be passed without cost
sharing language.

As a member of the ASACW staff noted in

1992 , "it (the theory) may not have a constituency outside
the administration."
Nevertheless , the economic theory supporting costsharing is well established and the legal objectives of the
legislation (with regard to the implementation of cost share
criteria) are clearly delineated in the Act and subordinate
implementing regulations.

It is frequently the case that

the significance of anyone component/condition of an
implementation effort may not be accurately assessed until
its supply or quality is reduced.

There is ample evidence

in previous research to suggest that population samples
associated with implementation efforts involving unsound
theory and/or unclear legal mandates and goals may have
ranked conditions one and two much higher.
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Clearly there is a need for additional cross policy
research which develops
。f

I

’functionally

equivalent" measures

variable significance to provide further insight on the

identification and ordering of implementation variables.
Notwithstanding the complexity of the implementation
environment and the apparent non-comparability of policy
types , this research confirms the call for parsimony in the
identification of causal and explanatory variables.
Expanding the range and scope of variables to accomodate
unexplained variance quickly leads to an unpromising
situation for both the theorist in pursuit of hypothesis
development and the practitioner seeking useful guidelines.
It is not surprising that so much of implementation research
has found that "actual results tend to depend on the nature
。f

the policy task ," thus reaffirming the suspicion that

scientific principles and implementation variables likely
covary with the task at hand (Gogginet. a l. 1990 , 201).
An interesting finding of the survey research revealed
that the conditions ranked highest were sUbstantially
focused on the capacity , will , and resources of the
implementing agency to support the "program" and "make
things happen."

One would expect participants in an

intergovernmental implementation to be acutely aware of the
necessity of a competent , sympathetic , and committed lead
agency.
The finding is consistent with those of the General
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Accounting Office (GAO) survey on cost shared water resource
development which determined that principal among the
complaints from non-Federal interests was the perceived
inequity of the Federal/non-Federal interest partnership ,
cost growth over the life of the project (and over which
they felt they had little control)
schedules (U.S. GAO 1991 , 2).

,

and reimbursement

Though participants may not

be able to effect policy redesign through direct negotiation
with Congress , they soon learn that the policy learning
process provides a vehicle by which Target groups and other
。rganized

constituencies can exert influence over policy

implementation.

The implementation of cost shared planning

principles offers an excellent example of this "second-tier"
policy learning phenomenon.
Kaufman (1981) observed that the degree of
responsiveness exhibited by a Federal agency to "client"
input is positively related to the influence and reputation
。f

the agency.

Thus , one would expect the Corps to be

directly involved and actively-responsive to concerns
expressed by Target groups related to programs the Corps
administers , and that has been the case.

Indeed , the Life-

cycle Project Management (LCPM)' initiative implemented in
1989 ,

l~rgely

as a result of demands of managing the LCA

process associated with the WRDA 1986 , resulted in a major
functional realignment of Corps personnel and the way in
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which the Corps does business.
Responding to criticism that the LCA process was overly
complex and lines of authority were either not clear or
erratically dynamic , the Corps has engaged in a series of
activities designed to foment an appreciation and
understanding of the partnership model. To assure that
sponsors understand the mechanics of the LCA process and

t。

provide additional avenues of input from "partners and
potential partners ," the Sponsors Information Kit was issued
as an Engineering Pamphlet.

The kit forthrightly

acknowledges the bewilderment that non-Federal interests may
encounter in its dealings with the Federal bureaucracy
generally and the Corps specifically (Kelly 1990).3
Structurally , the Corps implemented LCPM to provide a .
direct single Project Manager (PM) linkage with non-Federal
partners for all .aspects of project development.

The single

point of contact manages the project from feasibility study
through construction.

The objectives of this initiative

have been established as: 1) improving overall performance
by maintaining accountability and commitment to project
schedules , cost estimates; 2) integration of sponsors ,
partners , and customers into the implementation process;
ensure consistent application of administration policy; and
3) vest project accountability in a single
individual/function (EC 5-1-48 1992).
A variety of procedural and organizational measures
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have been implemented in support of this initiative
including the development of automated reporting and
tracking systems designed to reduce the review time for
project submittals , a Corps wide commitment to adopt
a cost/Schedule Control System criteria planning model for
all projects , and·extensive training for Corps personnel
authorized to implement the initiative.

Cognizant of

internal criticism from District PMs regarding sluggish
review systems at the Division level and beyond , confusing
。r

conflicting guidance from mUltiple sources , and the

propensity for sponsors to "leapfrog" over Districts on
important issues , the Corps has sought to provide sufficient
"resources" to its "street level" managers to avoid the
phenomenon of resistance to policy compliance (Lipsky 1980 ,
23) •

Though the implementation of LCPM appears a seemingly
practical and reasonable response to the problems associated
with the partnering model , the initiative has proved
difficult to fully implement as it involved the creation of
a new major functional "stovepipe" and a perceived
realignment of organizational authority.

While the Corps

has moved incrementally forward on the initiative , the
implementing regulation has only recently (24 April 1992)
been approved and issued by the HQ USACE.
A unique aspect of the policy learning environment
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associated with the WRDA 1986 was the scale of the groups
involved in the implementation.

As the Federal and non-

Federal interests communities were easily identified and
relatively small , they were able to engage in what amounted
to "town hall" sessions that provided face to face
discussions of impediments to implementation.
。f

.The products

such sessions are referenced throughout this research and

provide a rich source of information on the discourse
between Center , periphery , and Target constituencies.
Viewed as a whole , the documents provide graphic evidence of
the powerful dynamic of the policy learning process.
While the Corps , attending to the admonitions of the
Administration , has adhered to the cost share criteria and
beneficiary pay principles set forth in the Act , there is
ample evidence that the implementation process itself has
been sUbject to an iterative modification process.

such

evidence supports the "bottom up" perspective and suggests
that whereas the "critical elements" of implementation
policy may be imposed through legal mandates , the interface
environment of Periphery and Target groups will be largely
defined by the give and take of field personnel.
The supplemental data sample referenced in Chapter III
provides some insight on the nature and substance of the
dialogue associated with policy learning •. A sample of early
program (1986) local sponsors (N=20) consisting of ten flood
control or flood control/recreation projects and ten
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harbor/navigation projects were surveyed for their opinions
。n

To each , the following

the implementation process.

questions were posed:
1. Did the Corps provide adequate guidance (if
requested) on financing issues associated with
water resource development issues (generally) and
cost sharing specifically?
~.
Was there a problem with crediting for prior
work performed on the project by the sponsor?

3. Did you feel that the Corps ’ planning process
was more accessible under cost sharing guidelines?
4.Did your input into the mitigation plan
(and\。r other environmental features) lead to a
change in the environmental'outputs of the
project?
The findings for questions 1. through 4. are
contained in Table XXIII.

TABLE XXIII
NON-FEDERAL INTEREST DATA ON COST SHARED PLANNING
Yes

NA

N。

1. Corps Guidance on
Cost Share Finance

15 (75%)

5 (24%)

2. Creditin 딩
Prior Work

8

(40%)

12 (60%)*

。f

3. Accessibility of
Planning Process

9 (45%)

4. Mitigation Plan

7 (35%)

4 (20%)

7 (35%)

퍼(‘짧) 서

* Where no crediting was applied for the response was coded "No."
** Not all projects included mitigation plans.
Sponsors interviewed at that time were generally
positive about cost sharing and the Corp ’ s implementation of
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the program.

Notwithstanding the difficulty some sponsors

experienced in the negotiation of the LCA virtually all
indicated that Corps personnel had executed their duties in
a professional and cooperative fashion.

As might be

expected , District personnel were typically perceived to be
more flexible and understanding of local concerns than were
higher level Federal interest personnel.
suggest that concerns were not raised.

This is not

t。

Sponsors , while

satisfied with the overall Corps effort in

implementin앙

the

process , indicated a number of areas that they felt required
additional attention.

An abbreviated sample of observations

are offered below:
a. The (non-Federal) benefit analysis is more
business oriented (for navigation projects) than
is the Corps project (NED plan) benefit-cost
analysis. Local sponsors are leery of
constructing for "anticipated" benefits that may
not develop for years.
b. The Corps is very conservative as regards risk
assessment. Projects should be designed to risk
levels acceptable to those facing exposure.
c. Pay-as-you-go financing places a tremendous
burden on sponsor jurisdictions who must trade off
water resource projects with other infrastructure
demands. Sponsors have to take an incremental
approach.
d. Corps cost estimates are not as accurate as
sponsors would like. This is a particularly acute
problem when sponsor must engage in bond elections
tofund projects.
e. The review time at District , Division ,
HQUSACE , and ASA(CW) level is inordinately slow.
f.

Policy advice is not always consistent.

This
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is particularly acute when policy is issued at
different levels of the Corps organization.
g. The Corps needs to be more flexible in
negotiating design standards.
h. It is hard to be a partner because the Corps
has so much tradition that sponsors are not
familiar with.
i. It is not a 50/50 partnership when one partner
has all the regulations and final say.
What is most striking , is the similarity of these
。bservations

and those recorded in the NAFSMA (see Appendix

B) and GAO surveys conducted 5 years later.

This finding

tends to confirm that the initial observations by
participants have held true over time and across a range of
projects.

A review of Corps functional standard operating

procedures and policies and organizational restructuring
。ver

that same period of time would reveal that efforts

t。

address virtually all of these concerns have been made.
similar to the conclusion reached by many of the
bottom-up theorists , the data on the implementation of the
WRDA 1986 suggests that state and local governments do exert
influence over Federally mandated policy , though in this
instance that influence is more directly reflected in the
。rganization

and internal policies of the implementing

agency than in the WRDA 1986 and subsequent water resource
development legislation.

This observation is consistent

with the findings of the research which suggests that the
focus of the policy learning process may be redirected from
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efforts to effect legislative policy design to shaping the
。perating

agency.

relationship with the principal implementing

This mayor may not represent a sub-optimal

approach from the perspective of the Target group and its
constituency depending on the extent to which basic policy
differences can be resolved in their favor.
In the case of cost shared water resource development ,
it became clear to the development community that fighting
the continued application of cost shared development
criteria at the legislative level would likely result in
little more than Executive veto of pending water legislation
and a return to the "no growth" era which characterized the
1970s and early 1980s.
consistent with bottom-up implementation theory ,
negotiations of this type at this stage of the process
represent the continuing effort of "implementation elites"
to influence the goals , objectives , and procedures of the
process.

Thus , the marshaling of resources in an effort

t。

persuade the Corps to use its discretion to interpret the
legislation "liberally" with respect to the status and
rights of the non-Federal interest appears to be a rational
strategy with a reasonable chance of success. 4
It must be noted that the future of the Corps ’ civil
works program as well as the development plans of the nonFederal water resource development community are linked
the success of the partnership model.

t。

The substance of this
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interdependency is lost on neither party.

As Mazmanian and

Sabatier have noted in tests on their model , while strength
。f

the original statute and clear policy objectives are

initially most significant , in the long term , the existence
。f

a supportive constituency is probably more important

(Mazmanian 1983 , 277).
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ENDNOTES
1. The Clinton administration economic stimulus
package submitted to Congress in FY-93 proposed $79 , 053 , 000
in expenditures for' Corps O&M civil works and $3 , 900 , 000 for
construction general expenditures with the CG portion
dedicated to accelerating authorized hurricane protection
projects. clearly , the thrust of the stimulus package
confirms the assumption that O&M will dominate an
increasingly larger share of the Corps ’ civil works bUdget.
For additional data on the stimulus package and a complete
listi~g of projects see the CEDB 22 March 1993 letter from
the Director , Small and Disadvantaged Business utilization
Program to commanders , Major Subordinate Commands , sUbject ,
Economic Stimulus Package for FY-93.
2. Cortner (1987) maintains that failure to control
the Federal deficit , which resulted in the Gramm-RudmanHollings , Balanced BUdget and Emergency Deficit Reduction
Act , effectively signaled the end of large scale civil works
programs by identifying water resource development projects
as sUbject to discretionary cuts. Coupled with increased
Executive control of the agenda and non-Federal interest
budget constraints , new-start civil works construction will
not likely rise to pre-1970 levels in the foreseeable
future.
3. Following the December 1990 Corps/NAFSMA
Conference , the Corps (CECW-LP) issued a report of findings
。n the conference that substantially echoed and reaffirmed
the findings of this research on the status of
interorganizational relations. High praise was given the
Corps for its project management initiatives and the focus
。n a single point of contact during project planning and
construction. Sponsors still felt uneasy with their level
。 f participation in project management planning and with the
erratic nature of District decision making on cost shared
planning. A call was also made for more flexible financing
arrangements. A report of findings is available in CECW-LP
(February 1991) letter to Major Subordinate Commands ,
sUbject: NAFSMA Conference , 10-12 December 1990 , New Orleans
LA.

4. In response to sponsor concerns , a specific if
partial listing of what is and is not negotiable in the
development and execution of LCAs was pUblished in the 1992
edition of the Sponsors Information Kit published by the
COE.
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SURVEY FORMAT
IMPLEMENTATION OF COST SHARING FOR WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
Please provide the following information:
1. Name
3. Age

2. Sex
4.

occupation

5. position Title (Employer)
6. Years in current occupation
7. Years in current position
8. Years of Education (Circle one)
Highschool graduate / Some College / College Graduate /
Graduate studies
Masters Degree / Doctoral Degree
9. Number of cost shared projects you have worked
with.

1. The variables included in this survey are variables
thought to be important in achieving the successful
implementation of legislated policy. You will find that
they are stated quite generally. Thus , you are asked t。
rank these variable in order of relative importance based on
your experience in the implementation of cost sharing as
promulgated by WRDA 1986 and subsequent legislaton.
The
。rder in which the variables appear in the survey is
completely arbitrary and so should not affect your
evaluation of their significance. All questions should be
answered from YOUR PROFESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE.
2. Distribute 100 points among the variables in their
relative (according to your best estimate) order of
significance with the most important variable being assigned
the greatest number of points. You may distribute the
points in any manner you feel appropriate. Variables which
you feel are insignificant do not need to be ranked.

304

3. Please write , if you care to explain your ranking or
feel that it would be informative , a brief (1-3 sentence)
reason for your ranking of the three (3) variables you
consider most significant. Space on the questionnaire is
provided beneath the description of each variable.
4. Self-rate the confidence of your estimates by assigning
yourself a score in the categories listed below. Please
place a check beside the choice that best describes how you
would rate the accuracy of your estimates.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Very confident of accuracy of response.
Confident of accuracy of response.
Somewhat confident of accuracy of response.
Unsure of accuracy of response.
Just guessing
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VARIABLES TO BE RANKED
SCORE

(Total points assigned should equal 100)

1. The enabling legislation (Congressinal
authorization of the project and cost sharing program)
。r other legal directive mandates policy objectives
which are clear and consistent or at least provides
clear criteria for resolving goal conflicts.
2. The enabling legislation (Congressinal
authorization of the project and cost sharing program)
incorporates a sound theory identifying the principal
factors and causal linkages affecting policy objectives
and gives implementing officials sufficient jurisdiction
。ver non-Federal interests , members of the water
resource development community , and other points of
leverage to attain , at least potentially , the desired
goals.
3. The enabling le당 islation (Congressinal
authorization of the project and cost sharing program)
structures the implementation process so as to maximize
the probability that implementing officials
(representative of the Corps of Engineers) will perform
as desired. This involves assignment to a sympathetic
agency with clear , hierarchical organizational
structure , supportive decision rules , sufficient
financial resources , and adequate access to supporters.
4.

The leaders of the implementing agency (Corps
possess substantial managerial and
political skill and are committed to the succes of the
program.
。i-Engineers)

5.
program is
groups and
executive)
the courts
6.

The cost shared water resource development
actively supported by organized constituency
by a few key legislators (or a chief
throughout the implementation process , with
being neutral or supportive.

The relative priority of statutory
is not undermined over time by the emergence
。 f conflicting pUblic policies or by changes in
relelvant socioeconomic conditions which weaken the
legislation ’ s causal theory or political support.
。b품ctives

APPENDIX B

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD AND STORMWATER
MANAGEMENT AGENCIES (NAFSMA) SURVEY
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NAFSMA SURVEY ON CORPS OF ENGINEERS-PARTNERED
WATER RESOURCE PROJECTS (Percentages)
(Final as of 10/26/90)
The following results are based on the responses of 20 local
sponsors , with 30 current water resources projects covered.
The results provided in this compilation are based on the
project number of 30. In cases where the results fall short
。 f the 30 possible responses , the questions were either
found to be unapplicable or simply were unanswered.
1. Since 1986 , have you been a potential or are you
currently a local sponsor with a flood control project
be) cost-shared with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers?
쪽__

Current (# of Projects)

5

(t。

Potential

N。

2. If the answer to one is yes , what is the name(s) of the
project(s) and where is it (are they) located? (Corps
District , Division , City)
3.

omitted.

4.

omitted.

5. If you have an approved local cooperation agreement
(LCA) for construction , when was it signed?
14 have sianed LCAs. with the earliest beina sianed in
and the most recent sianed on Julv 30. 1990.

후요효흐-

후후__

No , LCA has yet to be signed.

i-- Not Applicable.

a)
LCA

At what stage in the Corps approval process was the
signed?

Planning (1)
Prior to construction (3)
Plans and specs completed (3)
After first construction appropriation (2) - Phase II
GDMi
complete and approved.
Post GDM approval (2)
Beginning of feasibility study
After final approval
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b) Does your LCA include language addressing hazardous
and toxic wastes?
_7_ Yes
10

N。

등__

NA (hasn't been signed)
_1_ Expected t。

6. Does your locality qualify under the Ability to Pay
provisions of the Water Resources Development Act of 1986 ,
which entitled qualifying localities to limited cost sharing
relief for flood control projects?
흐__ Yes
17
No
2
(Don ’ t know) (1 probably not)
(1 respondent indicated not according to the procedures
established by ASA , however , the ASA provisions do not
comply with the intent of Congress.)

5.

PARTNERSHIP QUESTIONS - Percentages of yes to no answers
Have you been:

Yes

N。

82효

후효윷

1. Listened to and had your opinion considered?
(1 sometime)

흐깥효

후흐흐

2. Kept informed during the project?
sometime)

쿄요효

흐도효

3. Provided fiscal documentation on the use of
project funds? (3 NA)

1흐중

2요흐

4. Allowed to attend project related meetings
with District project team?

쿄요효

Z요효

5. Participating in District Project Review Board
meetings? (2 NA)

후2효

율g효

6. Participating in Division Project Review Board
meetings? (2 NA)

효1흐

흐효호

7. Involved in a Reconnaissance Resolution
Conference? (2 NA)

쿄응흐

흐1호

8. Involved in a Feasibility Resolution
Conference? (2 NA)

효흐흐

효요효

9. Involved in a Technical Resolution or Progress
Review meeting? (1 NA)

(1
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Yes

N。

도g호

흐2호

10. Allowed to participate at a Washington Level
Review meeting? (2 NA) (1 No added that although
they had requested to participate they had been
turned down by Chief of Engineers.)

요1호

를쿄호

11.
Given the opportunity to meaningfully
participate in decisic임 s about project costs and
schedules?

1후호

2요흐

12. Allowed to participate in decisions about the
type and mix of project objectives?

효등효

록등효

13.
。f

Z흐흐

2요효

요걷호

효흐효

Able to influence formulation and selection
alternative plans? (1 NA)

14. Allowed to affect decisions about project
design , including environmental and aesthetic
features?
15.

Able to influence construction phasing?

(4

NA)
등묘중

효묘효

16. Provided the opportunity to assist the Corps
in preparing project documents: (check blank)

Note: For preliminary analysis , percentages for a-i were
taken out of 30 possible responses , this group of
responses only may be slanted too much to the
negative.
2않

a.

Reconnaissance Reports

b.

Feasibility Report __요흐효

c.

Environmental Assessments

d.

Design Memoranda

e.

Plans and Specifications

_격1효

f.

Project Management Plans

_격쁘

g.

Project Management Reports

h.

Feasibility Cost Sharing Agreements

i.

Local Cooperation Agreement

30 옹

37%

2월

_걱묘호

_격1효
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Yes

N。

흐효호

요요호

17. Provided copies of Corps Guidance Documents?
(1 No Answer-NA) (2 yes , added "Limited")

요흐효

를2호

18. Requested by the Corps to be the project
proponent to gain political support?

Can't use 19. Able to meet the local sponsor commitments
for the project including:
흐g호

후2효

- Timely response on issues or documents you have

been requested to review? (2 yes said
"somewhat" for all 4 related questions)
으2호

--ft호

- Providing financing on time?

Z효효

깥등호

- Delivered real estate interests on schedule?

(1 answered

between yes and no)
(1 answered between yes and no)

흐g호

응2효

- Insured relocations to meet project schedules?

(1 answered between yes and no) (1 NA)
흐흐효

쿄요호

20. Provided with a single point of contact
throughout the project development?

흐흐효

효표흐

21. Aware of an appropriate conduit in the Corps
to voice concerns in all areas of project
development?

쿄1호

흐쿄효

22. Given a copy of the corps' draft ’녕ponsor's
Information Kit" for review by your local
District?
One district reported it had not been received
there.
(2 Not sure-got one from NAFSMA)

깥효효

1걷효

23. Able to observe that your project has been
managed in a way to establish and maintain a firm
cost estimate and project execution schedule? (2
No answer)

길옥출

Z요효

24. satisfied with how the LCA negotiation
approval process has been handled for your
project?

쿄요호

흐도효

25. Able to determine if the Corps Division has
been an effective participant in the
implementation of the project? (3 Somewhat)

311
Yes

N。

흐흐흐

흐깥호

26. Able to find a way to keep real estate
acquisition from holding up your project? (If so ,
briefly describe how below.) (1 NA)

2요호

1후효

27. Faced with any problems in receiving credit
for compatible work? (2 NA)

2표효

Z흐흐

28. Forced to hold up or forego seeking credit
for local construction you believe was compatible
with the project? (2 NA)

요효흐

효Z흐

29. In the situation where you had a dispute with
the District about a design issue that you were
not able t。
resolve?

를걷흐

요효효

30. Able to define to your satisfaction what
constitutes a project betterment? (2 NA)

1후효

2요호

31. Able to achieve sensitivity to local design
issues? (1 yes added , but it was difficult)

흐2중

요g효

32. In a situation where the project being
implemented is called the "locally preferred plan"
and not the NED plan? (1 NA)

78효

22 효

33. Able to get the Corps to include changes in
the project/contracts to include locally requested
additions? (2 NA)

_0_

곽으흐

34. In a situation where the ability to pay
regulation was an issue?

효효효

요2효

35. Satisfied with escrow agreement arrangement
with the Corps? (3 NA)
(1 respondent answered questions 23-35 between yes
and no.)
(1 respondent answered questions 5-35 not
applicable , recon just completed.)
(1 respondent pointed out that most of n。
responses were due to the fact that they are not
far enough in the project to have meaningful
participation.)

APPENDIX C
INDEX OF ACRONYMS

313

ASACW

Assistant Secretary of Army for civil Works

CEQ

Council on Environmental Quality

CW

Civil Works

DA

Department of the Army

DDE(PME)

Deputy District Engineer for project
Management

DE

District Engineer

DE

Division Engineer

DFARS

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement

EC

Engineer

EF’ARS

Engineer Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement

EQ

Environmental Quality

ER

Engineer Regulation

ETL

Engineering Topographic Laboratories

FAR

Federal Acquisition Regulation

FCSA

Feasibility Cost Sharing Agreement

FOIA

Freedom of Information Act

FONSI

Finding of No Significant Impact

FY

Fiscal Year

GAO

General Accounting Office

GPO

Government Printing Office

ICWP

Interstate Conference on Water policy

HQ

Headquarters

HQUSACE

Headquarters , u.S. Army Corps of Engineers

ICWP

Interstate Conference on Water Problems

Circ끽 lar
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IPMP

Initial Project Management Plan

LCA

Local Cooperation Agreement

LCPM

Life Cycle Project Management

LERD

Lands , Easements , Rights of Way , Relocations

LERR

Lands , Easements , Rights of Way , Relocations

LERRO

Lands , Easements , Rights of Way , Relocations ,
Disposal

NAFSMA

National Association of Flood and Stormwater

NED Plan

National Economic Development Plan

NEPA

National Environmental Policy Act

OASA(CW)

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Army , civil Works

OMB

Office of Management and BUdget

PED

Preconstruction Engineering and Design

PE&D

Planning , Engineering and Design

P&G

Principles and Guidelines

SA

Secretary of the Army

SAME

Society of American Military Engineers

USACE

united States Army Corps of Engineers

USAED

united State Army Engineer District

WLRC

Washington Level Review Center

WRDA

Water Resources Development Act

WTP

Willingness to Pay

